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ABSTRACT
This study is basically a search for a framework of con­
cepts and economic theory which can usefully be applied to 
resource analysis* This search has led the writer to examine 
the ways in which men at different times have viewed themselves 
and their relation to the physical environment. The ideas of 
the anc lent Greeks, of the early eighteenth century economists, 
and of certain modern economists are examined.
Part I shows the need for the conceptual framework sought.
In this part, the views of a selected group of modern economists 
on the relationship between man and nature are examined and an 
overall conceptual framework for resource analysis is found to 
be lacking. This part is not a comprehensive survey of modern 
economic theory on the subject, but simply the presentation of 
concepts at successive levels of generalization.
Part II traces the earliest Greek philosophical formulations 
of natural process and the orientation of man in relation to na­
ture . The Greek development of basic thought forms for handling 
relationships, the organic, the evolutionary and unlimited, and 
the balanced and circulatory, are related to various stages in 
the development of thought concerning the degree of free agency 
and initiative exercised by man in dealing with nature to his 
own advantage. The analytical form and methodological formula­
tions of Aristotle are examined in considerable detail as the 
summation of Greek thought and method in socio-economic analysis.
In Part III, eighteenth century thought on nature and man is 
sketched to show the continuing influence of the ideas developed 
by the ancient Greeks on economic analysis*
The repeated expressions of similar patterns of abstract 
thought in varying ways related to general economic and histori­
cal conditions suggests the usefulness of further study of 
nineteenth century thought in terms of the continuity of the 




Natural resources are generally described in terms of the 
particular field of inquiry in which they are being investigated* 
The economic analysis of such resources must build to some ex­
tent upon these descriptions from other fields and at the same 
time explain the relation of resources to human beings. How­
ever , people have a variety of ideas about themselves and about 
what is significant. For this reason, attempts at abstract 
theory have tended to generalize human and natural processes, 
encompassing almost all human opinions and almost all natural 
views*
One must bounce like a ball between the two dilemmas of 
the abstract and general principles on the one hand which are 
too far removed from the pressing realities of individual prob­
lems to be practically useful; and on the other hand, the overly 
limited and descriptive treatments of specific problems. The 
danger of generalization is that it becomes abstract and may 
lose touch with changing problems. It requires an accumulation 
of loosely inclusive formulations which may become unintelligible 
in attempts to achieve general applicability. On the other 
hand, the overly specific approach often leads to a general as­
sumption of precision and exactness which is in fact applicable 
only to a single set of isolated facts at a given time and 
place. ,
The field of resource analysis may be illustrated by the 
following example. Assume that an individual, A, has a
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specific use, B, for fuel wood, C. A wants to cook B, his 
lunch, with C, wood. Here is a human desire, an isolated use 
for a predetermined purpose, and a specific object or substance 
which will satisfy the combined^desire and use. We may say 
that the A element is human nature, social science, psychology, 
or subjectivist economics. The B element is engineering, tech­
nology, or custom. The C unit is nature or natural resources. 
The last unit, however, is defined by the first two, and the 
first two are limited by each other and the last. This simpli­
fication serves to illustrate the definition of resources 
which has been assumed in this study; that is, that resources 
for the purpose of economic analysis are not merely substances 
or raw materials existing in nature as such. Rather, the re­
source is the relationship as defined by human purposes and 
customs of raw materials to human society.
Part I of this study outlines the views of several recent 
theorists in the field of economics on value theory as applied 
to resources. This portion of the study is neither a survey 
nor an exposition, but rather in the nature of a Search v : 
for ideas and problems. It does not purport to be inclusive 
of all important economic theory concerned with the subject.
The purpose was rather to find representatives of basic view­
points at successive levels of generalization* Part I is 
justified mainly because of its great personal value to the 
author in working out perspective and in illustrating the need 
for more precision in defining the borders of economic theory
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in the area of the theoretical bridge between the social and 
the physical world. This section serves to illustrate the 
fact that the theoretical foundation of resource analysis has 
been left to follow as a secondary conclusion of theories di­
rected at other problems, and that the field has not been 
adequately considered in formulations of value theory.
Part IX is a cursory survey of early Greek thought re­
lating to nature and ultimately to economic problems and re­
sources. The purpose of this section is to show how the Greeks 
worked out basic forms for treating nature and how they con­
sidered economic relations generally as a part of nature. Much 
time is spent in this section in tracing the basic natural 
philosophy of the Greeks and in presenting evidence of their 
economic and scientific development. This was deemed neces­
sary because of the common notion that the ancient Greeks were 
sterile and superstition ridden in science and lost in moral 
deduction in social fields. It appears tc the author that the 
simplicity and lucidity of Greek thought offers a useful 
vantage point from which to view static equilibrium analysis.
Part III deals with certain economists of the eighteenth 
century primarily from the point of view of their transmittal 
of the classical Greek heritage of naturalism and rationalistic 
analysis into the new industrial economy of that century. It 
serves to illustrate the idea that economic theory on such 
problems as development, scale, rent, and capital accumulation 
are all dependent upon a basic assumption of the nature of the 
resource relationship.
PAST I
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The concept of "resource analysis" as a logical focal point 
around which to study economic problems proceeds from the as­
sumption that the validity of economic theory may be judged by 
the soundness with which it explains human activities in relation 
to purely physical processes. The consideration of resources 
over long periods of time is related to more and more modern 
decisions, both those made by executives of multimillion-dollar 
corporations making plans in terms of twenty- and thirty-year 
estimates, and in the decisions of specialists in the economic 
development of "backward" countries# Economic decisions are 
coming to be more and more concerned with measurable material 
quantities and reserves*
Joseph L. Fisher has suggested that material resources are 
something more than mere physical setting, but rather "an im­
portant instrument for economic development":
In partnership with the labor force, capital equip­
ment, and the other major factors of production, natural 
resources form at once the base and an important instru­
ment for economic development* Regions and nations 
cannot go far beyond the resources which they have within 
their own borders or over which they are able to assert 
economic control. Resources, therefore, set the basic 
material framework, especially over the long run, for 
economic development and for national security.i
Generally, the impact of natural resources has been kept
Fisher, Joseph L., "The Role of Natural Resources," 
in: Economic Development, Principles and Patterns, edited by 
Harold F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195^), PP» 39-^0.
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well in the background of most theory regarding economic prob­
lems, except where the material variables have been approached 
as the sole consideration and economic relationships function­
ally ignored. She classical British political economists let 
rent tneory serve as an oil slick, filling the troughs and 
crests of the physical environment, and providing a glassy 
smooth foundation for social and political analysis. The com­
plexities which face the student of resource analysis were pre­
sented in an editorial in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change as quoted by Harold F. Williamson as follows:
Even a casual glance at the existing literature 
reveals not only the ajbsence of a satisfactory theory 
but also the absence of agreement as to which of the 
many problems apparent to the observer are important 
for study. The research worker seeking pathways to 
adequate theory finds no blazed trails, but instead a 
veritable jungle of vicious circles, obstacles to 
change, and necessary (but never sufficient) precondi=- 
tions to economic growth.2
It would seem useful to examine the assumptions and under­
lying the point of contact between economic theory and current 
systems of describing and dealing with the material or physical 
properties of the world around us. This approach to the problem 
involves economic value theory at a point where it can be kept 
in touch with physical measurement and quantitative estimates. 
The importance of relating specialized economic analysis to gen­
eral economic theory was stressed by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk in 
the following passage:
In a theory of any range and any difficulty there 
are points which by reason of some casuistical pecul-
2Economic Development. Principles and Patterns, op* cit.,
p. 17*
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iarities or other. are not always quite easily 
explained, even when the general principle which 
will give their solution is already known} and, 
so long as tho3e points are not distinctly traced 
back to the general principle, they stand like so
many living objections to its correctness. As it
happens, there are a good many such points in the 
two theories so closely connected —  that of value 
and that of capital.3
Similarly, Harlan L* McCracken noted the importance of relat­
ing diverse specialized fields to fundamental value theory in
the area of business cycles :
The past two decades have brought forth a vast 
number of books and articles on business cycles and 
price movements. • • The views presented have been 
highly divergent, and in many instances distinctly 
contradictory. A partial explanation of this situa­
tion would seem to lie in the fact that many have
proceeded directly to an analysis and explanation 
of price movements and business cycles without recog­
nizing that these phenomena are definite problems(in 
applied economic theory, especially value theory.*’'
The following pages will illustrate a more generally vague, but 
theoretically similar situation in the area of resource analysis, 
&ncL for nri £ibstr£Lct thsorsticsl of idsss upon
which a systematic organization of the field can be developed.
The first reaction may well be that such a problem does not exist.
However, even a cursory survey will illustrate the area of con­
cern, and the potentials of its investigation.
I  II III ■ ! !  II I I I  II    ■  III
3Bohm-Bawerk, Eugen von, The Positive Theory of Capital 
(New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1930), p. xvi.
ifMcCracken, Harlan L., Value Theory and Business Cycles 
(Second Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book *Co*, 1936), p. vii.
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Value Theory in Some Current Definitions of Economics 
Explanations of the important elements to be included in 
the scope of economics have varied from one historical period 
to another as "actual” problems of the "real'* world were viewed 
in different perspectives* To Adam Smith, the setting was an 
orderly, bountiful, but niggardly nature, the problem was pro­
duction, and the perspective the well-being of the nation; 
hence, political economy* To a modern economist in the subjec­
tivist tradition, interest is focused upon the economic success 
of individuals, the setting is the exchange economy, and the 
problem is that of distribution to keep individual interests 
from conflicting with the health of the exchange economy* Or, 
the subject of concern may be the health of the exchange economy, 
and the problem how to achieve this without injury to the indi­
vidual interests participating in the exchange economy* From 
either point of emphasis, it is obvious that modern economics 
has gotten further away from nature’s bounty and the well-being 
of the nation and therefore from the importance of peT capita 
physical quantities* The presumption that national interest 
and per capita wealth are automatically taken care of by seeing 
to the economic health of the individual and the exchange process, 
however, has not been conclusively demonstrated. The study of 
individual relationships in the exchange economy without consider­
ation of the material elements on which these relationships are 
based fails to recognize a vital aspect of economic analysis*
Until the physical basis of the exchange system is included in
8
economic analyses of the exchange system, a valid theory of
5value cannot be formulated*
Resource values cannot be analyzed in terms applicable in 
the natural sciences unless some workable assumption regarding 
the relationship between exchange values and physical life pro­
cesses and material elements can be accepted* Such a value 
theory would incorporate external increments and decrements and 
would have the prerequisites of a theory of value applicable to 
a dynamic system* However, as long as economic values muBt be 
defined solely in terms of exchange values, a static equilibrium 
system is unavoidable, and value theory cannot include an ex­
planation of change* For example, in the heredity vs. environment
    — 1 — ^ 4  ^y u u u x u ¥ c i ' D j  u v c r  jL r u a o c  u c v u r a u u o o  x u u x t x u m c u  u ^ u a T A V A  )  -la
we postulate that individuals create their own environment insofar 
as it affects their development and that environment determines
C
Northrop commented on the importance of value theory as fol­
lows: "A similar study of a contemporary treatise, such as Wicksell's
Lectures on Political Economy (comparing it with J. S. Mill*s work 
on value theory) reveals an important shift of emphasis. The ini­
tial chapters treating of the basic principles of the entire science 
have the title 'The Theory of V a l u e U p o n  this point such diverse 
economists aB Menger, Wlcksteed, Schonfeld, Pareto, Marshall, Hicks, 
Knight and even Marx are in agreement. As Professor Robbins has 
put it, 'The most important propositions of economic analysis are 
the propositions of the general theory of value . . .  no matter 
what particular 'school' is in question and 'no matter what ar­
rangement of subject matter is adopted*' These considerations in­
dicate that the development of contemporary economic theory has re­
sulted in the shift of the concept of value from the status of a 
secondary concept, dealing only with one portion of the science, 
to that of the primitive or basic concept of the entire science•"
(F. S. C. Northrop, "The Impossibility of a Theoretical Science of 
Economic Dynamics,'* The Quarterly Journal of Economics * Vol. LVI,
Nov., 1941, p. 3.)
9
heredity, we are in the same position* Value theory becomes a 
pure choice of where you want to get on the merry-go-around, and
no change can be explained by such a value theory* This is the
essence of static analysis*
Alfred Marshall's place in economic theory as the exhaustive 
analyst of economic problems of the firm in the industry and his 
prestige as the modernizer of classical British political economy 
constitutes a good starting point for a brief survey of twentieth 
century value orientations toward natural resources* Marshall de­
fined economics as follows:
Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind 
in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part
of individual and social action which is most closely
connected with the attainment and with the use of the 
material requisites of wellbeing* Thus it is on the one 
side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more im­
portant side, a part of the study of man. For man's 
character has been moulded by his every-day work, and 
the material resources which he thereby procures, more 
than by any other influence unless it be that of his re­
ligious ideals.6
Of importance in this passage is the interchangeable use of 
the terms "wealth" and "material resources*" Wealth is a concept 
which must be defined in terms of the attribution of importance by 
human beings, not material measurement* Wealth may be defined as 
that which is considered^useful and attracts attention, value, or, 
in more conventional terms, is.^scarce enough to achieve a position 
in the exchange economy* Marshall was not uh&ware of this problem 
and expressed himself concisely in terms of demand (how much a 
thing is wanted) and supply (how much there is of it) and price
Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics (Eighth Edition, 
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 193677
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(the point at which these two factors equilibrate). In an ex­
change economy, of course, equilibration takes place in a market 
for a price, and so Marshall dealt with demand prices (prices 
offered by various demandants) and supply prices (the cost of 
supplying various quantities)• Since costs are things incurred 
by people, not by nature, cost of supply is a concept which can 
be defined only in terms of social or exchange measurements. In 
his famous Appendix I, Marshall recognized the usefulness of a 
closed or internally defined system in economic analysis but̂ i, 
acare that the technique can only be valid in static analysis, 
warned against the inclusion of naive dynamics in such formulations:
But the greatest objection of all to his (Jevons*) 
formal statement of his central doctrine is that it 
does not represent supply price, demand price and 
amount produced as mutually determining one another 
(subject to certain other conditions), but as deter­
mined one by another in a series. It is as though 
when three balls A, B, and C rest against one another 
in a bowl, instead of saying that the position of the 
three mutually determines one another under the ac­
tion of gravity, he had said that A determines B, and 
B determines C.?
While Marshall was quite aware that economic availability 
can be defined in terms of mutually interacting aspects of the 
exchange economy, he did not consider this formulation of value 
to be inclusive of a dynamic process of economic development*
Erich Zimmerman's recent work furnishes an illustration of 
the results of carelessness with value theory applied to natural 
resources. He stated Marshall's static definition of the rela­
tionship of material resources to the economy, and although he
7Ibid.. p. 819.
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recognized the obvious fact that the economy is a constantly 
changing and developing thing, proceeded to deal with resources 
in terms of this static definition, as a neutral, inert mass 
significant only insofar as a dynamic culture gives it being:
The land surfaces may be fixed, but nature as a 
factor in resource development is not fixed. The 
totality of land surface is as irrelevant to the study 
of the availability of resources as is the totality of 
matter and energy in the universe. What counts is the 
function and meaning, to man, of land and all other 
phases of nature,®
This passage is a statement of supply cost in non-technical or 
broad cultural terms. Although Zimmerman was aware of the dy­
namic development of the western European and North American 
economies, he is satisfied to define the value base of resources 
in terms of Marshallian concomitance, which is a static system 
designed to avoid the fallacy of incorporating a dynamic as­
sumption through the back door of some casual notion external 
to the area of rigorous investigation, Zimmerman tends to de­
pend oh technology as the motive force .in economic development 
and perceives that the independent characteristics of natural 
processes influence the "efficiency" of technology, but he does 
not contradict his approach to resource values as static, inert 
’’neutral stuff" awaiting economic reality as a result of a dy­
namic culture. Moreover, he advanced no other theory of economic 
dynamics.
Zimmerman's purpose was, of course, the accumulation of an 
8Zimmerman, Erich W., World Resources and Industries (Revised 
Edition, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951) > p* S5»
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encyclopedic amount of information on raw material reserves and 
industrial requirements* However, without a theory of resource 
values as they relate to a dynamic economy, such a study can 
only be descriptive and not predictive of potentialities* The 
technological dynamic has been developed and will be discussed 
below with reference to Ayres and White, but no author has yet 
detailized just how such a dynamic expresses itself in terms of 
available capital, labor force, and expanded availability ex­
cept in terms of a social surplus of measurable physical material 
proportions*
Marshall's dictum regarding static analysis and the problems 
of a dynamic value system should be kept well in mind by the ad­
herents of his simplified static supply-demand definition of price 
value in partial equilibrium, or static firm-industry analysis:
But nothing of this is true in the world in which 
we live* Here, every economic force is constantly 
changing its action under the influence of other forces 
which are acting around it* Here changes in the volume 
of production, in its methods, and in its costs are ever 
mutually modifying one another; they are always af­
fected and being affected by the character and extent 
of demand. Further, all these mutual influences take 
time to work themselves out, and, as a rule, no two in­
fluences move at equal pace. In this world therefore 
every plain and simple doctrine as to the relations be­
tween cost of production, demand and value is neces­
sarily false: and the greater the appeainance of
lucidity which is given to it by skillful exposition, 
the more mischievous it is* A man is likely to be a 
better economist if he trusts to his common sense and 
practical instincts, than if he professes to study the 
theory of value and is resolved to find it easy*9
9Marshall, op* cit* * p* 368*
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Marshall was not specifically concerned with resource 
analysis, but if we consider his statement that "changes in .the 
volume of production • • * and in its costs are ever mutually 
modifying one another," it would seem fair to assume that he 
would never have attempted a dynamic theory of economics based 
solely on the human elements of the exchange economy* Such 
phenomena as dry and wet weather cycles, rich pockets in mineral 
veins, and erosion are dynamic elements which greatly affect 
quantity and costs in production and, unless one assumes an 
all-knowing predicting mechanism in the economy which can reduce 
these items to insignificant variables, the natural resource base 
cannot be regarded as "neutral" or static. When a functionally 
perfect discounting mechanism is assumed to be operative in 
society, the "exchange economy" becomes an insulated, static set 
of relationships, and the material surroundings are thus excluded 
from analysis, except insofar as there is a constant economic 
relationship expressing their proportional place in the general 
equilibrium of exchange* This brings us to a discussion of what 
is termed "modern economic theory."
Philip H. Wicksteed was a basic influence in the development 
of modern marginal analysis* His rich background in the Greek 
and Latin intellectual heritage gave him a unique position as a 
recognized classical scholar with a clear grasp of the essential 
problems being treated by subjectivist theory. In a paper on 
the scope and method of political economy Wicksteed defined the
14
economic problem as follows:
The economic organism • • • of an industrial 
society represents the instrumentality whereby every 
man, by doing what he can for some of his fellows, 
gets what he wants from others* It is true, of course, 
that those for whom he makes or does something 5may* be 
the same from whom he gets the particular things he 
wants* But this is not usual* In such a society as 
ours the persons whom a man serves are usually in­
capable of serving him in the way he desires, but 
they can put him in command of the services he re­
quires, though they cannot render them* This is ac­
complished by the instrumentality of money, which is 
a generalized command of the services and commodities 
in the circle of exchange; "money" being at once a 
standard in which all market prices are expressed, 
and a universal commodity which every one who wishes 
to exchange what he has for what he wants will accept 
as a medium, or middle term * .
It is clear that Wicksteed was concerned primarily with the rela­
tions of the individual to his counterparts in the exchange economy, 
regardless of the processes and sources resorted to by individuals 
in the "circle of exchange" to acquire material goods* It is the 
choices that are available after the fact of acquisition and the 
process of exchange itself which were Wicksteed*s concern* Thus, 
things have value in terms of the average view of the market, 
and such considerations as the most intelligent appraisal or the 
most advanced scientific understanding have no value except as 
potentially acceptable to the average mind in the market* This is 
a static view which incorporates change as discounts in terms of 
the static present* Whatever its shortcomings, however, this 
view of economics sufficiently encompasses the perspective and 
static problems of day-to-day business to have had a vigorous
10Wicksteed, Philip H*, The Common Sense of Political Economy* 
Vol.II (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd*, 1935), P» 773*
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Influence In modern commercial countries*
At this point, Wicksteed's description of the foundation 
of the value base of the theory initiated by the Jevons-Austrian 
School is useful:
Now Jevons's great discovery, like so many others, 
was nothing but a discovery of the obvious; for it was 
the discovery that whereas human wants are sometimes 
capable of complete satisfaction, and sometimes of 
gradual assuagement, in any case the relative urgency 
with which they demand further gratification is af­
fected to the extent to which they have already been 
satisfied* So that a slice of bread and butter is not 
of the same significance in comparison with other things —  
if one has had nothing to eat for several hours, and if 
he has Just enjoyed a hearty meal*
Walras in Switzerland, Menger in Austria, and Jevons 
in England were all of them without knowledge of each 
other's work, erecting a theory of value upon this ob­
vious but strangely neglected principle, which bases 
economic thought on the broad experience of daily life 
and the psychology of choice between alternatives*H
This view of value introduces material quantities only in terms 
of the amount desired by the individual from the exchange economy, 
already economically available, and value is the relation of the 
fractional desire or quantity to the total of desire and quantity 
in the "circle of exchange*" With this view of value, quantita­
tive relationships lose their significance as bases for evaluation* 
Value exists in terms of the exchange economy, and although it is 
expressed in terms of price (dollars per pound), the economic 
significance of such price is the relationship of this price to 
other prices in the total economy, and not the number of pounds
11 Ibid.* pp. l--25_
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available* Value will not distinguish between a lowering of 
price because of a decrease of desire or effective demand for 
the goods in question, a technological innovation which improves 
efficiency of production, or a discovery of a natural deposit 
which increases availability in the absolute sense of physical 
measurement*
Time and space are general or abstract physical measurements 
and are therefore equally irrelevant from the point of view of 
exchange value based upon subjective desire and market supply*
The ingenious way of treating time used by the Austrian School 
as a discount in terms of present market conditions avoids the 
necessity of a dynamic theory by incorporating the average indi­
vidual's anticipation of dynamic change. However, this dis­
counting of futurity in terms of the present gives depth to a 
static formulation and meets many of the needs of short-term 
commercial considerations as long as changes are not too precipi­
tous*
This relational approach to value has furnished the impetus 
for mathematical formulations of involved relationships and re­
finements by the use of statistics* In this approach, the com­
parison of statistics is the significant element, and over a time 
period, statistics must be weighted in terms of an index or base 
period so as to abstract the relationship, which is based on 
averages. Simultaneous empirical data of changes is laid out in 
such a process, changes in relations, but this is frequently 
relegated to economic history*
17
This theory of value, even with the use of statistics, 
by defining only relationships, leaves no room for the inclusion 
of physical measurement of quantities as such in economic analysis* 
However, if the classical value theory discussed above is incor­
porated with casualness toward theoretical consistency and basic 
value premises, price and physical characteristics can be classed 
els synonymous, thus bridging the gap between scientific analysis 
and natural dynamics on the one hand and the economic process on 
the other* An example of this approach to the economics of 
natural resources is contained in the work of Ciriacy-Wantrup 
which combines economic analysis with a scientific knowledge of 
the problems of physical processes:
According to common usage, one may differentiate three 
broad classes of resources: material, cultural, and human*
This trinity corresponds to the trinity of 'factors' of 
production —  land, capital, and labor —  as used commonly 
in economic texts* The former terminology has this ad­
vantage: it is frankly general and is not affected by the
many specific connotations that have been attached to 
•land,’ 'capital,' and 'labor* in the course of their his­
tory . . • This study, however, deals explicitly only 
with natural and to a smaller extent 'tangible' cultural 
resources* The latter are producer and consumer goods 
that are durable over a period of utilisation.^2
Ciriacy-Wantrup here isolates the physically measurable elements
of economic society, except population, and treats them as the
important quantitative elements underlying problems of resource
analysis. It might be said that health and population Eire also
dependent upon these physical underpinnings, regardless of the
exchange structure through which they are manipulated* Ciriacy-
12Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V*, Resource Conservation* Economics 
and Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952)', pp. 
29-50.
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Wantrup attacks the problem by abstracting hie structure from 
the bridge between culture and the physical nature of the human 
being found in psychological constants or eithical values, on 
the one hand, and from the bridge between human beings as cul­
tural products and the "real world" on the other hand:
Our preliminary objective, therefore, is agreement 
about the meaning of * conservation.* The attempt will 
be made to separate the economic and technological as­
pects of conservation from ethical, metaphysical, and 
other considerations* It will appear that the concept 
'conservation' can become neutral in terms of value 
judgements (wertfrei) and a highly effective tool in 
economic analysis.13
Ciriacy-Wantrup uses the exchange relationship concept of 
economics as a basis of his conservation analysis. At most, the 
exchange relationship can only treat natural properties in terms 
of availability from the perspective of exchange, not as quantities 
in terms of physical measurements of quantities. In the static 
instant, there is an established correspondence between an ex­
change value and a given quantity, and the static discount system 
of future expectations in terms of present knowledge and accepted 
exchange patterns is presumed to anticipate dynamic changes in 
society and in nature. By failing to recognize the limitations 
of his basic formulation of value problems in relation to eco­
nomics as it pertains to physical realities, Ciriacy-Wantrup finds 
himself in the position of explaining why his discount statics 
of economic relations do not square closely with physical formu­
lations. He seeks to avoid the difficulty by resorting to the
13Ibid., p. 20
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dubious notion that applicable theory can exist without its 
validity controlling specific formulations, or conversely, that 
valid theory can only be formulated if abstracted so far from 
concrete problems that its details cannot be applied:
Universal historical, as well as geographic, validity 
could be obtained by choosing an appropriate level of 
abstraction* On the other hand, if an attempt is made 
to apply economic theory to the solution of real prob­
lems of public policy, the degree of concreteness re­
quired necessarily limits validity historically as well 
as geographically*!^
The concept of a "level of abstraction" is one of a frame­
work for deductive analysis* It is a formulation of a static 
equilibrium within which elements are deductively or mathematically 
derived. The problem of validity in terms of the concrete problems 
of economics in public policy is limited by the lack of coinci­
dence of static theoretical formulation with a dynamic culture 
and a dynamic physical world*
Although Ciriacy-Wantrup focused current economic theory and 
its discount approach to time spans upon a thoroughly studied for­
mulation of the equivalent physical potential of natural resources, 
his underlying value theory does not resolve the hiatus between 
pure empiricism as expressed in German historicisa and the pure 
theory as expressed in the Austrian tradition* In practice, he 
glosses over the material value problem, and equates price with 
value and the potentials of materials with their current prices* 
This is perhaps an adequate and functional working hypothesis for
1^Ibid* * p. 24.
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business usage, but it provides no orientation for analyzing 
long-term processes and change. A clear understanding of the 
value assumptions upon which a theoretical view is founded and 
its thorough vertical integration is a prerequisite for the useful 
application of theoretical formulations to apparently parallel 
problems.
Some Current Expressions of Value Theory as They Relate
To Physical Resources
Marshall limited his discussion of technical economics to 
the business enterprise and took cash profit for granted as the 
objective of economic decisions. Wicksteed moved away from the 
idea that any such narrow area could be demarcated, and tended 
toward a position that the important element is the relationship 
between the area influenced by the individual's choice and the ef­
fect of his choice on his chosen purpose. In Wicksteed's view, 
economics is the study of the individual's relationship with the 
exchange economy. Thus we have a change from Marshall's approach 
in terms of a material or quantitative weighing of remunerations« 
As we have seen, Marshall viewed wealth as physical necessities 
and their value was closely related to price in his theories. The 
outlook of the economy and the physical realities had to be pre­
sumed to be in functional harmony. Competition was trusted to 
eliminate all materially unnecessary price or value-contributing 
factors within institutional limitations.
Wicksteed, on the other hand, withdrew from any commitment to 
material or quantitative consistency, and limited the area of his
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inquiry to the achievement of relatively more or less of what 
was desired from the exchange economy* He viewed the exchange 
economy as the social mechanism for dealing with the wants of 
individuals from nature, a mechanism beyond individual influence 
which is neutral toward the relative importance of aspirin, beef 
steak, pearls, and stage plays, but only providing such goods in 
the amounts which people demand*
Wicksteed's general formulation is that value is imparted 
to goods in exchange by individual desires, and the exchange 
economy is a social thing which equates goods in terms of the 
current aggregate of individual desires and amounts available*
The quantity® available are products of the social structure for 
getting scarce goods, and the aggregate of goods available is in 
terms of the techniques and institutions and scale of desires*
The individual, however, has no control or influence over these 
larger elements, and so he operates solely in terms of his de­
sire; the social structure and its interpolation of the physical 
world are beyond his grasp, and that of all his neighbors as indi­
viduals* The circle of exchange is also made up of individuals, 
all trying to adapt to the anticipated and expressed desire of the 
aggregate of individuals who are exercising choices and expressing 
desires* Thus, the source of material quantitative expressions in 
the economic area is in the pattern expressed by the order of 
wants* Any quantitative element or change is effected by the in­
dividuals who make up the aggregate of desires which control the 
pace and relative values of the exchange economy*
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This perspective does two distinct things to economics.
First, it lifts value theory from concern with anything hut rela­
tive strength of desires and economics becomes the application of 
these values in the area of effective individual choice as it 
pertains to the neutrally reciprocating exchange economy. This 
is the expression of a psychological key to the area of economies. 
Moreover, quantitative elements must be explained as psychological 
quantities. Any theory of economic change, therefore, must be in 
terms of psychological change rather than measurable in terms of 
abstract physical measurement. Such an approach provides little 
room for resource or geographic analysis. Change remains statically 
defined within this system since the changeable element in human 
desires is a product of culture or social training or it involves 
psychological autogenesis, neither of which are the concern of 
this view of exchange economies. A second limitation of this view 
of economics is that it circumscribes the field to the variations 
influenced by free will or choice. Secular trends are hardly the 
concern of the individual except insofar as he knows or anticipates 
them and can profit from or protect himself against them.
The projecting of subjective economics into general national 
economic problems involves a detailed body of institutional assump­
tions and measures, but does not advance toward a theory of re­
sources except in terms of deliberate planning for a stated purpose*
One of the most thorough and well-oriented statements of the 
theoretical framework of what has come to be considered "modern 
economics" has been made by Lionel Robbins. His careful develop-
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ment of his assumptions and his clarification of the value base 
of his economic theory are worth quoting as representative of the 
most academically popular theoretical base in Europe and the 
United States today. Robbins defined the “field of economics as 
follows:
The Economist studies the disposal of scarce means*
He is interested in the way different degrees of scarcity 
of different goods give rise to different ratios of valua­
tion between them, and he is interested in the way in 
which changes in the conditions of scarcity, whether com­
ing from changes in ends or changes in means —  from the 
demand side or the supply side —  affect these ratios* 
Economics is the science which studies human behavior 
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses*^5
Robbins attributes this view of economics also to Menger, Mises,
Fetter, Strigl, and Mayer* He continues:
The conception we have rejected, the conception of Eco­
nomics as the study of the causes of material welfare, 
was what may be called a classiflcatory conception • • •
The conception we have adopted may be described as 
analytical * It does not attempt to pick out certain 
kinds of behavior, but focuses attention on a particu­
lar aspect of behavior, the form imposed by the influence 
of scarcity.-*-®
When Robbins expresses the interest of economists in scarcity, 
whether from "the demand side or the supply side," he is not con­
fused about supply. He does not treat supply as a common term 
for economic supply and for material relationships* In Robbins* 
view, supply is the relationship between an available amount, re­
gardless of how or why it is available, to the amount wanted for
Robbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science (Second Edition, London: MacMillan and Co*, 19^5T,
p. l f S *
l6Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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a given end. Scarcity can change if the amount wanted changes, 
or the end changes, or the amount supplied changes, but supply 
has no existence apart from a given state of wants and ends, 
and it is therefore not a measure or analysis of material re­
sources independent of these other variables* It is a factor 
which can be measured in terms of an external standard of 
measure, but its economic significance is neutral to such 
changes:
For it is not the materiality or even material means 
of gratification which gives them their status as eco­
nomic goods; it is their relation to valuations. It 
is their relationship to given wants rather than their 
technical substance which is significant.1?
And further:
So long as we remain within the ambit of any defini­
tion of the subject-matter of Economics in terms of the 
causes of material welfare, the connection between eco­
nomics and the technical arts of production must remain 
hopelessly obscure.
But, from the point of view of the definition we 
have adopted, the connection is perfectly definite.
The technical arts of production are simply to be ■ 
grouped among the given factors influencing the rela­
tive scarcity of different economic goods.1®
Bobbins' view is narrowly static. Change is recognized and
studied when it appears, but the possible sources of change, shifts
in wants of behavior patterns, on the one hand, or technological
innovations or discoveries on the other, are external givens and
17Ibid. , pp. 21-22 
l8Ibid., p. 33.
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are considered as factual raw material at any instant of time.
It is interesting to contrast Bobbins' views on value theory 
and his definition of the field of economics with those of Clar­
ence Ayres. Ayres' work is in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen, 
with a thoroughly oriented application of John Dewey's instrumental­
ism in value theory. Professor Ayres agrees with the modern trend
referred to by Northrop previously, and makes this comment about
TQvalue: "Economics is nothing if it is not a science of value."
Ayres is primarily interested in an explanation of economic change 
and explicitly rejects the area of detailed relationships in the 
closed, static circle which Bobbins defines as the field of eco­
nomics:
If the things that people value are just the things 
those people happen to value, then demand means nothing 
beyond the bare fact that that is what is demanded, and 
price means nothing more than the particular money-ration 
at which something or other happened to be bought and 
sold: and the whole economic 'system' of modern society
is no system at all and means nothing but that such is 
the way things happen to be whenever they happen to be 
that way.^0
Ayres is not concerned with an individual maintaining his position 
in relation to the exchange structure by an understanding of the 
workings of these circular truisms; his interest is in physically 
measurable quantity and in the structure of social change. He 
does not view the institutional framework as a constant in relation 
to the physical requirements of the technological process. He 
wrote:
Ayres, Clarence, The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 19^*0 ? p.~208.
2°Ibid.,
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We have learned that such technical innovations 
come about as a result of the physical character of 
tools whicht like all physical objects, are capable 
of being combined. We know with certainty that inno­
vations and discoveries are combinations of tools, 
instruments, and instrumentally manipulated materials: 
and that the more tools there are, the greater is the 
potentiality of technical invention and discovery*
Thus we have learned that this process of technologi­
cal innovation is the dynamic force in social change.21
22The apparent disparity between the views of Ayres and Robbins 
on the nature of economic value and the subject matter of the 
science may be clarified by a passage from Robbins' discussion 
of history:
History is the epiphenomenon of technical change.
The history of tools is the history of mankind* Now, 
whether this doctrine is right or wrong, it is certain­
ly materialistic, and it is certainly not derivative 
from Economic Science as we know it. It asserts quite 
definitely, not only that technical changes cause 
changes in scarcity relationships and social institu­
tions generally —  which would be a proposition in 
harmony with modern economic analysis —  but also that 
all changes in social relations are due to technical 
changes —  which is a sociological proposition quite 
outside the limited range of economic generalization.
It definitely implies that all changes in ends, in 
relative valuations5 are conditioned by changes in the 
technical potentialities of production . ■ • There are 
no autonomous changes on the demand side. What changes 
occur are, in the end, attributable to changes in the 
technical machinery of supply. There is no independent 
'psychological' (or, for that matter, 'physiological') 
side to scarcity. No matter what their fundamental 
make up, be it inherited or acquired, men in similar 
technical environments will develop similar habits and 
institutions. This may be right or wrong, pseudo- 
Hegelian twaddle or profound insight • . • It is a
• 21Ibid.. p. .211. . ....
^It is clear that many disagreements in theory are dif­
ferences in the subject matter under discussion combined with a 
lack of communication between the parties. Robbins* revised edi­
tion appeared in 1935* with reprints in 1937, 19^0, and 19^5* 
Ayres' book appeared in 19^.
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general statement about the causation of human motive 
which, from the point of view of Economic Science, is 
completely gratuitous. The label ‘Materialism* fits 
the doctrine. The label 'economic* is misplaced.23
As pointed out earlier, both Zimmerman and Ciriacy-Wantrup 
enlarged their treatments of economics from land, labor, and 
capital to include natural resources, population, and culture. 
Robbins was quite clear in identifying technology as a generali­
zation of supply, but was vague about whether he considered supply 
an economic or a material property, and whether supply is supply 
price or physically measured tonnage in terms of physical com­
parisons. In his view, technology is a cultural utilization of 
material properties, and that which is technological about tech­
nology is a coalescence of material and cultural properties into 
a meaningful unit.
Marshall drew this circle in a shrewdly non-commital manner 
by saying that when demand adjusts to supply and supply is ad­
justed to demand (with price as the expression of and active in­
fluence on both), that the causation involved may be illustrated 
by three balls in a bowl mutually determining one another's posi­
tion. His was a static formulation for purposes of limited 
analysis* In his view, supply is obviously economic supply and 
not material supply, and the same is true of the material or re­
sources involved in the technologist's definition. Material is 
culturally available material. The culture is prescribed by its 
technology, and the culture and the technology determine the
23Robbins, op. cit•, pp.
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materials available and their significance) and the materials 
available and the culture create the technology. This is not 
dynamic. It is a static formulation which generalizes across 
the lines of accepted disciplines, which tends to make it immune 
from criticism.
A dynamic theory requires an explanation of genesis. If 
culture or values are created by technology, then what created 
technology? Not culture? Lacking a theory of spontaneous or 
mystical creativity, we are led to inquire about the usual treat­
ment of the material environment as a neutral backdrop and the 
similar treatment of the two major abstractions of the material 
setting, time and space. Are they neutral uniformities, or do 
we just consider them so for the purposes of building static 
formulations for long periods and over large areas? Other tfiews 
of cultural process indicate that these questions may be worth 
investigating.
As it happens, the study of general cultural phenomena is 
located in the discipline of anthropology, so let us glance at 
what writers in this discipline have to say. The technological 
determinist point of view is represented in this field in the 
work of Leslie A. White. White's position is clearly one of 
cultural determinism and, fundamentally, technological determin­
ism. Despite his anthropological background and studies of 
comparative culture, his formulation gives no working bridge be­
tween economics and materials except in his more self-conscious 
formulations.
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White's views are in striking contrast to the environ­
mentalist perspective of the early twentieth century represented 
by Ellsworth Huntington and Ellen Churchill Semple. These 
two authors approached human behavior as a mechanical expression 
of physical process. Their view was that the potential and the 
nature of economic development are expressed in the nature of 
the physical environment, and that with time, the mechanical 
interaction of physical elements produces a given technology 
and pattern of social adjustment to the surroundings. White's 
disagreement with environmental determinism is seen in the fol-
24See Ellsworth Huntington, ^orld-Power and Evolution (New 
Haven: Tale University Press, 1920). In his preface Huntington 
wrote: ,"Every aspect of human knowledge must be considered in
its relation to both space and time." In Civilization and Climate 
the problem of the effect of physical environment upon human 
progress was discussed in its relation to space. It was shown 
that the distribution of civilization upon the earth's surface 
is closely in harmony with the distribution of climatic energy, 
which he considered the most important factor in physical environ­
ment. In World-Power and Evolution he considered the same problem 
in its relation to time. Huntington postulated causal sequence 
whereby climate controls mental activity and health, which in turn 
control technological innovation and business cycles. This idea 
is criticized in Douglas H. K. Lee's recent work, Climate and 
Economic Development in the Tropics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1957).
See also Ellen Churchill Semple, Influences of Geographic 
Environment (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911)* She states her 
method of approach in. the preface as follows: "If these peoples
of different ethnic stocks but similar environments manifested 
similar or related social, economic, or historical development, 
it was reasonable to infer that such similarities were due to 
environment and not to race." (The emphasis here is on environ­
ment in opposition to heredity, rather than in opposition to 
cultural traditions).
For an historian's view of the influence of space on his­
torical development, see James C. Mai in., Essays Historiography 
(Lawrence, Kansas: James C. Malin, 19^6), especially Chapt. I,
"The Turner-Mackinder Space Concept of History."
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lowing:
The technological system is basic and primary*
Social systems are functions of technologies and phil­
osophies express technological forces and reflect social 
systems. The technological factor is therefore the de­
terminant of a cultural system as a whole* It deter­
mines the form of social systems, and technology and 
society together determine the content and orientation 
of philosophy. This is not to say, of course, that 
spcial systems do not condition the operation of tech­
nology, or that social and technological systems are 
not affected by philosophy. They do and are* But to 
condition is one thing; to determine, quite another*25
Here we have a formulation of three elements that can each
be viewed as elaborations —  supply price to technology, demand
price or institutions to social structure, and equilibrium price
or value to philosophy —  dealt with in terms strikingly similar
to Marshall’s billiard balls in a bowl. Marshall took issue with
Jevons’ chain of reasoning from the demand end, but refused to
indicate an end or beginning to the circle. White seems to close
the circle, but leaves a mark where he started just to show that
there was a starting point. The convenience of this is seen in
the following remarks by White:
One came eventually to understand that the deter­
minants of culture lie within the stream of culture 
itself; that a language, custom, belief, tool or cere­
mony, is the product of antecedent and concomitant 
cultural elements and processes* In short, it was dis­
covered that culture may be considered, from the stand­
point of scientific analysis and interpretation, as a 
thing sui generis as a class of events and processes 
that behaves in terms of its own principles and laws 
and which consequently can be explained only in terms 
of its own elements and processes. Culture may thus
^White, Leslie A., The Science of Culture (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Co., 19^9)♦ p. 3^6.
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be considered as a self-contained, self-determined 
process: one that can be explained only in terms of
itself.26
White here has frankly stated a closed or static system for analy­
tical purposes suggestive of Bobbins* foundation for abstracting 
a science of relationships rather than one of quantities* White's 
use of "antecedent and concomitant" does not include history 
since he treats culture as causing the "antecedents" to begin 
with. However, the gnawing reality of the material world breaks 
into this concomitance to be the causative factor of the sui 
generic system. White stated:
We can now formulate the basic law of cultural 
evolution: Other factors remaining constant, culture
evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita 
per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the in­
strumental means of putting the energy to work is 
increased. «oth factors may increase simultaneously of course.27
Here is an analysis of an external force, physical energy, 
which influences the significance of the causative factor, tech­
nology. Technology is the measure of, or process of harnessing, 
material for human purposes. Per capita energy is a product of 
the amount of energy which can be produced under a given state of 
knowledge (efficiency) and the amount desired (effective demand) 
on the one hand, and the amount of material energy available in 
nature to be produced under a given state of knowledge and tech­




to the pitfall that Marshall left for himself by not directing 
attention to the nature of supply. Is energy to be considered 
physical materiality in terms of physical potential, or is it 
the amount called forth by a given level of technology and want 
from a neutral averaged physical backdrop? White alludes to an 
apparent forceful element impinging upon the cultural process 
from the outside world as a generating force to spark the "self- 
generating” technology; however this appears to be a neutral 
generality of the material process, energy. Equally as good a 
case could be made for the abstract generalities of the physical 
world dealt with in terms of time, or geographic space. If effec­
tive culture or technology combined with culturally or technically 
available energy is to provide the motive power of culture, we are 
offered nothing but a ride on the same merry-go-around, another 
tautology.
If, on the other hand, we are offered a source of impetus to 
culture or economic growth from the physical nature of material 
reality in its purely natural characteristics as it comes in con­
tact with human Culture, we have a broader ambit of investigation. 
This would require a study of the- elements of the physical pro­
cesses as something more than vague averages, or "neutral stuff" 
in Zimmerman's terms and "energy" in White's. It is impossible to 
ignore the vast developments in the realm of understanding of the 
inherent properties of physical matter, and the formulation of 
processes in the organic geographic environment which have per­
mitted fertilization of crops, plant breeding, weather forecasting, 
and intricacies in industrial chemistry beyond the grasp of the
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ordinary citizen. The changes resulting from such developments 
have had a striking impact upon costs of production and manpower 
requirements. They have also created demands for goods that 
hitherto did not exist in the quantity or quality presently avail 
able. Any theory that is not flexible enough to allow for possi­
bilities which lie undiscovered in nature will fail to anticipate 
some of the most fundamental influences on our economic life*
The ultimate question in any science involves the issue of 
methodology and assumption. The methodological question involves 
technf \es of discounting personal background and cultural pre­
conceptions. Techniques are needed for observation and verifica­
tion* analysis and correlation* classification and generalization 
These are basically problems of epistomology* or the problem of 
knowledge as a process.
^he problem of assumption is generally treated in one of 
three different ways. One is to assume a fixed, immutable body 
of natural principles of material relationship whose discernment 
is possible and projectible, permitting breakthroughs in under­
standing and prediction of the behavior of natural phenomena.
This view can often include semi-mystical concepts of natural 
law. Another is to assume an infinitely changing developmental 
process of which we can get glimpses and form generalizations 
which must be used timidly until we recognize a more inclusive 
and more complex process, or until our generalization is found 
to be invalid as a result of a shift in the character or direc­
tion of the process. A third view is to reject any assumption
3h
about the nature of reality and to rely solely upon what is 
definitely demonstrable in laboratory experimentation on the 
assumption that reality is knowable only in terms of the pro­
cess of human knowledge, or learning process. In this view, 
the learning process itself is the only reality we can count 
on. This latter is a metaphysics or ontology which rejects 
the usefulness of any assumptions concerning reality beyond 
immediate, or almost immediate, verification. It is the gen­
eral outlook of positivism and much modern thought. There are, 
of course, many other mentalistic and idealistic perspectives 
with which human beings have approached the problem of learning 
and the definition of the significance of learning. However, 
the only purpose of this discussion is to point out that the 
commonly used notions of dynamic and static, objective and sub­
jective, true and false, general and specific, are quite variable 
in meaning, depending on one's basic view of the character of 
human propensities for inquiry, and the nature of the subject 
matter of inquiry.
Some Economists' Views on Space and Location
The political and economic significance of space as an ab­
stracted element of many important considerations has been recog­
nized since the time of the Greeks. Along with other concepts of 
interest to the resource analyst, spatial problems have been in­
corporated into various theoretical formulations, but space in 
the abstract has a more unyielding and stricter halo of notions
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surrounding it, and has not blended as smoothly into economic 
considerations as have such concepts as supply and land. Space 
was treated in classical British political economy as an aspect 
of land and dealt with as a property of linear uniformity of 
gradation in classical rent theory. Simultaneously, von Thunen 
in Germany used a much more involved theoretical framework in 
which space was considered a physical basis for economic rela­
tionships with abstract patterns of influence of much higher 
significance•
Since the early nineteenth century, however, the level of 
intricacy in commercial relationships has tended to keep abstract 
material considerations oftt of the mainstream of economic theory. 
Not the least of these causes has been the commercial usefulness 
of static formulations and the lack of emphasis on space in terms 
of changes or possibilities for changes in relationships. Space 
in its linear form, distance, combined with time costs of speed, 
has been considered as a barrier in transportation and analyzed 
as a cost of transport. However, the social structure of the 
transportation system in western industrial countries is generally 
more flexible and deserving of more attention than pure spatial 
considerations.
In general, space has been translated into economic costs 
of distance and time. In a statiU- evaluation, a cost is a certain 
number of dollars, and can be added or averaged with no regard 
for its derivation. However, In considerations of comparison be­
tween locations, the relationship between costs which are the
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result of different phenomena are a matter of concern* First, 
the character of the costs as fixed or variable production costs 
or as marketing costs has a bearing on establishment decisions 
from the pure dollar-total basis and the nature of projected 
changes in the business structure* Moreover, the relationship 
of different types of costs to others in various industries 
has been the basis of classification. Economists have gone be­
hind pure cost to isolate categories of costs with distinct 
patterns or characteristics, such as wages, rent, interest, and 
costs of land and capital* Sent or land and space value has 
been treated as a less fluid factor in short-term commercial 
analysis* Since it is highly susceptible to demand considera­
tions in urban realty analysis, it has been treated simply as a 
cost with little further interest*
An example of one of the most mature treatments of space 
from the perspective of economic theory is Melvin L. Greenhut's 
recent work in which he surveys the literature and analyzes the 
theoretical assumptions which are required consistent with cur­
rent economic theory. Greenhut applies "modern economics" as 
Bobbins defines it to spatial problems of location of industry, 
including both production and market area concepts:
In the physical sciences, the laws on conservation, 
such as of mass energy, are regularly being fulfilled.
Apart from subject matter properties, this fulfillment 
is due to the fact that the boundaries in which this 
general field of investigation is contained have appar­
ently remained constant. But quite clearly because the 
boundaries of spatial economics (i.e. wants in space) 
do not remain constant, the framework for this field of 
study fails to make possible any obedience to the laws 
of conservation. At first glance, this condition suggests
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the need for a broadening of the basic postulates 
of economic science, which would serve to enable at 
least a greater generality in findings than otherwise 
would exist.
.Notwithstanding the above consideration, we will 
find that advantage exists in not presenting our 
general theory on the basis of broader postulates, 
i.e., maximum satisfactions. To the contrary, the 
theory to be presented is mathematically formulated 
and is described in such terms that it will be kept 
in step with traditional presentations which argue 
that satisfactions are an end and analysis of profit 
as a means to 
contemplates
Greenhut defines economic space as space made meaningful by 
wants. He is prepared to accept the treatment of wants in terms 
of their price expression alone since this is amenable to formu­
lating the relationship between cost expressions of wants and 
cost formulations of economically weighted space. To deal with 
maximization of all types of possible satisfactions and all 
possible want-satisfying, socially meaningful characteristics 
of space would complicate the picture, but he recognizes that 
the problem of total wants related to total significance of 
space would be no advance over the relationship between dollar- 
wants to dollar-characteristics of space:
The reason for not formulating our general theory 
on a postulate of maximum satisfactions lies in the 
fact that though such postulate offers generic validity 
to our science, this condition alone would not make 
economics dynamic. To the contrary, economics would 
remain static . . .  Present levels of knowledge and 
method thus suggest gain only in pointing out the de­
ficiency of our current approach, which has now been 
done; it does not encourage yet a reformulation of 
our thinking and change in basic principles. It
28Greenhut, Melvin L., Plant Location in Theory and in 
Practice, The Economics of Space (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina P r e s s 193^), pp. 283-284-.
Ihe end is all that economic science
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follows that the general theory presented here is 
only such and nothing more; it does not offer pre­
dictability of future locations.
^he nature of Greenhut*s formulation as one of relation­
ships between factors derived from summaries of data combined 
under given assumptions is consistent with the most advanced 
theory and is the more valid for its recognition of limitations* 
A body of relationships is more general than the specific quan­
tities of the elements involved* In other words, 50 percent 
is a more general concept than half a dozen or two out of four; 
and is consequently more useful, but the generality is based 
upon the assumption of a static foundation. To be dynamic and 
to give predictability, the elements of the relationship must 
be predictable in trend, and this involves a knowledge of the 
relevant controlling factors. However, deduction of generaliza­
tions from facts derives relationships for the purpose of useful 
application and is an important aspect of any science* Yet, 
this is a deduction from observable data as it is already 
understood* The process of moving in the other direction toward 
further understanding is induction and it requires comparability 
in kind and in sequence of time in order to derive formulations 
of fact, which then must be carried deductively into systems of 
analysis and application* This process tests coherency and sug­
gests more consistent formulations, errors in perspective or ob­
servation, or inconsistencies in assumptions of external reality.
^Ibid., p* 284
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The general concern for pushing investigations into broader 
analysis was expressed by Perroux several years ago:
This example * * . has the object only of estab­
lishing a rigorous distinction between ’geometric* 
space and ’economic* spaces. While the latter are, 
by definition, the proper fields of our discipline, 
they are also those which have been the least direct­
ly and deeply studied* Space has probably given rise 
to technical literature less precise and less exten­
sive than time; however, our science possesses 
numbers of mathematically developed studies on the 
localisation of an economic unit of activity con­
sidered with respect to cost and price, insofar as 
they are dependent on space. But it does not 
possess, to my knowledge, a central study on the 
’illusion of localization,' which shows clearly that 
localization in banal space from the point of view 
of cost and price is only one aspectftof the diffi­
culties of our analysis and policy.5
Perroux suggests a much greater complexity than cost and 
price of distance in the analysis of economic space, and hints 
at the deeper factor of the nature of the relationships between 
banal space, or geometric space, and economic or socially eval­
uated space. He further suggests that the history of the western 
European development may well have been fundamentally c hctx*ast er 2-Zed 
by a successful free play of individualistic intuitions result­
ing in the evaluation of space beyond the grasp of the mathematics
31or economic theory of the times.
The notion of mere distance may suggest to us that abstract 
space can be treated in terms of time, but a moment's reflection 
will recall the fact that linear distance involves a rapid geo-
30Perroux, Francois, "Economic Space: Theory and Applications,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 6*f, No. 1, Feb., 1950* P* 92.
51Ibid., pp. 102-103.
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metric multiplication of area, and that geographic area presents 
factors of infinite variability, even within a static framework, 
whereas the very essence of static analysis is the freezing of 
time to avoid variability. The potential of further analysis 
of spatial phenomena in relation to the clarification of eco­
nomic problems of general theory was suggested in more classical 
terms by Friedrich:
To summarize, land rents, advantages due to favor­
able locations of industry in relation to raw material 
deposits and market areas appear to be variable func­
tions of the location of industry which are in turn 
variable functions of dynamic (or creative) factors, 
such as the development of raw material resources, 
transportation facilities, or increases in population 
which determine economic development in the long run.
An adequate theory of location seems bound to enrich 
the theory of land rent and thereby perhaps carry re- 
procussions into other aspects of the theory of value.
Although Friedrich does not make the distinction between economi­
cally-defined space and materials and geometrically or banaily- 
defined space in terms of modern economics (which defines outward 
from the circle of economic exchange), he is aware of the identity 
of spatial problems with those of raw materials and technology 
which must arise, in large part,, from their physical or material 
dimension, since their economic dimension is stressed in terms - 
of the common denominator of price, which excludes any further 
detail or characteristic of consideration.
This whole subject of the material character of things po­
tentially economic has been in the province of the field of
Friedrich, Carl J., author of the introduction and trans­
lator of Alfred Weber's Theory of the Location of Industries 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 192977 PP» xxxii- 
xxxiii.
geography for centuries. However, within the past century and 
a half, a rather strong interest in the interrelationships be­
tween human beings and the physical world has been injected into 
the schools of geography, springing from the German culture- 
history tradition. In highly oversimplified terms, the American 
trend has been to approach human considerations in relation to 
the earth from the point of view of the natural sciences. Thus, 
human activity and physical earth tendencies can be considered 
in interaction just as one might study the habits and effects 
of the social insects —  the bees, for example —  as contributing 
strongly to the "natural" environment as it is, and yet developing 
primarily in response to their demands through evolution, random 
mutation, and environmental selection. In recent years, however, 
the trend has been in the direction of specific study of the 
physical setting of specific types of economic activity. This 
area of investigation has come to be called economic geography.
Without becoming involved in a methodological discussion 
regarding the problem of a generic base or point of departure 
for the field of geography generally, it is sufficient to point 
out that human geography has been in search of a valid methodo­
logical unit of physical study in relation to man as opposed 
to the social or economic search for a valid methodological unit 
or value theory for an approach to human problems. Classical 
economists struggled toward a science of the material as it could 
be judged by the society, but despairing of the future of such a
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line of investigation, and with the mastering of the problems 
of underproduction of historically accepted necessities of life 
around the middle of the nineteenth century, modern economists 
have turned away from this problem and concentrated upon the re­
lation of the individual to the exchange system, and the general 
balance and health of the exchange system itself, taking physical 
adequacy for granted. There is, therefore, a void between 
western economic theory and the problems of backward countries, 
since the problems of underproduction have not yet been solved 
in these areas.
From the point of view of economic geography, which is pri­
marily being studied and administered by geographers with limited 
graduate training in economics, there is difficulty in adapting 
economic theory to the factual material being accumulated from 
their descriptive and historical perspectives. Strained attempts 
to adapt modern economic theory or to slur over the disjuncture 
between economic theory and economic geography is increasingly 
difficult as the valuable information of the geographer is being 
increasingly sought and used by corporate and public agencies in 
development programs, both domestic and foreign* This problem 
was expressed by an author with a doctoral degree in geography 
who is professionally employed by a firm of consulting engineers 
in a recent article in a journal devoted to geographic data per­
taining to economic matters. The paper is more bibliographically 
comprehensive, but meditatively characteristic, of much recent
k3
literature in economic geography.
One of the paradoxes of contemporary geography is 
the disparity between the number of substantive contri­
butions to economic geography and the conceptual progress 
of this branch.33
Ballabon surveys the problem by indicating that the economic 
geographer has been looking primarily to the economist for theory. 
He misses the dualism between physical and social analysis which 
comprises a major part of the difficulty by not showing the dis­
juncture between measurement in the physical sense and conceptual 
form for relationships in the social sense. The latter is essen­
tially a form of value theory.
Of the three basic steps of selection, measurement, 
and . . .  the third and most significant step, the estab­
lishment of spatial relationships between data, is, 
however, very elusive. This is particularly unfortunate 
as significant progress in establishing a body of prin­
ciples in economic geography depends upon the repeated 
recording of relationships between comparable bodies of 
data. While some of the difficulty is directly related 
to problems of selection and measurement, a major problem 
is raised by the concept of spatial relationship.3^
Although economic geographers may be looking toward economic
theory for a conceptual framework which will provide a common
ground, the trend in modern economics is to ignore the existence
of the problem in its more comprehensive form, classical rent
theory. This tendency is expressed in the following discussion
by Joan Robinson dealing with broad conceptual problems of general
Ballabon, Maurice B., "Putting the 'Economic' Into Economic 
Geography," Economic Geography, Vol. 33* Ho. 3* July, 1957* P* 217•
^Ibid., p. 221.
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social and economic concern as well as details for private 
business analysis:
The essence of the conception of rdnt is the con­
ception of a surplus earned by a particular part of a 
factor of production over and above the minimum earnings 
necessary to induce it to do its work* This conception 
of rent, both verbally and historically, is closely 
connected with the conception of 'free gifts of nature.'
The chief of these free gifts of nature (of which the 
essential characteristic is that they do not owe their 
origin to human effort) is space, and for this reason 
they have usually been referred to simply as 'land' —  
land being understood to comprise all the other 'free 
gifts' besides mere space • • • The whole of the earn­
ings of land in the economist's sense is rent in the 
economist's sense, for it follows from the definition 
of the free gifts of nature that they are there in 
any case, and do not require to be paid in order to 
exist.35
This line of argument takes the British classical tradition 
through its Marshallian detailization and, while keeping the 
phrasing that one would presume directs attention to the physical 
character of. the economic base, blends it with the modern trend 
of defining outward from the center of meaning. Although natural 
"surpluses" do not have to be paid in order to exist, what is 
the impact of a slight change in understanding which, with a 
single stroke as it were, changes the volume of the surplus ten­
fold? Does the value of the understanding, the value of the 
"land," or the cheapness of the product increase? How? Why?
The trend in economic theory has been to abandon this issue 
as social organization and government became the most involved 
and critical phase of our daily and yearly economic lives, but
^Robinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
(London: McMillan Co*, Ltd., 193*0 » P» 102.
this is possibly a temporary phase in economics. The possibility 
of the future is for more concern with material quantity, tech­
nological output and of developments in heavily populated areas 
whose material needs are short of the moral standards of the 
world.
Simultaneously, private industry has acquired a grasp of 
the impact of economic "breakthroughs” in understanding and in­
vention, and is increasingly interested in correlating physical 
research with commercial decisions which are being made in 
purely economic terms. The necessity of a value scheme which 
has functional validity for institutions such as corporate 
interests and nations with domestic and world obligations can­
not be passed off on the supposition that economics is a static 
problem which only involves thinking in terms of what we have, 
and dealing with the future in terms of the average customer's 
mental discount of possibilities which he has hardly the train­
ing to inquire about, much less understand.
The Time Problem in Economic Theory
The most fundamentally established extra-social measurement 
or physical process in terms of which economists have habitually 
thought has been time. Time is actually a measurement in terms 
of an astronomical process, namely the revolution of the earth on 
its axis, producing days, and its rotation around the sun, pro­
ducing years. The value and significance of this extra-social 
measurement is at once obvious and involved. It becomes a common
term for comparison, and is at the same time a constant or a 
neutral element for measurement of different items. Although 
we quite casually compare distances in economics in terms of 
cost of transportation and equate those with similar costs, 
we would not attempt to equate time to a crop yield. For 
example, where the average annual yield is thirty bushels of 
grain to the acre, we cannot refer to a yield of twenty bushels 
as two-thirds as long as a yield of thirty, economically speaking* 
The obvious reason is that time is external to all mundane 
variables with which we deal, and therefore is actually neutral 
in itself, whereas most other physical processes with which we 
are concerned vary markedly from place to place and year, to year 
at the level at which we are interested in them.
These variables in the realm of physical resources have 
usually been approached by economists in terms of a social measure­
ment which derives its terms from internal preconceptions, and is 
thereby inherently static. However, the progress in dynamic 
comparisons has been made by equating these physical processes 
to time and combining these measurements with social appraisals 
made in terms of time also.
The working out of the relationship of time as an external 
measurement of social and physical factors and the social signi­
ficance of time in terms of rates and quantity to absolute or 
external time is a much more involved problem than is apparent 
at first glance. Just as writers such as Perroux deplore the 
use of. banal space without weighting it in terms of the involved
*f?
social significance it holds, historicist economists have long 
urged the analysis of trends in terms of changes over time and 
the inapplicability of concise theoretical formulations from 
one time period to another, and from one place and circumstance 
to another during the same abstract time period. This idea has 
found its way into even the most deductive forms of current eco­
nomic theory. F. Zeuthen, an economist > in the modern Austrian 
and mathematical tradition, has the following to say about the 
difference between the social and the abstract physical aspects 
of measurement:
In economics one will often attach importance to 
certain quantitative properties and relations, such as 
magnitudes and price. These are fully capable of de­
scription in formulae or figures, but without the .
multitude of other attributes to be found in real life.
If we undertake such a formalization, we shall be better 
able to draw conclusions from the said quantitative 
properties, often in themselves very complicatede If 
one does not in this way facilitate the work for one's 
self, but tries to find the quantitative connection at 
the same time as one thinks about all the other proper­
ties of the things, such as all the individual character­
istics of persons or subjects involved, it becomes 
difficult-both"for one's self and for others to control 
which Conditions are included in the original and with 
what weight; it is also difficult to determine whether 
or not emotions have influenced the result. As an ad­
vantage of the strictly formal way of expression, 
Morgenstern emphasizes that it makes away with the ob­
scurities and contradictions inherent in the 'material 
mode of expression.* 36
And further:
Besides the abstract and displaceable time scale, 
which is applicable to a series of production processes,
36Zeuthen, F., Economic Theory and Method (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1955) 1 P» 9*
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or to an abstract calculation of interest, where the 
starting point may just as well be the year 1200 or 
1900 or 1980, it is necessary in economics, as empha­
sized by Johan Ackerman, to reckon with the actual 
historic scale of time, where each period and each 
year has its special stamp, dependent on the total 
economic, political and cultural situationC1 the calen­
dar scale')37
Although the first of these two passages does not clearly dis­
tinguish between social and physical measurement of material 
quantities, i.e., price or pounds, it quite clearly emphasizes 
the necessity of abstracting them from the complex of involved 
process for analytical purposes. However, when discussing the 
question of time, the same author is lucid about the importance 
of a neutral external abstraction. The contradiction implicit 
in this problem must be clarified in order to develop a theory 
of natural resource analysis which is more than a description 
of scientific and industrial measurements and quantities based 
on current prices and processes.
^he problem of the inherent static character of internally 
defined or socially defined social measurements has been reviewed 
as it pertains to equilibrium and space problems. Here, however, 
we have an instance where an author who defends the static ab­
straction to avoid the interference of detail in regard to 
"magnitudes and price," simultaneously rejects the usefulness of 
an external idealized measurement which is made to order for 
mathematical abstraction in favor of the complexities of inter­
57Ibid., p. 12.
nally defined social comparisons which defy precision. One 
might be inclined to ask why space could not be defined as a 
temporal magnitude in terms of economic costs of time required 
to traverse it and then no longer to be subject to treatment 
with the "material mode of expression," and require treatment 
which brought out the "special stamp" of each interval of time. 
But the special stamp is quite similar to the material mode 
whose complexities we just escaped.
The confusion here should demonstrate that the concept of 
"time" is not just a neutral, abstract physical measurement•
Time is neutral only as a socially constructed concept of a 
neutral common term for purposes of mathematical comparison in 
the sense in which Zeuthen asserts for "magnitudes and price." 
Time in the sense of physical reality is not neutral, but is a 
physical measurement of constant change. Although it is a cur­
rent concern of philosophy and physics whether time has any ab­
solute meaning, or whether it is nothing more than a human con­
cept of measurement with meaning resting only in the human mind, 
it is certainly not a neutral aspect of material reality. The 
popular concept that natural scientists believe in constants 
rather than use them where the variations are not of significant 
to the problem at hand is reflected in a current comment by a 
thoroughly oriented representative of the historicist point ©S' 
view. Regardless of this alleged misconception of the natural
38Cohen, Morris R., Studies in Philosophy and Science (New 
York: Henry Holt & Co., 19^9)» pp. 215 and 233 on "Einstein's 
Theory of Relativity."
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sciences, Leo Rogin's criticism of the mathematical and deductive 
approach to economics should be enlightening:
The natural sciences articulate the concept of a 
constant nature* which finds its empirical reference 
in the uniformities manifested in the heavens and in 
the materially isolated setting of the laboratories*
The purist type of economic theory proceeded to an 
analogous concept of a constant, a stationary economy.
But what is the empirical reference of the theory?
Is it possible that the reference of this type of 
theory is also the value-charged context of human 
history, and that what appears to be a retreat into 
objectivity is a retreat into s t e r i l i t y ? 2 9
The only explanation for the enduring concept that natural sci­
ence deals with material uniformity is the widespread publicity 
which the field of physics has received in recent decades. The 
fact that elements in astronomy and physics can be considered as 
constants for practical purposes is a commentary on the tremen­
dous time differential between human events and astronomical 
events. As soon as one suggests that a laboratory dog or a 
feeder pig be held constant during several years of experimenta­
tion, the unreality of this whole notion is clear* The non­
neutral and evolving character of the real world is apparent 
in all the life sciences, from the study of influenza viruses 
to the study of coastline characteristics*
The problem of analyzing the meeting point of the social and 
the physical in economic theory was approached to a remarkably 
clear degree in the area of time analysis by Eugen von Bohm- 
Bawerk in his analysis of productivity over time and the source of
7QRogin, Leo, The Meaning and Validity of Economic Theory 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 195f>) ? pp* 11-12.
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interest. Bohm-Bawerk approached the problem of the relation of 
man to nature with a clear consideration of the basic setting 
of his formulation. He conceived human beings as physical or­
ganisms in a physical world of great complexity with vast numbers 
of forces and tendencies. He brought this basic ontology or 
metaphysics to bear on economic theory in his treatment of time 
and the productive process as it influenced the exchange economy 
through the market and the forces controlling exchange:
Man’s role in production is much more modest. It 
consists simply in this —  that he, himself a part of 
the natural world, combines his personal powers with 
the impersonal powers of nature, and combines them in 
such a way that under natural law the co-operation re­
sults in a definite, desired, material form. Thus, 
notwithstanding the interference of man, the origin of 
goods remains purely a natural process. The natural 
process is not disturbed by man but completed, inas­
much as, by apt intervention of his own natural powers, 
he supplies a condition which has hitherto been wanting 
to the origination of a material good.
If we look more closely at the way man assists ma­
terial process, we find that his sole but ample contri­
bution consists in the moving of things. fPutting 
objects in motion’ is the idea which gives the key to 
all human production and its results; to all man's 
mastery over nature and its powers . . .  And this is 
so simply because the powers reside in the objects*
Now when man by his physical powers —  the power of 
moving things —  is able to dictate where the objects 
shall be, he obtains a control over the place at which 
a natural power may become effective; and this means 
broadly a control over the way and over the time in 
which it may become effective
And:
The same considerations which show us the kind of 
mastery man has over nature show us at the same time 
the measure and the narrow limits of his mastery. "̂1
Bohm-Bawerk, op. cit.. pp. 12-13*
^Ibid*. p. 15.
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Bohm-Bawerk1s principle of the "rou^i-about process of pro­
duction” is developed in this same work and rests on this basic 
approach to nature and resources. The idea he presents is that 
the longer the planning period over which a modicum of human 
influence can be organized, the greater the control, and there­
fore the more productive the effort will be per unit of time 
spent. He is quite explicit about the source of human influ­
ence in nature being a result of man's ability to play one 
natural force against another and to handle delicate balances 
or critical reactions in such a way as to control how, when, and 
where material reactions take place. All these powers are multi­
plied at a great rate by the less direct, or long-range approach, 
the "round-about" approach. This is the theory in the time dimen­
sion that is dealt with as "economies of scale" in a lateral or 
current quantitative level.
Moreover, Bohm-Bawerk carried this analysis further by dis­
tinguishing between fact and social tendency. The "Agio" of 
psychological dominance of the present over the future leads the 
exchange system to chronically undervalue the productive potential 
of nature at any given state of the arts, and therefore the more 
intelligent or daring achieve success by tapping the surplus pro­
duced by the differential between the market view and the real 
potential of nature, which may be exploited by lengthening the 
planning period. From the point of view of resource analysis, 
this is a view which recognizes a static, self-defining circle of
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exchange but it incorporates a theory of progress* or a dynamic 
based on the theory that an infinitely productive nature can be 
tapped for a surplus which rewards the individual who breaks out 
of the static equilibrium of exchange values which is always 
tending toward tradition and habit. This increment, interest 
on capital, is a material product which can be brought into the 
economy above and beyond the current gross material product, 
rather than a market charge for the rent of money or exchange 
value.
Inherent in this view is the idea that resource-value is 
different from and exceeds market price. This is a natural poten­
tial theory of value subject to realization by the farsighted 
through the round-about process of production. It is a concept 
of value outside the equilibrium of the market which he approached 
in terms of utility. His idea of the uniformity of utility ex­
pressing itself through price laterally, from commodity to com­
modity and vertically through time is a static concept of a 
socially-defined equilibrium or closed circle of social values:
Applied to the competition of different classes of 
wants this leads to the principle of harmonious satis­
faction; by which is meant that, in all branches of 
wants, satisfaction reaches down to the same level of 
importance, so that, over the whole field, the unit of 
goods procures the same marginal utility . '
And further:
But we employ the very same principle of harmonious 
satisfaction, for the same reasons, to regulate the com­




This theory of the harmonization of utilities between different 
goods in terms of their comparative want-satisfying qualities 
and their harmonization over time periods into the future in 
terms of their curve of decreasing importance to the subjective 
reactions of the collective which composes the market is an in­
herently static analysis. It is the same concept involved in 
all equilibrium analyses where economics is analyzed in terms 
of the wants which create value and the supply which responds 
to that same value, value or price being the expression of the 
two factors and also their measure.
The possibilities of carrying the material analysis of 
creative value in the "round-about process of production" into 
its implications where differential creativities may exist on 
both a lateral and temporal plane and an analysis of the details 
of absorption of the material surplus into the economy constitute 
an interesting and stimulating point of departure for resource 
analysis in terms of the uniform abstraction of time. The further 
elaboration of this type of analysis into the lateral dimension 
of space and economies of scale as another form of dynamic tech­
nique and its relation to time offers a challenging field of in­
vestigation.
The interesting aspect of Bohm-Bawerk's analysis is that he 
approached natural process through his theory of capital, whereas 
classical British political economists approached it in terms of 
rent theory, and neo-classical British economists used a concept 
of rent and quasi-rent as a definition of surplus without distinction
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between the potentially different sources of surplus —  physical 
product or social right. As long aSprice is equated to value 
within a closed circle of analysis, there can be no economic 
distinction between an increase in legal rights, of control over 
the common term of exchange, money, and an increase resulting 
from a physical expansion in quantity of useful goods. This 
does not distinguish between use value and exchange value in its 
traditional form. The problem is more one of how created values 
immigrate into the circle of exchange and how various forms of 
equilibrium analysis can be usefully correlated with various ap­
proaches to physical analysis for successful application to 
various types of problems which transcend individual profit in 
an exchange system.
Current economic development theory gives a superficial in­
dication of assimilating Bohm-Bawerk's time analysis by the "ex 
post-ex ante" analysis which is in terminological vogue. This 
technique is the experimental pragmatism of the past half century, 
by which the past and present and analyzed and projected into the 
future deductively. It, however, involves the same contradictions 
of classical British political economy which assumes that the eco­
nomic value of an item is the correct measure of its potential.
This is not what Bohm-Bawerk assumes. He assumes that the poten­
tial is infinite, beyond appraisal, and that social value is 
chronically augmented by the disparity between individual recog­
nition of potential beyond the social recognition. In other words, 
capital is productive because individuals can deviate from current
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exchange values and, by insight, gain a rewarding surplus. As 
soon as this is recognised in the market as an acceptable basis 
of production, however, it becomes a part of the equilibrium of 
exchange value, and is no longer productive in a perfectly com­
petitive economy. The reluctance to formulate a theory with 
faith in the future, and the tendency to cling to the sole 
reality of the most recent present is illustrated in the follow­
ing discussion by Hamberg on the "ex post-ex ante" characterization 
of time series analysis:
Besides examining the ex ante and ex post considera­
tions of economic units, the economists themselves apply 
corresponding considerations. By alternatively investi­
gating the plans, on the basis of given data, and the 
result of their realization in a certain period, includ­
ing the effect of this result on data at the beginning 
of the next period, we arrive at a deductive sequence 
analysis . . .  It may apply to individual firms as well 
as to whole communities. If the analysis is concerned 
with an actual current development, there will be the 
possibility of an empirical renewal of data, gradually 
as new experiences occur. These apply to current re­
search in economic development, which at the same time 
forms new pictures of reality and revises its basic 
theory.^
The defect of this approach may be illustrated by a super­
ficial analogy. In spite of how closely a driver studies the 
highway just behind his car, and no matter how imaginatively he 
deductively reformulates his anticipation of the future in terms 
of the demonstrable past, the road ahead is still real, and is 
under no obligation to follow a deductive projection of the care­
fully analyzed past except in very broad terms of physical neces-
^Hamberg, D., Economic Growth and Instability (New York, 
W. W. Morton & Co., 1956'), p. 171.
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sity.
Modern economic theory rests very heavily on the assumption 
that the laboratory of economic analysis is the setting in which 
choice is made and the analysis and synthesis of the nature and 
results of choice within the framework of the circle of exchange# 
Despite the undeniable fact of progress in technology and under­
standing, demand and supply make up the dimensions subject to 
choice. They are, essentially, summations of social purpose on 
the one hand and technology and understanding on the other. Any 
given purpose, desire, or technology is part of a social or 
cultural definition in terms of its own static relations. Purely 
physically defined resource variations, however, are a reality 
constantly upsetting any equilibrium, and are always subject to 
deviation from any deductive prediction, particularly those re­
quiring tight mathematical precision as opposed to general princi­
ples of character and tendency. We must recognize that economic 
theory can never be precise unless resources or natural phenomena 
are made precise by being counterweighted or depreciated or ap­
preciated to fit into a fixed quantitative relationship in a 
deductively stable circle of static analysis. This may give 
stability in money terms, terms derived from this equilibrium, 
but never stability in terms of food, population, standard of 
living, or military potential. The necessary degree of insta­
bility inherent in a developing economy in the absence of perfect 
concomitant price and profit adjustments at an instantaneous 
rate to keep the economy in perfect tune with its physical bases
is illustrated by the following comments by Hamberg:
If resources (or any other factor of production) 
fail to expand as rapidly as capital, then ceteris 
paribus, diminishing returns to capital will set in. 
Diminishing returns must affect the capital coeffi­
cient and consequently, the value of the accelerator*
Thus, in addition to neutral technical progress . . • 
the assumption of a constant capital coefficient and 
accelerator entails one of two such explicit assump­
tions: that diminishing returns to capital are
avoided through resource developments keeping pace 
with capital accumulation., or that technological 
progress offsets declines in marginal productivity ^r 
to the extent that resource development lags behind, J
Though this discussion does not clearly distinguish between eco­
nomic value and resource value or the concomitant relationship, 
if any, it does indicate that there is no basis for anticipating 
equilibrium and stability except in terms of either a social 
compensation for physical changes, or a fortuitous natural com­
pensation for social changes.
A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Resource Values
Up to this point, the discussion has not drawn careful lines 
of definition between such frequently used terms as price, value", 
usefulness, technology, resource, and raw material. Essentially, 
there are two ideas implicit in the parade of terms cited, namely, 
social or economic importance, and physical character. It is im­
material whether people refer to "getting fair price for fair 
value" or to the "sufficiency of raw materials to fulfill the re­
source requirements" of an industry.
A comprehensive development of current economic theory and
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technique in the area of space has recently been published.
Much work on transportation, time and scale, and raw materials 
1+7is being done* Economic development theory is being applied 
to many problems involving such factors in hitherto undreamed­
of social laboratories in underdeveloped countries*
At the present time, definitions and statistical surveys 
clarify the elements of the problem at any given time and in any 
given case, but they do not build constructively toward a body of 
theory because of the lack of a body of perspectives to give 
broader meaning to particularized problems. The blossoming of 
our technical industrial economy has led to a tremendous burden 
of social elaboration which involves expansions in training and 
education, government and business organizations, and a timing 
or synchronization of a multiplicity of simultaneous processes 
which must mesh to guarantee smooth operation of the complex 
machine that is our modern industrial society. As purposes be­
come more involved and specialization increases, the tendency 
to relate problems back to general theory may lapse because of 
the barriers to communication which tend to be built up between 
specialized fields. Too often, we are approaching new problems 
with new specialized understanding but relying on an outmoded 
concept of the relationships between our work and that of others.
^Ponsard, Claude, Economie et Espace: Essai d*integration
du facteur spatial dans 11 analyse economique (Paris: Observation 
Economique VIII, Sedes, 1956).
^?Isard, Walter, Location and Space-Economy (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1956). Isard considers natural resources neutral. 
He treats space primarily in terms of transportation costs with 
emphasis on geographical regions as units for a moving equili- 
brium analysis.
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This has tended to occur in economics between the areas of re­
search in raw materials and standards of living on the one hand, 
and exchange and value theory on the other. Adding to the body 
of definition will contribute little more than re-phrasing ac­
cepted analysis of old problems in a changing situation. The 
need is for a more comprehensive conceptual framework which can 
systematically include the body of analysis which has been de­
veloped in western Europe and the United States in the last 
century and a half.
One of the most effective steps toward new ideas is through 
an examination of the old ones. This is not to suggest that his­
tory repeats itself, or that absolutely nothing new is ever 
thought up. However, the recorded ideas of exceptional minds 
are full of perspectives that were either functionally meaningless 
or socially unacceptable at the time they were propounded. We 
are also less likely to be awed with the veneration of current 
ideas when we examine their childhood.
The history of thought concerning raw materials is particu­
larly rich because our civilization has been carrying us further 
and further away from a fairly recent epoch of almost total de­
pendence upon the superficially abundant aspects of nature which 
were subject to wasteful exploitation. Although the area has 
shrunk in its all-pervasive importance, the concomitant latitude 
of choice with respect to human life has greatly enlarged. Planned 
or'Calculated individual and political choices have become character­
6l
ized as economic problems. However, these choices still rest 
on a complex foundation of natural potential and exist in a 
background of cultural tradition. Culture may he only the 
memory and confinement of the structures, physical and social, 
of yesterday's choices. The physical world is, on the other 
hand, not dependent upon man for existence, although it is in­
fluenced by him. The physical world provides the changing 
setting for man's choices, and is possibly one of the stimuli 
for cultural or economic change.
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PART II
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS
Most discussions of the development of economic thought 
begin with the writers of the eighteenth century, usually the 
Physiocrats in France or Adam Smith in Scotland* There is, 
however, no dispute regarding the prior existence of economic 
problems, or the prior existence of recorded thought concerning 
such problems.
The ancient Greeks lived in a more complex society than we 
tend to ascribe to them# Moreover, they not only developed the 
first recorded strides in theory applied to social and physical 
problems; they took a further step and developed methodology, 
or the theory of how to derive, develop, or formulate theories* 
They applied theory to their important problems, and it has 
only been the assumption that they had no important economic 
problems which has permitted the neglect of their economic 
thought*
Interest in the classical world has grown beyond the con­
fines of moral philosophy as archeological evidence has accumu­
lated over the past century. This evidence pictures the Greek 
civilization vastly different from the formerly prevalent view 
that the Greeks lived in a predominantly agricultural community 
with only insignificant commercial activities* It is now known 
that the Greeks carried on large-scale commercial colonization, 
extensive shipping, and industrial production in certain areas,
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not without attendant comples political and economic problems.
The records of this commercial activity and the methods of 
dealing with the problems engendered by it have been filtered 
through successive epochs of thought and economic orientation.
The Roman administrators, the Arab scientists, and the European 
monasteries kept what they deemed valuable through storjay periods 
of war and cultural change. Later, the widespread commercial ac­
tivities of the Italian city states revived interest in the cor­
relation of science and philosophical speculation. Leonardo da 
Vinci's breadth of interests during this period was on a plane 
with those of Archimedes and Aristotle.
That the Greek material which has survived has been mainly 
that of the Socratic philosophers was given by A. A. Trever as 
a reason for the supposed paucity of Greek economic thought:
Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative 
unimportance of Greek economic thought is usually not 
emphasized. It is the patent fact that almost our 
only extant sources are the Socratic philosophers, who 
represent avowedly a direct moral reaction against the 
commercial spirit and money-greed of their age* Thus 
the limited development of Greek economics, so far 
from being an evidence of primitive economic conditions 
in Greece, is a direct argument for the opposite.
Trever, A. A., A History of Greek Economic Thought (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 191̂ ") § p. 21 • Trever's work is an ex­
haustive collection of discussions in the surviving Greek literature 
from the bibliographic point of view, but it presses the analysis of 
the theory represented by these discussions into a rigid Ricardian 
framework spiced with John Ruskin. The rich ore awaiting a modern 
theorist in this field will require both an imaginative receptivity 
to theoretical ideas and training in classical languages to re­
translate much of the material in light of a fuller understanding 
of its implications for economic history and theory. Without this 
latter qualification, precise study and analysis is wasted on am­
biguous phrasing in modern languages which can never do more than 
roughly approximate the fine lines of theoretical discussion char­
acteristic of the Greek philosophical tradition.
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Some of the fundamental differences between ancient Greek 
and modern western European traditions and the social pattern of 
Greek civilization must be briefly examined before surveying the 
economic thought of the Greeks*
Literary Sources of Greek Economic Thought
A first consideration is the character of the literary rem­
nants on which we rely* Most of this material comes from the 
fifth and fourth centuries B.C., from Socrates to Aristotle, with 
subsequent commentaries. Thi-s constitutes, the late Hellenic 
period, i.e., ancient Greece prior to the death of Alexander the 
Great in 521 B.C. The literature of the subsequent Hellenistic 
period, during which Greek culture was a .-.■■major influence from the 
Indus to the Nile and up into the steppes of south Russia, was 
largely ignored by the early Christian scholars, but the Arabs 
utilized the scientific literature from this period. Of course, 
many fragments and exceptions discolor this generalization. How­
ever, our concern is with the pre-Socratic scientific material 
and the Socratic and Aristotelian theorists. From the writings 
of Homer and Hesiod in the eighth century B.C. to the middle of 
the fifth century B.C., the major writings were in the form of 
poetry* The impression one gets is that their preservation was 
a result of form rather than the content, except for fragments 
from the quotations and paraphrasings of the systematic "reviews 
of the literature" in the Aristotelian type of discussion.
The Socratic and Platonic dialogue and the Aristotelian texts
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were developed as seminar reports in Plato’s Academy and in 
class notes from Aristotle’s lectures (the latter delivered while 
the teacher strolled briskly, followed by his students). The 
copies of the careful discussions and often quibbling definitions 
of the Platonic dialogues and their style were designed for re­
use as teaching guides in an educational system that was pri­
marily oral. Aristotle’s texts, which require careful scholarship 
to determine which parts are original and which were added by 
later students "revising their notes," constitute an exhaustive 
and well-rounded summary of theory on the subject of social rela­
tionships in which politics and ethics are the two primary 
disciplines. Since most Greek economic exchange was regulated 
by city ordinance, much of what we would call economic theory 
today was expounded under legal and political theory, and the 
rest was considered ethics.
Some Differences in Ancient Greek And
Western European Traditions *
Another aspect of importance in understanding Greek thought 
is the role of the citizenry in a tightly-knit city state with a 
patriarchal or family philosophy of mutual obligation. Although 
this outlook excluded the growing number of slaves during the 
sixth and fifth centuries B.C., it nevertheless was the founda­
tion for a sense of civic duty to the full citizen to an extent 
that its influence is difficult to understand today. Part of 
this was the military perspective of the Greek citizen. Rostovt-
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zeff commented on the patriarchal and military aspects of Greek 
civilization as follows:
Thus, the first duty encumb&nt on every Greek city 
was to guarantee its citizens an adequate supply of 
food for consumption and of metals and other materials 
for the manufacture of tools and weapons and for ship­
building. As regards military equipment it must be 
remembered that war was endemic in Greece, and that 
one of- the most urgent needs of an adult citizen was 
to provide himself with a good panoply. His safety 
and efficiency in war, as well as his social standing, 
depended largely on this.2
When we consider that the equestrian or cavalry class was 
composed largely of the nobility or agricultural aristocracy, 
the heavily-armored infantry of the city merchants, and the mass 
of the infantry and sailors of the urban and rural poor, we can
begin to understand how deeply ingrained was military status as 
a symbol of economic position in the fabric of Greek political 
life. One can imagine the argument that arose during the fifth 
century when Athenian power rested upon the strength of her 
navy manned by the rural poor, with weapons furnished by the 
state. Without private ownership of weapons and accompanying 
status, how could men be expected to take care of their equipment, 
or feel a sense of individualistic duty in warfare?
A further contrast in the ancient world as compared with 
our own was the relation of science and philosophy to the 
democratic movement in the commercial city states and the eastern 
Mediterranean. The individualistic nature of war, trade, and
2Bostovtzeff, M., The Social and Economic History of the 
Hellenistic World. Vol. I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 19'4lY* 
pp. 91-92.
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political power gave knowledge of a practical character a pre­
mium on influence, and secrecy surrounded most knowledge of 
navigation and cartography, as well as engineering and other 
crafts and skills#
During the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., commercial ac­
tivity and skilled craftsmanship on a large scale produced a 
democratic ferment among the impoverished and displaced peasantry 
who still retained full citizenship. With the development of 
large-scale commerce, secrecy became impossible, and the ex­
ploitation of practical information and knowledge of a factual 
nature had to be approached by exploiting the time factor. Ex­
ploitation of trade opportunities and material resources before 
anyone else rather than secretly became a part of commercial 
life*
The agricultural aristocracy managed to retain their wealth 
by using slave labor on large estates for the production of olive 
oil and wine for commerce, but they lost their position of social 
leadership and respect. Political individualism was being de­
nounced, and the reaction of the nobility was to resort to per­
sonal self-improvement and moral justification. The writings of 
Heraclitus around 500 B.C. illustrate the view of the aristocratic 
scientist and intellectual toward the army of sailors, potters, 
smiths, and small traders who had no respect for individual no­
bility of person, but rather concerned themselves with fair 
grain prices and political rights. These democrats seemed in­
satiably greedy for material improvements. Moreover, the aris-
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tocracy found that the Homeric tradition and Hesiod's writings 
from the eighth century treated both the aristocrats and the 
gods as petty, self-indulgent beings deserving of no honor and 
respect not required by fear'of their physical power* Heraclitus 
wrote of the times:
The Ephesians deserve to be hanged, every one that 
is a man grown, and the youth to abandon the city, for 
they cast out Hermodorus the best man among them, 
saying:—  Let no one among us be best, and if one be 
best, let him be so elsewhere and among others*
For what sense or understanding have they? They 
follow the bards and employ the crowds as their teacher, 
not knowing that many are bad and few good* For the 
very best choose one thing before all others, immortal 
glory among mortals, while the masses eat their fill 
like cattle*5
The aristocracy suffered from the reputation their fore­
fathers had built through several centuries of abuse and injustice. 
In defense, they studied high-minded morality and the principles 
of ethical conduct, as well as the nature of the world and the 
purpose of human activity, concluding that the leadership of the 
new self-denying, duty-conscious nobleman looking toward chronic 
warfare to build character was the hope of the self-indulgent mob* 
Far from being useless, however, this emphasis on knowledge and 
moral reflection brought together all the available factual data, 
and produced the basis for a surge of intellectual activity 
which transcended its aloof parentage* Windelband summed up
^Smith, T. F., Philosophers Speak For Themselves (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 193*OV p* 12.
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the importance of this period of speculation:
The emphasis falls primarily upon the lifting of 
mere knowing to the plane of systematic knowledge, or 
science. Not content with his storing of practical 
facts, and with his fantastic speculations born of 
his religious needs, the Greek sought knowledge for 
its own sake. Knowledge, like art, was developed as 
an independent function from its involvement in the 
other activities of civilization. So, first and 
foremost, the history of ancient philosophy is an ^
insight into the origin of European science in general.
There are two aspects of Greek life and scholarship which 
pertain to their analysis of economic resources. The first of 
these is the advanced body of social forms built up to handle re­
sources. In some senses, these forms and their problems are 
dramatically modern; in others, they are almost unintelligibly 
different. Secondly, the types of mathematical and logical gen­
eralizations with which Greek scholars dealt with problems in 
parallel fields concerning which we have more data, and their 
view of the applicability of forms of generalization from one 
field to another may be helpful in providing a background for 
understanding their economic ideas. A brief survey of some as­
pects of classical Greek economic history of the sixth through 
the fourth centuries B.C. with a view toward understanding the 
setting in which the fragmentary writings on economic theory re­
lating to resources are to be interpreted follows*
Zj.W&ndelband, W., History of Ancient Philosophy (New York: 
Charles Scribner1s Sons, 190o), p. 1 ^Translated from the 
Second German Edition by Herbert E. Cushman). Italics mine.
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Early Economic History
The economic life of the eastern Mediterranean must be 
viewed as a continuous process of growth and development over a 
long period of time. Because historians until quite recently- 
relied largely upon the extant writings of Greek historians 
such as Herodotus and Thucydides, the tendency has been to look 
upon the Greek civilization as an isolated surge of development 
unrelated to other cultures. From archeological and other evi­
dence, however, it is known that the commercial civilization on 
the island of Crete during the second millennium B.C., the Minoan 
civilization, and the Babylonian civilization built on irrigated 
agriculture and the caravan routes across Asia Minor during the 
same period, had accumulated a vast body of knowledge on which 
we unfortunately have little detailed information or documenta­
tion.
Of the Babylonian civilization, which had terminal caravan 
cities on the Mediterranean coasts and a strange theocratic eco­
nomic system where vast treasuries of the religious temples pro­
vided the commercial capital for extensive banking and trading 
projects, Rostovtzeff wrote:
Babylonia, with its long established civilization, 
its highly developed agriculture, industry, commerce, 
and banking, had a most complex and highly differentiated 
structure • • • Centralization, planning, and control were 
during thousands of years the salient features of its 
economic evolution.5
^Rostovtzeff, M., op. cit♦, p. ?8.
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During the first half of the first millennium B.C. the 
Phoenicians carried on the trade of the eastern Mediterranean.
The relation of the Phoenician ports to the Babylonian caravan 
trade and to the Minoan island commerce of Crete, whose numerous 
colonies were probably going into business for themselves as the 
Cretan empire fell, provides a suggestion of the heritage of the 
eastern Mediterranean.
We know that seventh-century Ionian Greek cities like Miletus 
and Chalcis had long traded with settlements near the Black Sea 
for metals and peltry, and it is suggestive that the archeologi- 
cally documented Trojan War of Homer's Iliad of the early twelfth 
century B.C. involved a city dominating the gateway to the Black 
Sea at a point where the traders' galleys frequently camped wait­
ing for favorable winds and currents. Jason's search for the 
Golden Fleece led him: into the same country.
As an illustration of the state of commerce in the seventh 
century, it is worth noting that Nechos, Pharoah of Egypt from 
610 to 59^ B.C., spent considerable effort in the latter part of 
his reign in furthering an old project to build a canal from the 
Nile Delta to the Red Sea. The project was abandoned on the 
advice of his hydrographers, who contended that the level of the 
Red Sea was higher than that of the Mediterranean, and that the 
fertile delta would be flooded by such a canal. Around 596 B.C. 
Rechos built a fleet and commissioned a force of Phoenician ad­
venturers to circumnavigate Africa. They started down the Red
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Sea and returned three years later through the Strait of Gibraltar,
ghaving stopped seasonally to make a crop of grain for provisions.
The Ionian Greek city of Miletus at the mouth of the Maeander 
River in Asia Minor was the leading commercial city near the 
Aegean Sea during the seventh century B.C. By the middle of the 
seventh century, she was the parent of over sixty colonies in 
the Black Sea area, and the lands between lying on the route.
The mainland Greek city of Corinth was among the earliest promi­
nent Greek cities engaged in commerce with the Black Sea in the 
east, and Italy and Sicily in the west. At Corinth, ships were 
dragged across the isthmus for a distance of five miles either 
way on a skidway from the Aegean to the Adriatic, thereby saving 
over two hundred miles of coasting around the Peloponnesos.
This trade stimulated craftsmanship with specialisation 
among the coastal cities in bronze work, cloth manufacture,
pottery, and shipbuilding. In the eighth century Hesiod com-
7mented on the development of competition between artisans and
gadvised the raising of only one son. This period was one of 
expanding agricultural populations and increased manufacturing 
for export. The extensive introduction; of local coinage of 
money in the commercial city states and the importation of grain
6Breasted, James H>, A History of Egypt (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 
nTrever, op. cit.. p. 14*
OMyres, John L., Geographical History in Greek Lands 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 172-208"!!
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from the colonies in southern Russia stimulated the growth of 
urban commerce# The establishment of trading posts, or colonies, 
became very important to even the less commercial cities like 
Athens* Linforth wrote of the period:
The general character of the seventh and sixth 
centuries in the history of Greece is well known*
It was an age of colonization, of rapidly growing 
commerce, of sudden riches and sudden losses. The 
old traditional life of isolated Greek communities 
was undergoing a transformation: the old noble
families embarked on new enterprises of money making; 
the lower classes saw opportunities for advancement 
which did not depend on the ownership of the soil.
The mass of the people began to be aware of hopes 
and possibilities which had never before entered 
their heads. The world was suddenly opened to them.
A spirit of adventure, an eagerness for a larger 
and fuller life marked the whole age.9
An illustration of the extent of individualistic trading during 
this period is provided by the trade across Asia between the 
Scythians on the Black Sea and Mongol tribes with access to a 
supply of gold at China’s back door. Some fragments of a poem 
by Aristeas from the seventh or sixth century indicate that a 
Greek trader had travelled by land almost to the borders of north 
China. According to the poem, he brought back reports of the 
Hyperboreans, who lived behind the north wind in settled agri­
cultural communities with a temperate sea beyond them.^^
There is ample historical material on the pattern of com-
^Linforth, Ivan M., Solon The Athenian (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1919), p. 50*
■^See G. F. Hudson, Europe and China (London: Edward Arnold 8c 
Co., 1931)* PP* 27-32 for a discussion of the extent of inland 
trade across Asia during this period.
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mercial evolution in the city states of Greece as they wended 
a stormy course between democratic and aristocratic principles* 
Some of the best detail and earliest economic thought is pro­
vided by the poems and legends of Solon, who was made Archon 
of Athens around 39b B*C* Solon's role in Athens is significant 
because the economic situation in Athens at the time was char­
acteristic of many Greek cities during the preceding century, 
and of many more for two centuries to come*
In brief, Athens was situated close to the coast in a rather 
poor agricultural district with a rapidly expanding population 
which had evolved from herding to cereal production. The in­
habitants came in contact with traders of various countries and 
commerce developed. With the introduction of wealth in the form 
of silver and gold coins which could be accumulated and con­
cealed, the nobility began putting their poorer lands into 
vineyards and olive groves to provide a cash crop. The poor 
found willing lenders of cash during the all too frequent years 
of poor grain harvest in Attica, the district around Athens, 
and debt became a social problem. We cannot know the exact sys­
tem of land tenure, but with the nobility controlling the judicial 
structure, and with personal or physical liability for debt, 
large tracts of land were being acquired by the rich from dis­
possessed peasants and converted into vineyards, for which it was 
best suited. The peasants who lost their land through debt were 
sold into slavery abroad, reduced to serfdom or slavery at home,
75
or forced into the city to join the labor force with produced 
goods for export. Many migrated to the colonies to get a new 
start.
The political turmoil brought Solon to power. His poems 
describing the situation provide an economic perspective of 
theoretical import. Solon believed in a moral justice that 
would triumph in the end, an idea similar to the old Homeric 
notion of "Fate” which was preordained, and beyond the control 
of the gods. In Homer’s Iliad, Zeus weighed the "fates” of 
Hector and Achilles on a balance to see which would be victor­
ious. Solon believed in a natural equilibrium of justice or 
moral right that would emerge if given time. Toward that end, 
if political and economic forces were balanced so that nothing 
would occur too rapidly, the process would permit natural reason 
and stable legal government to prevail. The following passages 
from one of the longest fragments of Solon's poems are worth 
quoting because of their economic description, and their funda­
mental welding of economic, political, and legal problems into 
one single problem of ethical and natural policy:
The ruin of our state will never come by the doom 
of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal 
gods . . .  It is the townsfolk themselves and their 
falsehearted leaders who would fain destroy our great 
city through wantonness and love of money. But they 
are destined to suffer sorely for their outrageous be­
havior. They know not how to hold in check their full- 
fed lust, or, content with the merriment the banquet 
affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in order.
They are rich because they yield to the temptation of 
dishonest courses . . .  They spare neither the treasures 
of the gods nor the property of the state, and steal like 
brigands one from another. They pay no heed to the
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unshaken rock of holy justice, who, though she be 
silent, is aware of all that happeneth now or hath 
happened in the past, and in course of time, surely 
cometh to demand retribution. Lo, even now there 
cometh upon the whole city a plague which none may 
escape. The people have come quickly into degrading 
bondage; and war destroyeth many in the beauty of 
their youth. As if she were the prey of foreign 
foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and con­
sumed in those secret conspiracies which are the de­
light of dishonest men.
These are the evils which stalk at home. Mean­
while, the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded 
with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign 
lands . . .  Thus public calamity cometh to the house 
of every individual, and a man is no longer safe within 
the gates of his own court . . .
In the latter part of the same poem, Solon continues:
These things ray heart prompteth me to teach the 
Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness 
worlceth more harm to the state than any other cause.
But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony, 
and at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers; 
it maketh rough things smooth, it checketh inordinate 
desires, it dimmeth the glare of wanton pride and 
withereth the budding bloom of wild delusion; it 
maketh crooked judgements straight and softeneth ar­
rogant behavior; it stoppeth acts of sedition and 
stoppeth the anger of bitter strife. Under the reign 
of law, sanity and wisdom prevail ever among men.1-*-
Solon was a military hero and a poet of great repute. He 
was an aristocrat, but he had travelled widely as a merchant, and 
he sympathized with the lower classes. His reputation was largely 
gained from his defiance of a ban on discussion of Salomis by re­
citing a hundred-line poem in the market place of Athens, and 
thereby winning the leadership of a military expedition. We 
do not know the circumstances surrounding this event, but he
^Linf orth, op. cit., pp. 140-1^3*
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apparently defied a death penalty in criticizing a decision of 
the governing body of Athens*
Solon was made Archon for one year with extraordinary powers 
to reorganize the constitution of Athens about 59^ B.C. The 
respect of the lower classes for his courage and honesty, and 
the respect of the more reflective element of the aristocracy 
which trusted his version of reason and morality led to this 
individualistic approach to reform. It took place in an epoch 
when popular revolts were setting up tyrannies in many of the 
Greek commercial cities* These tyrannies were Napoleonic af­
fairs, forceful seizures of power by democratic elements which, 
lacking an organizational tradition, resorted to personal dic­
tatorships. Apparently Solon could have taken the tyranny 
of Athens. However, since the aristocracy knew he did not be­
lieve in it, they preferred to grant him extra authority to 
stabilize their position with as few sacrifices as necessary.
Backed by a set of emergency decrees designed to avert 
revolution, Solon set aside all debts for which the liberty of 
the individual was security, liberated slaves r/.wh©/; had been 
reduced to that status through seizures for debt, and apparently 
used public money to re-purchase citizens who had been sold 
abroad. During the term of his office, Solon revised the legal 
structure and broadened the franchise. However, class quali­
fications for office holding were retained. He developed a 
system of judicial referendum which enabled the popular vote to 
be the ultimate authority in judicial decisions. The democratic
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process was successfully served by the custom of trying elected 
officials at the end of their term of office. Therefore, in 
general, although representation was poor, the moral and states­
manlike characteristics of the nobility were stimulated by a 
kind of negative democracy. This seems to have been Solon’s 
answer to the problem of providing educated and trained leader­
ship with a democratic sense of responsibility. It is the 
institution of regulation as applied in economic matters in 
modern western European economic and industrial affairs.
Solon’s understanding of the course of economic development 
is evidenced by his attempt to stop the abuses of the decaying 
agricultural system. At the same time, he took steps to stimu­
late the growth of the commercial and industrial enterprises 
which offered a means of providing for the unemployed and desti­
tute. His major acts in this direction were the minting of 
Athenian silver coins and the adoption of the system of weights 
and measures prevalent in the Aegean commercial basin to replace 
the mainland system. While the mina was the same in both systems, 
the new system equated the mina to one hundred drachmae instead 
of seventy drachmae as in the old system. This had the effect of 
creating inflation at the lower levels of the economy. Indica­
tions are that it was designed to reduce by thirty percent fixed 
money rentals and charges and secured debts among the lower in­
come groups where the amounts were specified in drachmae.
After Solon’s archonship, there ensued in Athens over thirty 
years of fairly well balanced strife while she forged her new
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commercial orientation. Solon, apparently dissatisfied with the 
lesson ir. organization and collective action learned by the citi­
zens of Athens, left a post-mortem in another poetic fragment:
If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of 
your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil for­
tune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men 
to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this 
course to a wretched state of servitude. Each man 
among you, individually, walketh with the tread of a 
fox, but collectively ye are a set of simpletons. For 
ye look to the tongue and the play of a man’s speech ^  
and regard not the deed which is done before your eyes.
This sarcasm was directed to the aristocracy who had the 
power to elect the civic leadership. The tyranny finally came in 
560 B.C., but it came through Pisistratus, a kinsman of Solons, 
and a man who understood Solon’s economic program. He exiled the 
most incorrigible landowners and redistributed their estates to 
the landless, introduced viticulture on a large scale, and pro­
vided government loans at low interest rates to facilitate the
transformation of the smaller holdings into olive orchards and
13vineyards to further the more profitable export trade. Athenian 
exports grew, her industry expanded, her common people prospered 
and became the backbone of her strength as she emerged as a mari­
time power.
For fifty years after Pisistratus, Athens was ruled by 
tyrants dependent upon the full mobilization of popular support
~*~̂ Ibid. . pp. lMf-1k5% Fragment XIV.
13Marsh, Frank Burr, Modern Problems in the Ancient World 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 19^3T, p. 27* Also see Chapt. 
Iy "Solon and the ’New Deal'," pp. 14-28, and Chapt. II, "Unem-
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to recapture control on several occasions. Chronic warfare 
increased in scale, and Persia closed in around the eastern 
Mediterranean, conquering Egypt and crossing sporadically into 
the base of the Grecian peninsula. Finally, with the island 
and coastal cities of the Aegean threatened by Persia, Athens 
put all her state resources into a navy, and defeated the Per­
sians in a naval battle in 480 B.C. Combined with the dis­
covery of silver at Laurion on the Attic peninsula near Athens 
in 483 B.C., this development made Athens the commercial empress 
of the Aegean.
In 4-7? B.C. the Confederacy of Delos was established under 
the leadership of Athens. Sparta, the strongest military land 
force in the Grecian world, had no economic interest in the Per­
sian empire beyond her own grain fields, but Athens had a dual 
use for her fleet. The fleet was to give mobility and protect 
the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor and the islands. It 
partially maintained itself by piratical raids on Persian terri­
tory along the coasts. With protection, many smaller cities 
preferred to pay cash dues to Athens and to let Athens provide 
the ships and men to man them. The peacetime fleet offered
cheap transportation for goods and stimulated trade by securing
14navigation against all but the hazards of the weather.
Athens had now grown to a commercial center with colonies 
in Sicily, southern Italy, southern Russia, and the coasts and
"^See J. B. Bury, A History of Greece (London: Macmillan & Co., 
Ltd., 1956), p. 328 ff., on the Confederacy of Delos.
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islands ringing the Aegean to which she could dispatch armies
on short notice. Her silver coins with the owl on one side and
the goddess Athena on the other were the common currency of the
Mediterranean.. These coins were made from the produce of the
silver mines in the rocky ridges of Laurion where an estimated
labor force of from twelve to sixty thousand slaves worked on
1 5a ten-hour day producing silver and lead for Athens.
A census of Athens in byi B.C. gave a population figure of 
172,000 freemen and 1^2,500 slaves and metics (resident alien 
craftsmen and merchants). The census was fortunately taken just 
prior to the subsequent plagues and the Peloponnesian Wars which 
wrecked the Athenian empire. This total population of 31*f,500 
was not by any stretch of the imagination maintained by local 
produce. Practically all grain was imported, primarily from the 
large number of colonies in south Bussia, and another major
17staple, fish, was imported from the rivers of the same region. 
Trade was atomized to a degree beyond our experience, with the 
state controlling capital investment where large sums and 
material quantity were important.
15̂See George M. Calhoun, The Business Life of Ancient Athens 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 135-172 for a 
discussion of all aspects of the mines, the blighted industrial 
districts of Athens, the regulated grain trade, and banking.
■^Bostovtzeff, op. cit., p. 96.
17Xbid., pp. 105-106.
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Athenian power was dependent upon the democracy, and her 
control over the members of the confederation became nearly ab­
solute by denying the right of secession. Democratic parties 
were supported over the agricultural-minded aristocracy which 
feared the growth of commerce and Athenian domination. The 
policy of the state under these democracies was to permit small 
business to flourish by regulating trade and fragmenting com­
mercial processes so as to prevent monopoly and the growth of 
an economic opportunity for the aristocrats to dominate commerce 
with their agricultural wealth.
For example, most ships were owned by one man, or by partners, 
leased by a merchant or captain under a bottomry contract which 
provided for twenty to thirty percent interest, but did not re­
quire payment if the vessel were lost at sea. This combination of 
marine insurance and short-term capital was provided by third 
parties specializing in such operations, not by banks. The mer­
chant or captain could sublet cargo space on the vessel, and on . 
return, the cargo was held by the financier for repayment. How­
ever, the merchant was responsible for sale of the merchandise.
In the case of grain, no grain wholesaler could buy or have in 
his possession at one time more than fifty measures of grain, 
which prevented anyone from cornering the market.
Athens reached the climax of her wealth and artistic achieve­
ments under Pericles just prior to the Peloponnesian IVars of 431 
to 401 B.C., and this period of warfare broke her control over
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the export markets of the Greek world. However, her technology 
and science as well as her prosperity continued throughout the 
following century. Socrates and Plato are remembered as the 
intellectual giants of the latter part of the fifth century and 
extending into the fourth. During the Peloponnesian War the 
colonies, probably long able, seized the opportunity to become 
industrial exporters in their own right. Athens traded power 
with Sparta until the land and sea powers of mainland Greece 
were neutralized in dual defeat, although Sparta, the land power, 
nominally won. Fourth-century Greece produced Aristotle and 
Alexander the Great, and provided the cultural and technologi­
cal impetus of the post-Alexandrian period. Bostovtzeff wrote 
of the economic life of this period:
After the Peloponnesian War, the ceaseless wars of 
of early fourth century, and the repeated political and 
social revolutions within the cities, the economic aspect 
of Greece completely changed. Though still prosperous 
and still increasing and improving her agricultural and 
industrial production, Greece was now passing through 
an economic and social crisis which gradually became 
more acute . . .
The economic and social life of the time was marked 
by two dominant features: the lapse of the mass of 
the population into proletarianisra and, closely con­
nected therewith, the growth of unemploymentj and 
secondly a shortage of foodstuffs, which sometimes as­
sumed an acute and catastrophic form.1®
This period of ferment produced the mature economic thought
l8Ibid., p. 9b
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of the Greek world. Because of its traditions, social philosophy 
was included in the study of politics and ethics, but as will be 
apparent in our discussions of Xenophon and Aristotle, the area 
of relationships specifically related to production and commerce 
on an abstract level was recognized. The economic setting is 
clearly suggestive of very modern problems. Before examining 
the theories of Xenophon and Aristotle, it will be necessary to 
survey in a cursory manner the intellectual history and theoretical 
setting in which the economic ideas of the fourth century in 
Greece were developed.
Early Natural and Social Philosophy
In the Preface to his compendium of the mass of ignored, 
overlooked, and scattered data which gives ample contradiction to 
the idea that the ancient Greeks were mere speculators and made 
few scientific advances, Morris Cohen wrote:
The notion that natural science began in the seven­
teenth century with Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, or 
perhaps in the sixteenth with Copernicus, and that the 
Greeks were mere speculators and the medieval thinkers 
all sunk in theology and superstition is not merely an 
established popular error; it has become a basic dogma 
of modernistic philosophy and is even shared by some 
professional historians. This error is largely sup­
ported by the prevailing type of specialized education, 
which trains students of nature to look at things ex­
clusively from the point of view of current conceptions 
and does not sufficiently equip them with philological 
or historical methods to investigate how the world ap­
peared to men at other times.̂ 9
Clagett's recent work adds substance to the idea that the
^Cohen, Morris !<• and I. E. Drabkin, A Source Book in 
Greek Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc•, 1948), p. vii.
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Greeks did indeed make a significant contribution to the develop­
ment of science. Regarding the contributions of the Greeks to 
the structure of scientific theory, Clagett said:
Initially we must insist upon the general 'rational,' 
critical, often secular and nonmythological tone that 
the natural philosophers of the pre-Socratic period 
gave to much of Greek thought and science. • •
Another distinctive feature of Greek thought that 
emerged during the first period (600-^00 B.C.) was 
the basic concept of a 'generalized' science as dis­
tinguished from a set of empirical rules.
Clagett cited the development of geometry as characteristic of 
this early period, but in dealing with the later Hellenistic 
period when Alexandria was the center of Greek culture and sci­
ence, he criticised Hero's ideas on experimental method contained 
in his work on vacuums, observing that "it falls short in the
maturity and universality of its use of mathematical-experimental 
21techniques*" Clagett characterized the Greek development of 
optics as an example of the near-establishment of a completely 
modern science since in this field empirical relationships were 
analyzed and formulated mathematically, permitting theoretical 
manipulation of the possibilities consistent with the experimental 
evidence, even though the causes were not fully understood.
Characteristic of the beginnings of Greek science was a 
naturalism and cosmological orientation which led the philosophers
20Clagett, Marshall, Greek Science in Antiquity (New York: 
Abelard-Shuman, Inc., 1955T, PP* 22-23,
21Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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to associate nature and man and physical and social processes 
together as facets of a single universe. Cherniss observed:
■From the sixth century E.C. Greek thinkers were 
obsessed by the desire to establish relations among 
all the entities and events of which they had cogni­
zance*^
In reference to the pre-Socratic philosophers he continued:
Of their works we have only exiguous fragments and 
reports at secondhand or third; but evidence enough 
exists to show that even the Ionians, the earliest of 
the 'pre-Socratics,' were not exclusively 'natural 
historians' or 'physiologers' and that probably all ~  
and certainly some ~  of them treated the physical : 
origin of things as only the first chapter in their 
investigation of the causes of the world of men in 
which they lived.^3
Pre-Socratic thought, occuring as it did before philosophy 
became involved and detailed to the point of requiring a special­
ized vocabulary and formal background, reveals the clear roots 
of the dominant formulations of even modern social and physical 
thought. Our understanding of the naked structure of theory is 
improved and made easier to criticize. According to W&ndelband:
The beginnings of scientific life that are thus 
found in ancient philosophy are most influential upon 
the entire development that follows. With proportion­
ately few data, Greek philosophy produced, with a kind 
of grand simplicity, conceptual forms for the intellectual 
elaboration of its facts, and with a remorseless logic 
it developed every essential point of view for the study 
of the universe. Therein consists the peculiar char­
acter of ancient thought and the high didactic signi­
ficance of its history.2^
^ C h e r n i s s ,  Harold, "The History of Ideas and Ancient Greek 
Philosophy," in Studies in Intellectual History by Boas and others 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933)* p. 22.
25Ibid.j p. 23 
24Windelband, op. cit.. p. 2.
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 ̂ - - -At -the-beginning of "this discussion, it is worthwhile to 
note that Greek religious tradition had a rather open moral code 
which revolved around, or within, a concept-of moderation. The 
principle tended to be that, given the extreme choices of be­
havior, one could not go too far v/rong if he chose the inter­
mediate course. There was no necessary valuation of the 
extremes as to how far they were from the moral mean, but rather, 
whatever it happened to be, the "median" had a moral value.
This is the background for a habit of thinking in terms of an 
equilibrium, or in terms of opposites as a way of formulating 
problems. We can also recognize in this moral tradition the 
concept of equilibrium out of which logic grew, equating terms, 
and subsequently the use of equations in detailizing problems 
to give formulations that made known relationships applicable 
to specific problems. We do not know the age or the roots of 
this pattern of thought nor its relationship to earlier mathe­
matics.
The Ionian Nature Philosophers
The Ionian nature philosophers of Miletus were the first re­
corded thinkers in our tradition. They were Thales, probably 
from 640 B.C. to 5̂ -8 B.C. and, according to tradition, a personal
friend of Solon; Anaximander, probably 610 B.C., who left a
25treatise behind; and Anaximenes, 585 to B.C.
^5see T. V. Smith, op. cit.. pp. 5-69. For general treatments 
of the pre-Socratic period, see W. Wendelband, op. cit., and W. T. 
Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co•, 1952),pp. 3*91•
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Thales is reported to have formulated a theory of the nature 
of all things that involved a vast circulation with water or li­
quidity as the common form, or equilibrium state. He was aware 
of the cycle of evaporation and precipitation, which he associated 
with springs and silting at river mouths. He assumed the gaseous 
and solid states to be extremes in the circulatory system of 
liquids, or water, but water was the basic stuff of nature, in 
his view. This approach is an important beginning because it 
excludes all mystical or superstitious causes, and prepares the 
way for observation and measurement as the avenues toward 
scientific knowledge. However, it is his ideas on circulation 
and equilibrium which will interest us.
A surviving fragment of Anaximander's work indicates that 
he abstracted his views from the simple physical elements, and 
believed in a natural order or balance within circulatory systems 
and between them, which he believed constituted a natural princi­
ple which had application in natural morality and justice. The 
following is from a fragment of his writings quoted in T. V. 
Smith's work:
The beginning of that which is, is the boundless, 
but whence that which is arises, thither must it re­
turn again of necessity; for the things give satis­
faction and reparation to one another for their 
injustice, as is appointed according to the ordering 
of time.
The concept of "justice" or "injustice" is presumed to have had
Smith, o£. cit., p. 6.
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a common meaning of balance or lack of balance in a physical as 
well as a moral sense*
Anaximenes had a different approach. He assumed a develop­
ment over time and therefore looked for the basic or generic 
material, not as an equilibrium, but as a starting point. He 
assumed that air or gaseous matter was unlimited in quantity, 
that motion existed without beginning, and that these two quan­
titative elements caused a development of forms with varying 
degrees of condensation, rarification and motion, thus making 
up all quality or specific characteristics of natural phenomena. 
He thought that the earth was suspended in air, and apparently 
applied a principle of evolution to all things.
It is presumed that the Ionian philosophers applied their 
concepts to social as well as physical process since natural 
order and natural justice were prevalent notions in their period. 
Of significance to us is the basic thought forms of circulation, 
equilibrium within circulation, equilibrium between two balancing 
circulations, the overall tendency to balance between opposites 
that are temporarily out of equilibrium, and the idea that things 
have an origin in a basic type of substance and grow and develop 
over time within the limits of certain natural conditions.
Since this beginning struggle into abstraction, men have gone 
over the same ground again and again, concentrating on more de­
tailed problems, on narrower aspects, or on drawing tbgether the 
accumulated ideas. Each time they have worked over the same old 
quilt with the same needle they have dug in a little deeper,
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picking up a second and then a third ply of the fabric of useful 
understanding.
After the Ionians came several distinct lines of thought 
which are important, but shakily incomplete as balanced theories.
Heraclitus
Heraclitus (probably around 500 B.C.) further refined the 
Ionian philosophy and the pattern of thought which he established 
persisted for a long time. He abstracted the concept of circu­
lation into an ultimate principle similar to the modern concept 
of the indestructibility of matter. He believed that the basic 
elements of the universe are: fire (energy), air (gas), water
(liquid), and earth (solids). He considered fire to be the 
common form of all these elements since they all are exchangeable 
with it, but at the same time regarded it as a phase in their 
balanced circulation. He also incorporated the notion of 
development or change of Anaximenes into his theory. Windelband 
summarized the significance of his outlook in modern terminology:
The physical application of these principles afforded 
a thoroughgoing theory of the elemental changes in the uni­
verse. Action and reaction take place in orderly suc­
cession, and indeed in such wise that they are constantly 
balanced in their results. Thus it happens that single 
things have their appearance of persisting, when two op­
posing forces temporarily hold each other in equilibrium, 
as, for instance, the river SppearSoas a. permanent thing 
because just as much water flows to a point as flows 
from it. Heraclitus designated this rhythm of change as 
the two 'Ways' which are identical . . .27
27Windelband, op. cit., p. 55
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Heraclitus* view of things as everchanging and in constant 
development, yet observable from a point, probably emphasized 
space, and had overtones later of value in a moral sense. It 
is as simple and yet as complex an idea as the method of sur­
veying used by the United States government in terms of town­
ships and ranges from an arbitrarily selected point, lacking 
a comprehensive formula for geoidetic deformation. Much eco­
nomic thought of the last tivo centuries is based upon the 
arbitrary significance of "price" as a starting point for cal­
culating production and distribution against a presumption of 
a circulatory undercurrent. In this connection, Heraclitus made 
a casual reference by way of clarifying a sequence of ideas 
which, had it been given as a statement of primary intent, 
would have given him claim to being the predecessor of the Phy­
siocrats in the theory of circulation:
This order, the same for all things, no one of 
gods or men has made, but it always was, and is, 
and ever shall be, an ever living fire, kindling 
according to fixed measure, and extinguishing ac­
cording to fixed measure.
All things are exchanged for fire, and fire for 
all things; as wares are exchanged for gold, and gold for wares.28
Heraclitus wrote a book on politics in which he applied the 
principle of natural order to social relations. The fragments 
remaining of this work clearly reveal that he believed that jus­
tice results from an equal balance of force, war and strife being 
natural processes, and that the source of social stability is
28Smith, op. cit., p. 11.
92
equilibrium. He illustrated his idea by the example of a strung 
bow, saying that the string pulls just as hard as the bow does, 
and for the reason that the bow is pulling just as hard as the 
string is. This idea of an equal balance of forces was the 
principle behind Solon's reforms of the previous century. It 
is a theory of evolution and equilibrium combined in a strikingly 
modern analysis. The point of importance to our discussion is 
that this is viewed as a totally natural process, with no room 
for human choice and therefore embodying no possible concept of 
resources, or uses. Value is in process alone, and everything 
is natural. The weak point that Heraclitus had to deal with 
was the realization that,
Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men, since 
their souls lack understanding.
It is not good for men to have whatever they want.
Disease makes health sweet and good; hunger, satiety;toil, rest.^9
Such ideas pose the problem of the fallibility of human opinion 
and the question of the relativity of values. Heraclitus in 
other passages expounded the idea that there is a clear order 
of truth, but that it requires men like himself to understand it. 
Earlier reference has been made to his attitude toward the lower 
classes in the democratic cities. Heraclitus needed a dependable 
scientific measuring stick of natural phenomena since raw obser­
vation obviously had its limitations.
^Ibid., pp. 10 and 12*
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After Heraclitus came new and more inclusive formulations 
of the order or lack or order in the world, and of the methods 
of studying it. Here is the beginning of the problem of method 
in forging theory.
The Pythagoreans 
The Pythagoreans were an important religious and scientific 
organization in the tradition of Xenophanes and Pythagoras from 
the late sixth century. These men believed in a mystic order, 
a non-anthropomorphic god of order and consistency, and were 
convinced that empirical investigation of order and relationships 
was the avenue by which men could grow in understanding their god. 
The Pythagorean societies frequently had much political influ­
ence and may have been similar to medieval monasteries, but 
they concentrated on studying mathematics, astronomy, and musical 
harmony. Working with geometry and proportions, they worked 
out multiple relationships and dealt with harmonies of greater 
complexity than equilibriums between two opposites. Plato and 
the Athenian moralists belittled them for not probing the mys­
terious with their minds, and for spending so much time measuring 
and counting things.
Parmenides and Zeno 
Another branch of the growing tree of Greek theory is rep­
resented by Parmenides of Elea (born about 513 B.C.) and his 
pupil, Zeno. These men are not distinguished from the Pythagor­
eans by many of their contemporaries. However, the views developed
by Parmenides and elaborated by Zeno are distinct from the mystic 
empiricism of the later Pythagorean societies.
Parmenides took up the key point of method. He concluded 
that observation was inadequate, and that logical consistency 
was the avenue to truth. He was prepared to follow logic where- 
ever it might lead with an almost mystic feeling for the validity 
of mental processes in fathoming the truth about reality. His 
most important contribution was his readiness to doubt estab­
lished assumptions and to follow a method in spite of apparent 
conflicts with superficial observation. Unfortunately, he 
carried his views into a blind alley of absurdity, as evidenced 
by the following passage:
Come now I will tell thee— and do thou hear my 
word and heed it— what are the only ways of enquiry 
that lead to knowledge. The one way assuming that
being is and that it is impossible for it not to be,
is the trustworthy path, for truth attends it . . .  .
This beginning of a discussion on truth in one of Parmenides 
poems illustrates his concern with what has come to be known as
the "metaphysical problem." Parmenides denied the possibility of
change since, if all things exist or are, then everything that 
happens to them is also in existence, and nothing new can be 
created out of that which already exists. He felt that the 
notion that there might be new things created out of nothingness 
was utter nonsense. The possibility that a force could create 
something which had not previously existed was equally nonsensi­
cal to him. Based on this assumption which specifically re­
nounces evolution and sets forth a totally static base, deductive
5°Ibid., p. 15.
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logic can derive all answers about any relationships. If 
nothing can change, then there is no such thing as motion*
He had to deny both change of time and variability in space. 
Ever since Parmenides, deductive logicians and mathematicians 
have been searching for unchanging or static generalizations 
which permit deductive answers closer to the line of common 
sense observation than were Parmenides’ conclusions. Some 
change always crops up, whether from incomplete grasp of the 
complexity of the body of static relationships, or from exter­
nal or creative interjections; from which, we can never be ab­
solutely sure.
Zeno elaborated Parmenides' work with his famous paradoxes. 
He demonstrated logically that if Achilles chased a tortoise, 
and every time the tortoise moved a given distance, Achilles 
reduced the distance between them by half, Achilles would keep 
halving the distance between himself and the tortoise, but 
given a relationship with the tortoise in front, there could 
be no change. The argument requires the indulgence of one's 
common sense to conceive of such infinitely minute divisions 
of space, or infinitely small fractions of time* In other 
words, the backdrop of a larger measuring stick of time or 
space has to be sacrificed when defining a relationship as 
static between two things in isolation. Aristotle and many 
others were able to expose this argument, but it, and many like 
it, sharpened the methodological wits of the Greeks, and
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emphasized the necessity for an empirical background for logic
31and mathematical calculations from a static assumption. Of 
course* Zeno did not necessarily concede time or space differen­
tiation since that would presume change or newness in structure 
which, could not come into existence out of nothing; and if it 
already existed, then it was not new or was not change.
After Zeno came two reactions which fairly well filled out 
the range of possibilities in scientific thought. Heraclitus 
had said that change was the nature of all things and relation­
ships, and that permanence was like an imaginary point in a line, 
or, at most, an equilibrium between two changing forces. Par­
menides and Zeno, on the other hand, had made everything so 
permanent that any relationship was immutable. According to 
their view, logic can explain all if one assumes that the totality 
of things possible already exists. The various responses to this 
type of thought are illustrated by Empedocles of Acragus in 
Sicily (about ^90 B.C. to ^30 B.C.) who resorted to empiricism 
and reunited logic and change. Empedocles wrote:
But come, examine by every means each thing how 
it is clear, neither putting greater faith in anything 
seen than what is heard, nor in a thundering sound more
than in the clear assertions of the tongue, nor keep
from trusting any of the other members in which there
lies means of knowledge, but know each thing in the wayin which it is clear.32
31Ibid., pp. 17-21 
32Ibid., p. 28.
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In the same tone as Empedocles' poems, Anaxagoras of Cla- 
zomenae (about 500 B.C. to *f28 B.C.) took a more noncommital po­
sition. He conceded an infinite number of things and an infinite 
detail. He believed that existence and non-existence are simply 
degrees of mixture and separation, and that it is merely the 
grossness of the human observer which leads him to characterize 
things in terms of their most conspicuous element. He contended 
that change is only a shift in relationship or order of importance. 
The idea is important because it introduced more subjectivism 
into formal thought at a time when subjectivism grew up in oppo­
sition to the objective religiosity of the aristocratic thinkers.
The Sophists
The Sophists were an important group of thinkers in the 
fifth- and fourth-century Greek world, but they have been less 
well remembered since they taught the democracy instead of the 
aristocracy. Protagoras of Abdera (*f8l to ^11 B.C.) is an 
example of the first of the prominent Sophists. He is reported 
to have been a common porter, noticed and educated by the atomist 
philosopher, Democritus. He was prominent in Athens during the 
Periclean period. He earned the scorn of Plato because, not 
having a private income, he charged money for teaching. Pro­
tagoras was a complete subjectivist. One of his major works be­
gins :
Man is the measure of all things, of things that are „  
that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.
35Ibid., p. 60.
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Protagoras represented the democracy, which had no moral 
rationale for its objectives. He therefore rejected any appeal 
to objective reality which was presumed to have common moral and 
physical meanings, and contended that everything is a matter of 
choice and purpose to suit men, since men can have no concern 
beyond themselves. This body of Sophist philosophy characterized 
by Protagoras represents the end of the search for natural prin­
ciples of society and the frank acceptance of social life as an 
arbitrary melee that man can make of what he will. The change 
of emphasis in political economy in the 1870's from objectivistic 
classical theory searching for natural laws to subjectivistic 
Austrian theory concerning itself with how the individual can 
best improve himself against the background of a commercial econ­
omy was a vastly refined reiteration of the same shift of emphasis 
in social thought.
In the latter fifth century B.C., the sophistication and or­
ganized mass of philosophy increased to a degree that makes its 
casual summation impossible. However, the objective and sub­
jective views of social analysis had been developed by this time, 
which furnished the basic thought patterns of subsequent philoso­
phy and science. Of great importance to economic theory is the 
recognition of the importance of the Sophists, since their views 
were accepted by the majority of the population and by the politi­
cal leadership of the fourth century*
The most important single idea of this summary of the natural
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and social philosophy of the Greeks is that the absence of eco­
nomic theory in the modern sense in fourth-century Greece was not 
the result of the absence of commercial or industrial problems, 
nor the absence of thought concerning these problems. Economic 
theory was developed, but it was couched in political, ethical, 
and institutional forms. In this respect the thought was some- 
vvhat similar to the perspectives of V/. C. Mitchell, Thorstein 
Veblen and J. B. Commons. In the light of this, a summary of 
the fifth- and fourth-century Greek thought on resources and 
natural process and its relationship to policy and governmental 
intervention in business will be more meaningful,
Greek Thought on Natural Relations and Human Choice
One’s assumptions regarding the order or pattern in nature 
and the latitude of choice exercised by human beings, both indi­
vidually and collectively, provide the foundation for any given 
theory of resources. Economic theory deals with the relationship 
between choices that might be made, and the character of patterns 
and choices that are made. This encompasses both free will and 
natural order* However one defines the nature and source of 
choice, these choices are made in terms of material or natural 
quantities or processes. It is this point of contact which 
shapes the material significance of such things as standards of 
living and capital goods, and in trying to understand the full­
ness of the contact, it is necessary to examine both the theory 
of nature which is the substance of economic concern as well as
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the theory of human alternatives and processes as the egocentric 
focal point of our practical interests. Greek thought was con­
cerned with this problem, although their ideas were presented in 
mythological metaphor or in involved abstract philosophizing.
In a seminar report given at Plato’s Academy a young man 
named Critias attempted to summarize the moral religious view 
of nature and human choice. Of course, Plato edited all these 
reports and is ultimately responsible for their contents since 
he used them as teaching aids. Critias presented the notion 
that the gods use persuasion on man to lead him to live properly 
on earth:
. . .  but they considered us as a docile and obedient 
animal; and, as if piloting a pliant ship; employed per­
suasion for the rudder; and with this conception as the 
leader, they governed the whole mortal race. Different 
gods, therefore, being allotted, adorned different 
places. But Vulcan and Minerva; who possess a common 
nature, both because they are the offspring of the same 
father, and because, through philosophy and the study 
of arts, they tend to the same things, 1—  these, I say, 
in consequence of this, received one allotment., viz., 
this region, as being naturally allied and adapted to 
virtue and prudence.3^
The translator's note explained the metaphor employed as follows:
Vulcan is the divine power which presides over the 
spermatic and physical reasons, or productive princi­
ples, whibh the universe contains; . . .  By Minerva we 
must understand the summit . . of all those intellectual 
natures that reside in Jupiter, the Artificer of the 
world; or, in other wordsyshe is the deity which il­
luminates all mundane natures with intelligence.35
3bPlato, The Timaeus and the Critias or Atlanticus. The 
Thomas Taylor translation, the Bollingen Series (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 19^)* p» 233*
55Ibid*,
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This view represents the aristocratic tradition of a chosen 
people in a chosen land with divine leadership, but with an area 
in which error may be committed. Divine leadership must be 
discerned, however, and the Platonic solution was through rational 
thought which, it was believed, would parallel the divine formu­
lations and intent. Thus, understanding was sought through 
divine inspiration. It was thought that by developing the nature 
of the mind itself, reason would follow divine intent. This re­
ligious naturalism assumes that all knowledge will be revealed 
through thought and mental exercise to develop the self-contained 
propensities of the mind. Everything, therefore, is a natural 
resource in the purely natural sense, and the only choice re­
maining to man is to spend more time contemplating so as to im­
prove his receptivity to natural leadership. This view represents 
the extent of Plato's interest in practical knowledge.
In one of his dialogues, Plato presented the contrasting 
views of Protagoras the Sophist. The dialogue consisted of an 
argument between Protagoras and Socrates which Plato recorded. 
According to Plato's version, Protagoras lost the argument and 
was ridiculed after resorting to quibbling definitions. However, 
Protagoras' views have a clarity of understanding which gives him 
the upper hand in the judgement of history.
Protagoras' account of the accepted mythology went somewhat 
as follows. When Zeus, or Jupiter (the latter is the Latin tern) 
created the earth, he passed out means of livelihood and defense 
to all the animals. However, he was careless in his apportionment,
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because he ran completely out of natural defensive mechanisms or 
natural means of getting food while he still had one animal left. 
This was man. Out of sympathy for man, left naked and helpless, 
Prometheus stole fire and the arts of metallurgy from Hephaestus 
(Vulcan), and from Athene (Minerva), the intellectual and house­
hold crafts. Zeus has sole possession of political wisdom 
(and, we may suppose, economics, as a subsivision thereof), so 
Prometheus could not get any of that for man. Prometheus was 
severely punished by Zeus for imparting this bit of godliness 
to man, but when Zeus observed that men had gathered into cities 
to protect themselves and yet still fought each other, he de­
cided that he had to save the situation. Therefore, he gave men 
a sense of justice which, according to Protagoras, was meant for 
all, although the skills given by Prometheus had been selectively 
distributed. On this ground, Protagoras contended that justice 
and political principles could be taught to all. Socrates took 
issue with this democratic assumption.
Concerning Protagoras' use of mythology in this argument, 
it may be pointed out that one of his books dealing with the gods 
began with the sentence:
As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either 
that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are 
the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity 
of the question and the shortness of human life.36
After being read publicly in Athens, the book was burned in the
market place after all copies had been collected. Protagoras was
Smith, op. cit., p. 60.
103
considered a skeptic*
As to how man should approach the problems of society and 
chart his course based on the limiting confines of natural ten­
dency, Plato scornfully represents Protagoras as abandoning the 
moral view in the following passage in which Protagoras states 
his position regarding decisions pertaining to the art of so­
ciety:
Would not the art of measurement be the saving prin­
ciple; or would the power of appearance? Is not the 
latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and 
down and take the things at one time of which we repent 
at another both in our actions and in our choice of 
things great and small?
But the art of measurement would do away with the 
effect of appearances, and showing the truth, would 
fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, 
and would thus save our life. Would not mankind gen­
erally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes 
this result is the art of measurement?
Well, then, my friends, I say to them; seeing 
that the salvation of human life has been found to con­
sist in the right choice of pleasure and pains, —  
in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the 
greater and the less, and the nearer and the remoter, 
must not this measuring be a consideration of their 
excess and defect and equality in relation to each 
other.57
Protagoras defined virtue as choice, and reasoned that if virtue
is rational knowledge, then virtue can be taught. On the other
hand, he reasoned, if virtue is not rational, measurable knowledge,
38then it cannot be taught. Socrates was inclined to believe that
3^Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, Laws. Translated 
by Benjamin Jowettl (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 125.
38Ibid., p. 130.
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virtue is more of a natural endowment*
It is important to keep in mind this definition of virtue 
as the material valuing mechanism in political decisions, and the 
fact that virtue was included under both politics and ethics in 
discussions by the philosophers in ancient Greece* Protagoras' 
definition of virtue and his approach to its determination could, 
almost with amendment, be substituted for the statement of value 
theory in economics by a modern writer such as Lionel Robbins, 
for example*
The Platonic tradition, which is the most cultivated of the 
lines of Greek thought, by rejecting concern for an area to which 
measurement should or could be applied, rejected social science 
as such, and allowed only for investigations into the ordained 
natural principles of the world. Plato's natural method was 
mentalistic and mystical; he was inclined to believe that there 
is no distinction between the social and the physical. In this 
context, sill social phenomena are natural resources, and the 
definition of a resource is a tautology because there is no area 
of choice, no leeway in which human decisions or evaluations 
operate. For example, Plato's view of the division of labor 
was not an economic one, but a natural one similar to an analysis 
of the differences between hands and feet. The subsequent natural­
ism of the eighteenth century may have been in the same tradition, 
but it admitted an area of arbitrary social determination. Trever 
compared the ideas of Plato with those of Adam Smith on the divi-
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sion of labor as follows:
The basis of this law Plato finds in the fact of 
the diversity of natures, which fits men for different 
tasks. In this he differs from Adam Smith, who be­
lieves that the differences of natural talents in men 
are much less than is generally supposed. Smith makes 
the propensity to barter the source of specialization, 
which, in turn, is based on the interdependence of 
men. He thus considers the diversities in human na­
ture to be the effect rather than the cause of the 
division of labor. Plato, however, is probably nearer 
the truth, since the very reason for mutual interde­
pendence is diversity of nature.39
Our habit is to look at such relations in terms of static 
equilibriums; e.g., the degree of complexity of society is 
equal to the degree of specialization and diversity of training 
and ability, and the level of training, ability and specialization 
is equal to the complexity of the society. Each facet is a de­
terminant of the other, just as Heraclitus' bow string pulled 
just as hard as the bow pulled against it, and vice-versa.
However, most are prepared to concede that no given relationship 
is born full grown, and most are prepared to question whether 
any body of relationships is morally desirable as a permanent 
state, instead of a course of development. The trouble is that
if economic interdependence and specialization developed from 
a lesser degree to a greater, they could not have always been 
in equilibrium, and are not now. Thus, some fractional genera­
tive force, either a natural tendency or an external social pres­
sure must have chroncially pushed interdependence or specialization, 
and the tendency toward a static equilibrium between specialization
XQTrever, op. cit., p. 53*
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and interdependence drew the other factor along.
The impression is that Plato thought toward a full grown 
naturalism, that diversity in nature held the potential for a 
natural equilibrium ivith a concomitant degree of social com­
plexity, and that the stable society was the harmonious balance 
of social complexity with natural diversity and other natural 
factors. Thus, in Plato’s terms, natural stability was a 
natural resource, just like iron ore, and the social advantage 
was in working out the most harmonious and effective system 
of utilizing this resource. The later eighteenth century na­
turalists perceived fewer complex naturalistic tendencies which 
permitted variations in development with variations in result, 
together with many less ideal conditions, which left much more 
room for human initiative*
An example of modern thinking in this naturalistic vein 
is the concept of a "natural state of nature" in parklands or 
in forest areas. This idea assumes a completely oriented, full 
grown, stable state, with ideal properties inherent in the 
isolated and unmolested "wilderness area." Modern ecologists 
recognize that there is less balance than constant change in 
such an area, and that the complexity of the chain of causes 
is difficult to predict unless an over-riding external force 
such as fire or logging is introduced to control the "natural" 
forces. The surprisingly broad area of results that are af­
fected by the acts of man and the animals he influences defies
107
naturalistic definition as a balance or equilibrium. Only the 
generative forces can be called natural —  as long as they are 
not understood well enough to be recognized as influenced by 
decisions.
Early City Planning in Greece
The inclusion of the subject of city planning under a gen­
eral classification of natural resources may seem incongruous. 
However, in terms of Greek thought, it is conveniently explored 
in connection with this subject. Most philosophers whose major 
works have been preserved left some comments on this subject. 
Plato's Republic and his Laws are two of the most famous, but it 
.will suffice for us to describe the first such theory, and to 
indicate that the detailization and variations of the problems 
involved constitute a respectable body of data in itself.
Previous discussions have indicated that the eighth, seventh, 
and sixth centuries B.C. were periods of overpopulation and com­
mercial colonization in Greece. Although many of these colonies 
were probably no more than fortified trading posts, the intentional 
promulgation of colonies as an adaptive measure to population pres­
sure on the part of the city states must be presumed. Along with 
colonization, infanticide was used as a means of controlling popu­
lation to some degree, and was advocated by moral philosophers 
ifOlike Plato.
f̂OSee Myres, op. cit., p. 91 on colonization; p. 197 on 
Plato's idea of Mthe number of the state;M and p. 199 on infanti­
cide and documentation of the practice.
108
he elevation of colonial planning to the level of an ab­
stract science is as consistent with the pattern of philosophical 
thought in the Greek world as the development of theory in any 
other area where problems were recognized. The remarkable thing 
about their approach is that city planning was not the attempt 
to order natural tendencies to suit man's purposes, but the or­
dering of man's relationships to suit the natural order. It 
was thought that the discovery of the natural order was the dis­
covery of a useful element which would enable man to harmonize 
himself with nature and to save himself the discomfiture of being 
out of step with the natural order. While many modern thinkers 
accept varying degrees of natural order within which we must make 
our choices, these Greek city planners thought in terms of an 
all-pervasive natural order that was generally abstractable and 
which should be approached in every detail for maximum efficiency.
Hippodamus, a native of Miletus, was the first recorded
thinker to propound a definite theory of city planning. Aristotle
attributes to this man the invention of the art of planning cities,
hialong with a fondness for notoriety and eccentric mannerisms. 
Hippodamus planned the port city of Athens for Pericles in ^46 B.C. 
He applied here, in planning the Piraeus, his principle of laying 
out towns in broad, straight streets intersecting at right angles. 
He also planned and was architect for the founders of the Anthen- 
ian colony of Thurii in Italy in B.C. He superintended the
IflAristotle's Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. 
(New York: The Modern Library, 19^3)* PP* 102-107.
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Lprebuilding of the city of Rhodes in *t08 B.C.
Aristotle recognized Hippodamus as the first person other 
than a statesman to inquire into the best form of government, 
but he found fault with Hippodamus* flexible concessions to 
Sophism:
The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 
citizens divided into three parts —  one of artisans, 
one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of 
the state . . .
He also enacted that those who discovered anything 
for the good of the state should be honored . . .
. . . and it may sometimes seem desirable to make 
changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences 
have certainly been beneficial; Medicine, for example, 
and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have de­
parted from traditional usage. And, if politics be 
art, change must be necessary in this as in any other 
art . . .  The analogy of the arts if false; a change 
in a law is a very different thing from a change in 
art. For the law has no pov/er to command obedience 
except that of habit, which can only be given by time, 
so that a readiness to change from old to new laws 
enfeebles the power of the law.^
Hippodamus* views on change and technology sound rather modern. 
However, a careful analysis of the purely technical attitude 
toward change reveals it to be an approach analogous to the de­
velopment of new swimming strokes, or a better way to train the 
body for a track meet.
The potential to understand human nature and to better adapt 
it to the natural order was the problem which seems to have been
hoEncyclopedia Britannica, Vol. II (London: The Encyclopedia 
Britansica Co. ; 19^1)» p • 585.
^Aristotle*s Politics, op. cit., pp. 102, 103, 109-106, and 
106-107.
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the main concern of these men, and even Aristotle, the master of 
careful, systematic thought, retained this orientation in most 
respects. Host of the early philosophers were credited with 
various inventions. Protagoras, the ex-porter, was alleged to 
have invented an improved shoulder pad for carrying heavy loads. 
However, such practical innovations seem to have been considered 
as adjustments that harmonized natural possibilities and created 
nothing new in nature, but improved the harmony of man and his 
environment. This concept of harmonious equilibrium is the basis 
of static analysis, and although difficult to apply over varia­
tions of time and space without closing one eye to increasing 
deviations from reality, it was the type of analysis which the 
Greeks developed to a very high level.
Considering population as an aspect of city planning, Aris­
totle did not believe that the population of a city should be 
just so many persons, as did Hippodamus, but rather a natural ad­
justment to a natural relation of physical environment and human 
society. Aristotle thought the population should be large 
enough to provide abundance, implying the full exploitation of 
the standards of division of labor and specialization in existence:
In like manner, a state, when composed of too few, 
is not, as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of 
too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, 
as a nation may be, it is not a state, being almost in­
capable of constitutional government.^
khIbid.. p. 288.
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With this view of population size as an equilibrium between two 
natural factors Aristotle concluded that the desired size of a 
territory of the state should be large enough to support the 
population, "temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of lei­
sure but small enough to be easily defended. The preoccupation 
with defense in all the discussions on city planning is an indi­
cation of the primacy of defense considerations and the fact that 
military strength and economic strength were not so nearly identi­
cal in an age of non-industrial, individualistic warfare.
Aristotle thought that a city should be located in a balanced 
position near the sea, with consideration given to other factors:
. . .  if we could have what we wish, it should be 
well situated in regard both to sea and land . . .  This 
then is one principle, that it should be a convenient 
centre for the protection of the whole country: the
other it, that it should be suitable for receiving the 
fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of 
timber and any.other products that are easily trans­
ported. ̂5
The habit of phrasing relationships in terms of a group of oppo­
sites and of harmonizing these in a common answer is conspicuous 
in the writings of Aristotle. In form, this method resembles the 
simultaneous equations in algebra and proportions in geometry 
which the Greeks of this period were studying as abstract 
theoretical formulations. Aristotle's reliance on relationships 
freed his philosophy from the confines of naturalism. The Sophists 
went further and applied free choice to social processes on the
^Ibid., p. 289
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assumption that no purpose was preordained or natural. Aristotle's 
concept of natural control was that of a multiplicity of opposing 
forces which produce natural harmony through fine balances:
Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revo­
lution when the country is not naturally adapted to pre­
serve the unity of the state . . .  At Athens, too, the 
inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than 
those who live in the city, for just as in war the 
impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break 
a regiment, so every cause of difference, however 
slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest op­
position is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next 
comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other 
antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one 
is this difference of place.
Although Aristotle generally concerned himself with equili­
brium between aggregations of natural elements through the tech­
nique of classification and harmonization of variables, he 
occasionally recognized problems more in the realm of human 
creation. He advocated a balance of trade for his ideal city, 
and in his specific economic discussions, as in others, he tended 
toward an analysis of social development attendant with economic 
activity which is difficult to define as natural order in the 
static sense, but rather an equilibrium between a variety of 
processes. This achievement of recognizing an independently 
growing social scheme of things increasingly less confined by 
natural underpinnings is the essence of a more flexible position 
for man and society and makes possible the consideration of
Ibid., pp. 216-217
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nature or natural resources as something apart from the totality 
of all human problems.
Equilibrium Theory and Nature
It has been seen that the use of equilibrium analysis as 
one of the methods of describing and understanding nature was 
employed by the earliest Greek philosophers. They also developed 
ideas on the problem of change, circles of change, and of pro­
cesses or circulations in equilibrium. It is clear from the 
fragments left by these writers that they considered these re­
lationships to be natural realities, the discovery of which 
would lead to understanding and improving the ability of man to 
cope with nature. As such, these discoveries were regarded 
just as much as natural resources as would be the discovery of 
the usefulness of water power. The mental understanding was the 
technological achievement, and the natural process being grasped 
by this understanding was the equilibrium or circulatory nature 
of the world. The purpose of acquiring this knowledge tended to 
be negative since it was sought for the purpose of avoiding 
deviation from the natural order.
The idea of an equilibrium was developed first as a theory 
of how natural relationships exist and was, therefore, a partial 
theory of nature, or an incomplete notion of the total of rela­
tionships. The Pythagoreans added the idea of harmony, or a 
multiplicity of elements in complex equilibrium. The next stage,
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which Aristotle and his followers elaborated with varying degrees 
of success, was the idea that equilibrium relationships are them­
selves a method, an arbitrary structural framework applicable 
to a body of isolated facts for constructing a theory of rela­
tionships; as such, equilibrium analysis is a theory for the 
development of theory. The later refinements proceeding from 
this assumption have been widely accepted in the fields of 
logic and mathematics, partially accepted in many of the natural 
sciences, and struggled with in the complexity of the social 
sciences.
Aristotle is distinguished for his meticulous classification 
and systematization of all elements in the encyclopedic area of 
his inquiries. He habitually posed groups or aggregates of oppo­
sites and ranked them in order of importance* An indication of 
his approach to the idea of this as a method for revealing and 
understanding relationships, rather than the natural relationship 
itself to be used for the purpose of revealing facts, is ap­
parent in the following passage;
. . .  we must not look for the same degree of ac­
curacy in all subjects; we must be content in each 
class of subjects with the accuracy of such a kind as 
the subject matter allows, and of such an extent as is 
proper to the inquiry.^7
After comparing the practical and theoretical interest in a right
angle by a carpenter and a geometer, Aristotle continued:
47Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics* Translated by J.E.C. 
Welldon (London: Macmillan and Co,, 1934), Book I., Chapt. 7, 
p, 17 •
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We must follow the same course in other subjects, 
or we will sacrifice the main points to such as are 
subordinate.
Theophrastus was a slightly younger contemporary of Aris­
totle and successor in his school. His works on plants are the 
most important of his surviving documents, but he also wrote on 
political and social subjects. It is useful, for two reasons, 
to review Theophrastus1 approach to certain problems in botany. 
First, because his writings demonstrate the conscious use of a 
common approach to both botanical and social problems, and 
secondly, because a comparison of his theories with modern 
botanical theory gives an insight into the continuities and 
changes which have taken place in an area free of the complexi­
ties of social science where men investigate themselves. Theo­
phrastus wrote in his work on plants:
Again the differences, both between the plants as 
wholes and between their parts, may be seen in the ap­
pearance itself of the plant. I mean differences such 
as those in size, hardness, smoothness or their oppo­
sites, as seen in bark, leaves and the other parts . . .
These then as has been said, are differences of 
natural character, as it were, and still more so are 
those between fruitless and fruitful, deciduous and 
evergreen plants and the like. But with all the dif­
ferences in all these cases we must take into account 
the locality, and indeed it is hardly possible to do 
otherwise. Such differences would seem to give us a 
kind of division into classes, for instance, between 
that of acouatic plants and that of plants of the dry 
land . . * °
Ibid.
ilQ^Theophrastus, Enquiry into Plants. Translated by Sir 
Arthur Hort (New Tork: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), Vol. I, 
pp. 29-31* (Greek and English).
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This probing into the possible bases for distinction be­
tween plants and for a system of classifying vegetation generally 
is indefinite as to whether the plant as a whole is the prime 
unit, the characteristics of its different parts, or its zone 
or habitat. Moreover, it is not made clear whether these are 
relationships to be discovered between natural entities, such 
as a natural structure for handling these variations, or a 
method for forcing a mass of data into artificial relationships 
so that theories can be developed. He proposed morphological, 
specific, and geographical opposites as the possible generic 
bases for classification or as a suitable structure for coordi­
nating the data into a useful theory.
It is interesting to skip to the present and observe an 
application of the same equilibrium approach in a novel way by 
Edgar Anderson in what he calls a "pictorial scatter diagram. 
Anderson used a system of defining five oppositions in a diverse 
group which he wished to clarify. He then plotted each sample 
on a geometric grid with marks indicating these oppositions, 
and obtained a pictorial impression for use as an aid in clari­
fying relationships and in the formulation of theories of plant 
distributions. The scatter diagram is a technique, but the 
equilibrium formulation is a method of dealing with relationships 
for the purpose of devising theory.
50Plants, Man and Life (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1952),
p. 9*f-102.
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Theophrastus made the following observations on acquatic 
and dry habitats* demonstrating that he was conscious that he 
was dealing with a method rather than a theory:
However, if one should wish to be precise, one 
would find that even of these some are impartial as 
it were amphibious • • . But to consider all these 
exceptions, in general, to consider in such a manner 
is not the right way to proceed. For in such matters 
too nature certainly does not thus go by any hard and 
fast law. Our distinctions therefore and the study „  
of plants in general musb be understood accordingly.
Theophrastus was attempting to develop bases for classification 
and theoretical analysis, and did not get into the area of rela­
tionships between plants themselves. He was aware of such 
factors as the influence of open and closed forest growth on 
the form and knottiness of timber, but his concern was with the 
more comprehensive problem of determining whether the plants as 
wholes, or their morphological or geographical characteristics 
would be most useful for initial classification. The method 
was that of using equilibriums for equating opposites for 
analytical purposes. In modern botanical work with complex 
associations among plants, we are still faced with the same 
problem of how to treat the data.
H. A. Gleason outlined three current theories of plant 
associations as follows: (1) an organism or natural unit in
process, (2) a natural structure of natural relationships with 
lesser variations within the unit of natural equilibrium, and 
(3) a complex of interacting elements. He observed:
51Theophrastus, op. cit., p. 33 •
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The vegetational unit is a temporary and fluc­
tuating phenomenon, dependent, in its origin, its 
structure, and its disappearance on the selective 
action of the environment and on the nature of the 
surrounding vegetation.^
Gleason developed the thesis that since none of the species in 
a plant association have identical spatial properties, distri­
butions, or cycles of duration, that any association is an 
arbitrary handful of changing elements classified as a unit by
subordinating the changing elements to a single, or a few
dominant species, with the implication that their dominance is
determined by our interest in them.
The first of the theories of plant association which 
Gleason mentioned neglects time and assumes a unit which is 
constant over time, but which has existence as an equilibrium 
in space. The second assumes a group of processes in time 
with a stable relationship, such as an equilibrium between cir­
culatory systems. The third theory assumes that the significance 
of an association lies in the methodological process of defining 
the relationships between the different elements. Therefore, 
the concept of an association as a static equilibrium is useful 
as a methodological device.
This discussion of botanical theory illustrates the struggles 
of the Geeeks, exemplified by Theophrastus, to apply the theory 
of their day to complex natural phenomena, and of the strides
^2Gleason, H. A., "The Individualistic Concept of the Plant 
Associationy'V The American Midland Naturalist, Vol. 21, Jan.- 
May., 1959, p. 93*
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that were being made toward method as such. It was indicated 
that in the Greek world the investigation of nature was the task 
of the philosopher, and that his province also included everything 
from ethics, ambition and politics, to astronomy, anatomy, and 
botany, as well as physics and mathematics. The Sophists tended 
toward an abstraction of theory from the natural and moral com­
bination and dealt with choice as creative rather than as a 
result of a low level of rigor in nature. Their contribution 
was invaluable because, until change in human society and eco­
nomic relationships was accepted, the resource base was fixed 
as a part of natural relations, and the study of resources for 
policy purposes or planning could not be attempted.
Greek Thought on Economic and Social Development
Since Greek thought was largely descriptive and not con­
cerned with change, the Greeks were able to accept wide variations 
in 'customs without apparently being stimulated to inquire into 
the significance of such differences. Some of the most vital 
social relationships were presumed to have been instituted by 
individual lawgivers and were considered quite superficial in 
regard to the order of nature. For instance, the custom of in­
fanticide was not considered objectionable even in areas where 
the custom was not practiced.
Variations in custom, to an extent much broader than we 
can easily imagine, were so casually accepted that they seem to 
have stimulated little critical thought. Discussions of com-
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parable and different customs were approached with the same 
craftsmanlike attitude that a carpenter might apply to different 
types of wood, and the notion of a common ideal or central moral 
standard applicable to the whole world was not developed in rela­
tion to customs*
When generalizations did come, they were in highly abstract 
terms, remarkably parallel to those which were developed in 
eighteenth-century Europe when the much larger national units 
had been mentally assimilated, and comparisons between nations 
and larger spheres of culture were beginning. In terms of posi­
tive comparison, the military results of a system of customs and 
their effectiveness at avoiding civil strife were the two major 
concerns of much Greek thought* This is consistent with a life 
where military defense and stormy social conditions within the 
cities defeated much sense of continuity and kept planning 
limited to the all-important problem of survival here and now.
A good example of the facility with which the Greeks dealt 
with variations in custom and still concerned themselves pri­
marily with natural law with little concern for the temporal 
continuity of law is presented in the closing pages of Aristo­
phanes* comedy, "The Clouds," written in the last part of the 
fifth century B.C. In this comedy, a son, preparing to beat 
his father, rejects the parental plea that the principles of 
filial piety have natural sanction, and asserts that the natural 
conduct of the animals contradicts this concept of filial duty:
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’But the law nowhere admits that fathers should 
be treated thus.'
'Was not the legislator who carried this law a 
man like you and me? In those days he got men to 
believe him; then why should not I too have the 
right to establish for the future a new law, allow­
ing children to beat their fathers in turn? . • •
But look how the cocks and other animals fight with 
their fathers; and yet what difference is there be­
tween them and ourselves, unless it be that they do 
not propose decrees.'53
Though this passage is from a flippant comedy satirizing the 
Socratic philosophers and their ability to argue themselves into 
any position, it demonstrates the sophisticated casualness with 
which a popular theatre could deal with custom within an ac­
cepted framework of naturalism and of order in nature.
This discussion should shed some light on the apparent 
paradox of an awareness of economic variation, in the sense of 
change that did not,, somehow, incorporate a realization of time, 
and the passage of time as a natural phenomenon. The natural 
order was considered static, and therefore the natural process, 
of itself, could not be the cause of change. Change was a 
lateral process, related to quantity and harmonies, but was ap­
plied to summaries of factual events and their explanations, 
though change over time was strangely ignored.
One of the earliest references to the conditions of social 
development is to be found in Critias' paraphrase of Solon's
53"^Aristophanes, The Eleven Comedies. Vol. I. Translated 
by the Tudor Publishing C~ (n.d.), p. 373* "The Clouds.”
5^See John L. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philoso­
phy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 193-196, 
for Aristotle's view that time is essentially a statement of 
motion for the measurement of space.
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ideas on intellectual development. Solon was represented to 
have left a statement that people concern themselves with and 
discourse on necessaries and do not study history and the re­
lated fields until these necessaries are supplied and they can
55gather into cities. This suggests that Solon attributed 
social theory to the development of leisure and urbanization.
It is not a theory of production in the modern sense, but 
can best be viewed as a statement of a fact, or an absolute 
potential in a given body of relationships, rather than thought 
tied to concern with changes in productivity.
Later, in the writings of Thucydides, the historian of the 
Peloponnesian Wars, we see an example of this static type of 
development theory, and a clue to its consistency with the 
pattern of much Greek philosophy. Most accounts refer to ori­
gins and process, but here we have a specific reference to the 
fact that in ancient times there was no accumulation and that 
wealth was at a low level. However, it is apparent that Thu­
cydides did not regard accumulation and wealth as self-perpetuating 
or creative, but rather the result of a natural equilibrium in­
volving social and physical, forces:
The richest districts were most constantly chang­
ing their inhabitants, . . .  For the productiveness 
of the land increased the power of individuals; this 
in turn was the source of quarrels by which communities 
were ruined, while at the same time they were more ex­
posed from attacks from without. Certainly Attica, of 
which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom
^Plato, Critias, op. cit. , p. 2j4.
123
from civil strife and therefore retained its original 
inhabitants.56
Thucydides thus contended that accumulation was the result 
of an equilibrium between natural wealth and two social forces, 
military invasion and civic unity. Moreover, civic unity was 
a balance between greedy individuals and the degree of cooperation 
required by the productivity of the soil in order to sustain es­
sentials. Thus, the apparent paradox, that a physically poor 
city accumulated more because it was better organized and stronger 
against intruders; hence, intruders were less interested. The 
stability of the population over time was a result of these bal­
ances. There was a natural equilibrium inherent in the character 
of the people, the effort required for a living, the nature of 
the country, and the potential for organization. Thucydides1 
example of a poor city, Attica, was a cultural center in the Age 
of Pericles, and in the mid-fifth century held an empire con­
trolling the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea. According to Thucydides, her secret was not wealth, but a 
fortuitous balance of natural forces which stimulated organiza­
tional strength. This detailed thought on organization, and the 
clarity with which economic organization was theoretically and 
practically developed, deserves emphasis. Organization was the 
key to the early approach to the exploitation of natural resources.
Since the Greeks had given considerable attention to organi­
zational problems, it was to be expected that the division of 
labor would have been included in their discussions. Plato, it
^Thucydides. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (Boston: D. 
Lothrop Co., i8$3), Vol I, p. 2•
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will be remembered, held that the division of labor was an organi­
cally natural or god-given phenomenon. He did, however, ac­
knowledge it as the basis of trade. Insofar as value is the 
result of exchange or potential for exchange, resources there­
by acquire their significance. However, if as Plato suggests, 
exchange is natural and completely controlled by natural.'ability, 
then the value of goods produced by skilled hands is also the 
subject of natural value in the same sense as raw materials.
Xenophon, on the other hand, regarded the division of 
labor as a source of productivity resulting from organizational 
achievement, an idea consistent with his other works:
. . .  but the food that is sent from the king's 
board really is much superior in the gratification 
also that it gives. That this, however, should be 
so is no marvel. Tor just as all other arts are 
developed to superior excellence in larger cities, 
in the kitchen that same way the food at the king's 
palace is also elaborately prepared with superior 
excellence. For in small towns the same workman 
makes chairs and doors and plows and tables, and 
often this same artisan builds houses, and even so 
he is thankful if he can only find employment enough 
to support him. And it is, of course, impossible for 
a man of many trades to be proficient in all of them.
In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many 
people have demands to make upon each branch of in­
dustry, one trade alone, and very often even less 
than a whole trade, is enough to support a man; one 
man, for instance, makes shoes for men, and another 
for women, and there are places even where one man 
earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by 
cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers to­
gether, while there is another who performs none of 
the operations but only assembles the parts. It fol­
lows, therefore, as a matter of course, that he who 
devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of 
work is bound to do it in the best possible manner.57
^Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 2 vols. Translated by Walter Mil­
ler. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 191*0, p. 333* This work is 
a romantic account of the idealized ruler of Persia. In it, the 
monarch explains that he avoids accumulating more wealth than he 
can properly handle by using the surplus to build good will.
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This interpretation tacitly assumes a social theory of skill 
and division of labor, whatever its cause. The emphasis, how­
ever, is on the value of specialization as a creative force,
A theory of social enhancement of individual power through 
specialization is suggested. This is not a natural theory like 
Plato’s, It is a theory of a compensatory social consequence of 
group living resulting in enhanced individual ability. It is a 
description of how man is improved in his power to meet nature 
in the form in which it exists.
Xenophon’s views on exchange have also been preserved in 
one of his dialogues. The dialogue is written in the style of 
the Platonic School as a review by Socrates to a friend of a 
discussion which he, Socrates, had held with a wealthy agricul­
tural aristocrat with a reputation for wisdom and justice. 
Xenophon’s definition of ’’goods” is given in the review:
’You seem, then,' said Socrates, 'To mean by goods 
& something serviceable to the owner?' . . .’If then,
a man buys a horse, and does not know how to manage 
him, but falls off him, and receives some injury, is 
the horse not a part of his goods?' . . .'So, then, 
with regard to sheep, if a man, from not knowing how 
to manage sheep, suffers loss by keeping them, the 
sheep would not be a portion of his goods' . . .
'The same things, then,' continued Socrates, 'are 
goods to him who knows how to make use of them, but 
not goods to him who does not know; . . .(after 
pointing out that flutes which a man cannot play would 




It is clear from this exchange that Xenophon rejected the 
idea of a natural value in raw material itself, or even in native 
ability. Later in the dialogue he asserts that knowing how to 
sell a thing is an appropriate use, and that a thing's value is 
dependent upon one's ability to use it or sell it. Thus, the 
underpinnings of value were dependent on the acquired training 
of some individual to fully exploit an item, and the possibility 
of reaching him through a social process of exchange.
The relation of specialization and exchange, as reverse 
sides of a coin, may be illustrated as follows. If ten men live 
in a circle of contact and only one of them knows how to train 
and handle horses, then if any one of the men is able to acquire 
a horse, even if he himself cannot ride it, the horse still has 
the potential value attributed to it by the most skilled horse­
man in the circle. The size of the group permits and stimulates 
specialization, and exchange facilitates its growth through the 
shifting of goods from the one who cannot to the one who can make 
use of them. Thus, Xenophon concluded that the ability to sell 
and the readiness to buy are the measures of value. Exchange 
value is, in this view, simply the aggregation of individual use 
values and the expression of these values in specialization. This 
is a view in the Sophist tradition, where society and man are the 
measure of all things. It is a relatively modern view, even ex­
celling many modern analyses in the clarity of exposition of use 
and exchange value. However, there is a peculiar limitation to 
the analysis.
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In the second chapter of his Oeconomicus, Xenophon reviewed 
Socrates* speculations on the material basis of wealth. He re­
corded that Socrates had maintained that an individual is 
wealthy only insofar as he has a surplus over his needs, and 
that the requirements of a wealthy man like Critobulus, for in­
stance, were such that he was perpetually short of assets with 
which to meet civic assessments, whereas he, Socrates, had a 
surplus over his requirements. Thus, the idea of absolute ma­
terial wealth through the accumulation of a body of material re­
sources was rejected in the analysis in favor of relativity as 
the basis for comparison.
Xenophon's outlook assumed a perfectly neutral nature.
There Was no concept of economics over time, and his approach 
was static in its assumptions of relationships. Moreover, no 
units or periods of time were defined artificially and absorbed 
into the static theory as in modern static analysis. In his 
discussions on agriculture concerning the two field cycles of 
fallow and cropping and rotation practices, the time element 
was not considered any more significant than the aging of 
humans or the growth of children. His neglect of the time ele­
ment is not surprising, of course, since even in modern economic 
theory, the problem of how to handle time has not been completely 
solved.
In passing, it is interesting to note Plato's description 
of erosion and falling water tables, though the importance of
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such processes did not creep into his economic analysis:
. . • and the plains, which are now denominated 
Phellei, were then full of fat earth, and the moun­
tains abounded with woods of which there are evident 
tokens even at present. For there are mountains which 
now only afford nutriment for bees, but formerly, and 
at no very distant period, the largest trees were cut 
down from those mountains . . .
This region, too, every year enjoyed prolific rain, 
which did not then, as now, run from naked earth into 
the sea, but being collected in great abundance from 
lofty places, and preserved for use in certain cavities
in the earth, diffused copious streams of fountains
and rivers to every part of the country.59
In his Laws, Plato discussed ideal forms of organization of the
state and recommended conservation practices on a civic scale,
primarily as a means of keeping military trainees busy at con-
60structive work such as road building and erosion control.
Xenophon's purpose was to explain how one may improve his 
exploitation of his surroundings. It is individualistic in 
that other people and society were not excluded as fit subjects 
for exploitation, but the lines of society and social relations 
were generally considered as part of the natural order. Xenophon 
had to deal, with slavery and the land as the two main elements of 
production of primary importance in Greece. Although he neglected 
time as a factor in his analysis, Xenophon found ample room for 
planning at the quantitative and spatial level, or in terms of
Plato, Critias. op. cit., p. 235“236» For other descrip­
tive data on the erosion problem in middle eastern civilizations, 
see Tom Dale and Vernon G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955)* especially pp. 88- 108 on Greece.
The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, Laws, on. cit.., pp. 522-
523.
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what modern economists would call programming and economics of 
scale:
Or even if a person be utterly ignorant what the 
ground can produce, and has had no opportunity of 
seeing either fruits or plants from it, or even of 
hearing from anyone a true description of it, is it 
not much more easy for anyone to make trial of the 
earth than a horse or a man? For it exhibits nothing 
for the purpose of deceit, but sets forth plainly and 
truly, with the utmost simplicity, what it can do and 
what it cannot.61
And further:
'However,' said Ischomachus, 'it is possible to 
ascertain, from looking at one's neighbor's ground, 
what it can bear and what it cannot, if v/e only ob­
serve the corn and the trees upon it; and when a 
person has learned this there is no further use in 
fighting against nature, for he would not obtain a 
greater supply of provisions by sowing or planting 
what he himself might require, than by sowing or 
planting what the earth would of its own accord produce and nourishI62
Xenophon delighted in order and advance planning, and his 
• favorite example of the benefits to be accrued by order was that 
of a galley. He described a Phoenician galley in detail as a 
masterpiece of efficient, well-ordered utilization of space and 
neatness. He illustrated his regard for order by having the 
characters in the dialogue point out the source of their strength 
and effectiveness as being the unison of the crew and the orderli­
ness of their actions in a confined space. Also, he had Critobulus 
explain to his young wife that the source of beauty and pleasure 
in a chorus of singers and dancers was the unison and coordination
6lXenophon1 s Minor Works, The Oeconomicus, op. cit. , p. 1̂ -1 • 
^Ibid. i p. 128.
130
of their actions;
There is indeed nothing, my dear wife, more useful 
or more creditable to people than order. A chorus of 
singers and dancers, for instance, consists of a number 
of persons; but when they do what each of them happens 
to fancy, all appears confusion, and disagreeable to 
behold; but when they act and speak in concert, the 
same persons prove themselves worthy of being seen andheard.°3
At the beginning of Oeconomicus Xenophon took up the question of 
the nature of the art of management;
'Tell me,' said ho, Critobulus, 'is domestic man­
agement the name of an art, as that of healing, or of 
working in brass, or of building? . . .  And as we can 
specify concerning these arts, what is the business of 
each, can we also specify concerning domestic manage­
ment, what is its business?'
'It is possible, then,' said Socrates, 'for one who 
knows this art, and happens to have no property of his 
own, to earn money by managing the house of another, 
as an architect earns money by building a house?'
'Yes, doubtless,' said Critobulus, 'he might earn 
a large sum of money, if, taking a house under his 
charge, he can fulfill the duties which it requires, 
and augment the value of it by adding largely to its 
resources.'
•But what is it that the term house gives us to 
understand? . . .  It seems to me,''replied Critobulus,
'that everything a person has, even though it be not 
in the same country with the possessor, is comprehended 
by the term house or personal property. ' ^
This definition of management cannot be limited to exclude com­
mercial management or business ventures generally. However, it 
does not, as Xenophon developed it, include many of the aspects
63Ibid,, pp. 73-76. 
fihIbid., pp. 103-10**.
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of business with which we deal today* Xenophon's inquiry was in 
the areas of orderly and planned programming and harmonizing of 
men with men, natural material with natural material, and men 
with natural material. These three areas seemed to constitute 
the subject matter of the art of organization; it is limited to 
organization, not over varying periods, but in the horizontal 
direction, over areas, numbers and quantities* Trade was highly 
atomized and regulated, and subordinated to defense and subsis­
tence. Moreover, prices must have been quite variable and 
dependent on local customs and laws, as well as on.supplies at 
markets. No attempt to begin a study of economics from price 
analysis would have been very practical under these conditions.
The non-commercial influences were too strong and too numerous 
to make a purely commercial analysis significant. Exploitation 
of nature and human propensities, however, offered a clear field 
that was general enough, and included the level at which short- 
run production under undependable circumstances could be analyzed 
for benefit.
Another treatise of Xenophon's, written toward the end of 
his life, set forth his recommendations for the financial im­
provement of the condition of his home city, Athens* Xenophon 
began the work with a chapter describing the geographical posi­
tion of the city, her climate, and communications. He concluded 
that the city was in a favorable commercial position, and that 
she should develop her position as a trading center. He men­
tioned certain improvements in social relationships with merchants,
132
and recommended the suspension of a mercantilist policy then in 
effect prohibiting foreigners from selling for cash, a measure 
apparently designed to protect Athens against an unfavorable 
balance of trade. His approach to these problems is consistent 
with the theory or order and planning which he developed in 
The Oeconomicus:
To effect such augmentations of the revenues, it 
is not necessary for us to be at any cost but that 
of philanthropic ordinances and careful superintendence*
For securing whatever other revenues seem likely 
to come to us, I know that there will be need of a 
fund.6^
The final part of this passage suggests the concept of production 
based upon capital, but the idea was not developed further. He 
considered capital useful merely as a means of facilitating per­
sonal relationships and organization. He suggested as capital 
improvements better hotels for visiting merchants and public 
galleys available for hire by the trip.
Later in this work he directed his attention to the silver 
mines at Larion. Here, he thought, there should be established 
a fund of capital to permit public acquisition of slaves to lease 
to the mining contractors to facilitate larger scale enterprises, 
since many were short of capital. This recognition of the mines 
as being different from other forms of production reflects keen 
economic understanding, and would seem to indicate that he
65Xenophon*s Minor Works, op. cit*, "On the Means of Im­
proving the He venue of the State of Athens," p. 2f?l.
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attributed some value to silver beyond social or exchange con­
siderations. Here he hints at, but is unable to master, the 
time factor or the much wider spatial effectiveness of money 
values or metals generally. His writing on the silver mines 
stands, nevertheless, as the first recorded economic discussion 
of a natural resource and the economic relations of its ex­
ploitation in our tradition of economic thought; and it reveals 
his recognition that there are some peculiar characteristics of 
this type of economic development:
Nor does the space of ground that is dug for silver 
appear to be at all diminished, but to be perpetually 
extended in a wider circuit . . .  At the present time 
too, no one of those who have slaves in the mines is 
diminishing the number of them, but is indeed contin­
ually adding to it as many as he can; for when but 
few are engaged in digging and searching, little treasure 
is found, but when many are employed, a far greater quan­
tity of silver ore is discovered; so that in this occu­
pation alone, of all those that I know, no one envies 
those that extend their operations. All persons that 
have farms would be able to say how many yokes of 
oxen, and how many workmen, would be sufficient for 
their land, and if they send into their fields more 
than are necessary, they consider it a loss; but in 
the mining operations for silver, they say that all 
are constantly in want of workmen. For the conse­
quence is not the same in this case as it is when there
are numbers of workmen in brass and when, as articles
made of brass necessarily become cheap, the workmen 
are ruined nor is it the same when there are excessive 
numbers of blacksmiths; or as when there is abundance
of corn and wine, and when, as the fruits of the earth
are cheap, agriculture becomes unprofitable, so that 
many farmers, quitting their occupation of tilling 
the ground, betake themselves to the employments cf 
merchants, or innkeepers, or bankers; but, in regard 
to the silver mines, the more silver ore is found, and 
the more silver is extracted, the greater is the number 
that devote themselves to mining. Of furniture, when 
people have got enough of it for their houses, they do 
not much care for buying additional supplies; but
13^
nobody has ever yet had so much silver as not to 
desire an increase of it; and if people have superr 
abundance, they hoard it, and are not less delighted 
with doing so than with putting it to use,°°
Xenophon went on to suggest, by v/ay of explaining the dif­
ferences enumerated between mining and other forms of production, 
that silver can be used in times of disaster to buy necessities 
when no barter can be arranged, and to buy luxuries in times of 
plenty# We would attribute to him an explanation in the vein 
of his own theory: that silver is transportable, that it is
a common medium of exchange; therefore, it has infinite possi­
bilities of spatial distribution, and is consequently completely 
fluid as a common medium for organization and harmonization.
We should note that Xenophon did not think in terms of mining 
operations as being more successful when financed over longer 
periods, but only on larger scales. Modern thinkers would char­
acterize silver as being subject to accumulation which permits 
planning and extension over time rather than in area.
Aristotle and the Climax of Greek Theory
Aristotle's writings may be considered the high point in 
abstract thought from the third century B.C. into the eighteenth 
century. His massive body of detailed surveys provides more 
thought forms and possibilities than most thinkers can assimilate
Ibid., pp. 253-255.
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or apply to new situations. His ideas were the foundation of 
European education until well into the nineteenth century. His 
influence is a product of both the systematic nature of his work 
and the wide range of his contributions to such diverse fields 
as Scholastic philosophy, theoretical physics, and statescraft.
After Aristotle, the culture of the Mediterranean world be­
came vastly more complex. The Alexandrian Empire and, later, 
the Roman Empire, broke down the localized tradition and indi­
vidualism which had permitted much of life to appear as natural. 
Choice and policy became dominant. Zeller wrote of this period, 
dominated by the Stoics, the Epicureans and Skeptics, and later 
the Christians:
An age like this did not require theoretical know- 
ledge. It required to be morally braced and strengthened.
. . .  these three Schools, however else they may differ, 
at least agree in two fundamental points —  in subordi­
nating theory to practice, and in the peculiar character 
of their practical philosophy.68
And further:
Through all the Schools runs the common trait of refer­
ring everything to the subject, of withdrawing every­
thing within the spere of mind and of the inner life, 
one consequence of which is to press into notice prac­
tice rather than speculation, another being that the 
satisfaction of this want can only be had in internal 
self-consciousness, and in a mental equilibrium at­
tained by the exercise of the will and the cultivation 
of the intellect, 9
^7Zeller, E., ^he Stoics. Epicureans and Skeptics. Trans­
lated by Oswald Ruchel (Revised Ed*, London: Longmans, Green 




In Aristotle's writings we find the theoretical forms, but 
not the separation of social from natural science, nor the at­
tempt at such a distinction approached by Xenophon in his 
practical discussions. The necessity of framevrorks of theory 
for investigative purposes is undeniable, but Aristotle carried 
his theory into areas where facts and measurements and organiza­
tional potential still needed two thousand years to mature and 
accumulate.
Aristotle's Natural Values
Aristotle began all his inquiries with the premise that 
truth is a question of fact, and can be discovered:
. . .  because with what is true, all things which 
really are are in harmony, but with that which is 
false the truth very soon jars.7°
On this assumption, we find that a fact is its own justification, 
and that anything that exists obviously encounters nothing in­
compatible with its existence, for if it did, it would not so 
exist. Thus, we can agree with Aristotle that there is some 
kind of harmony by definition in the fact of harmony:
And again, you must not demand the reason either 
in all things alike, because in some it is sufficient 
that the fact has been well demonstrated, which is 
the case with first principles; i.e., starting point 
or first principle. And of these first principles 
some are obtained by induction, some by perception, 
and some by a course of habituation, in others, in 
different ways.71
7°Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by D. P. 
Chase (^ew York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950), p. 14.
71lbid., pp. 15-14.
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Aristotle found the basis of all society and the state in the 
basic fact of the harmonious transaction. According to him, 
there are four equilibriums which are the basis of human society. 
These four equilibriums are those between man and woman, master 
and slave (ruler and subject), parent and child, and that of ex­
change between people. He contended that these relationships 
between people exist and will persist, and as such, are harmonious, 
natural, and embody truth* He reasoned that these relationships 
obviously satisfy the demands of both parties equally since they 
exist and are repeated, implying balance and harmony. It is 
evident that this theory is just as sound as any modern theory 
of the balance of nature in botanical investigations. Aristotle 
explained the basis of these equilibriums and the transactions 
inherent in them in purely naturalistic terms, not in terms of 
development as Xenophon had done in his attempt to eaqplain spe­
cialization as a result of urbanization. Aristotle wrote:
He who thus considers things in their first growth 
and origin, whether a state or anything else, will ob­
tain the clearest view of them . . .  Wow nature has 
distinguished between the female.and the slave. For 
she is not niggardly like the smith who fashions the 
Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing 
for a single use, and every instrument is best made 
when intended for one and not for many u s e s . 72
This natural diversity Aristotle thought to be the basis of com­
plimentary or equilibrium relationships, exchange being one of 
these.
72Aristotle's Politics, op. cit., p. 63.
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There was tradition, expressed by Xenophon, to the effect 
that wealth could be created by skill. As was mentioned pre­
viously, this was the first attempt toward a theory of natural 
resources, or a theory which permits the treatment of nature 
as a field in which man can apply technique and benefit from 
better techniques. Aristotle expressly rejected this view as 
he built up a systematic theory from equilibrium analysis* 
Although he realized that people have certain natural desires 
based on physical processes, he felt that all natural desires 
are stable and satiable. Money was developed to facilitate 
trade, but the accumulation of money is not natural, Aristotle 
thought, since money only has a natural function as a common 
term for items in trade* He illustrated this point by saying 
that shoes have two uses: that of being worn and that of being
sold in commerce. The first use Aristotle considered natural. 
The latter use, he maintained, is natural only when the purpose
of the exchange is to get shoes to the wearer or to obtain some­
thing for the seller which he needs for his own use, even if 
money is use^ in the transaction. Thus, Aristotle considered 
capital accumulation unnatural:
The same may be said of all possessions, for 
the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it 
arises at first from what is natural, from the cir­
cumstance that some have too little, others too much 
(of different things). Hence we may infer that re­
tail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting
wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to ex­
change when they had enough.73
73Ibid., p. 67
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This point bears careful analysis since it questions the 
assumption that equilibrium can be consistent with capital ac­
cumulation. As Aristotle saw it, the accumulation of wealth 
had no reference to its use in satisfying the needs of the in­
dividual concerned. If there were ways of getting more wealth 
than one needs for his individual uses, then disequilibrium 
would result since the other party would be getting less than 
he needed for his uses. Likewise, Aristotle could not accept 
profit since, if there is an equilibrium, both sides would 
make the same profit, and that would be self-contradictory.
Since Aristotle regarded exchange as a process whereby parties 
voluntarily demand other goods slightly more than a surplus of 
goods they have so that mutual advantage results to both parties, 
he did not see any created value or organizational gain in this 
process. As he believed it to be natural to start with, nothing 
new could result. In Aristotle's view, the art of getting wealth 
is the art of incurring disequilibrium, an unnatural state of af­
fairs. He argued that the process of getting money to satisfy 
natural needs by exchanging natural products is one thing, but 
that the art of accumulating money above the value of this which 
is traded, or needed, is a sign of disequilibrium, a withdrawal 
from the social process of exchange for personal greed, and 
jarring to the harmony of nature. Everything in this system 
is static, including his view of natural resources, or fruits 
of nature:
For political science does not make men but takes 
them from nature and uses them, so too, nature provides
3A0
them with earth or sea or the like as the source of 
food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager 
of a household, who has to order the things which 
nature supplies —  he may be compared to the weaver 
who has not to make but to use wool, and to know, too, 
what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and 
unserviceable , . . But strictly speaking, as I have 
already said, the means of life must be provided be­
forehand by nature; for the business of nature is to 
furnish food for that which is born, and the food of 
the offspring is always what remains over of that from 
which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting 
wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.7^
Aristotle’s Theory of Choice and Creative Exploitation
Any treatment of resources must include a theory of a source 
of increment, or an addition to that which is in use or in func­
tional existence. Equilibrium analysis excludes the existence 
of changes in relationships, or shifts, and consequently ex­
cludes the idea of resources. As pointed out above, Aristotle 
placed natural produce in the area of a natural equilibrium and 
analyzed human society, including individual productivity, as 
part of the same continuous equilibrium. These ideas were set 
forth in an age of individualism and artistic creation. Zeller 
described the individualism of the times at the intellectual 
level as follows:
In the play of political life, throwing everyone 
on himself and his own resources, in the rivalry of 
unlimited competition for all the good things of life, 
the Greeks had learned to make free use of all their 
mental powers*75
7bIbid., p. 71.
75Zeller, op. cit*, p. 15*
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To explain the phenomena of human creativity, which did 
not fit well into his natural equilibrium, Aristotle turned 
toward the character and individual aspect of man for the source 
of progress. This course seemed reasonable in view of the in­
stability in economic and monetary processes and the chronic 
warfare of the fourth century, which made individual wealth 
very insecure. The individual and his own virtue, or character 
and ability, seemed to offer the best investment for surplus 
energy which simultaneously contributed to the welfare of the 
community, Aristotle had to recognize that reason or delibera­
tion is exercised by man alone and that it is this faculty which 
raises him above the other animal6. Desires are natural, but 
reason is introduced to effectuate those desires. Thus, reason 
does not change nature, but merely enables man to manipulate 
himself subjectively to ude alternative means of adapting to 
nature. Ends are not the subject of reason or choice; they are 
naturally determined, but means offer some room for alternatives
But we do deliberate respecting such practical 
matters as are in our own power (which are what are 
left after all our exclusions).
I have adopted this division because causes seem 
to be divisible into nature, necessity, chance, and 
moreover intellect, and all human powers.
And as man in general deliberates about what man 
in general can effect, so individuals do about such 
practical things as can be effected through their 
own instrumentality.
Again, we do not deliberate respecting such arts 
or sciences as are exact and independent. . . but we
Ib2
do deliberate on all such things as are usually done 
through our own instrumentality, but not invariably 
in the same way; as, for instance, about matters con- 
nected with the healing art, or with money-making; 
and, again, more about piloting ships them gymnastic 
exercises, because the former has been less exactly 
determined . .
So then, deliberation takes place in such matters 
as are under general law, but still uncertain how in 
any given case they will issue, i.e., in which there 
is some indefiniteness . . «
Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means 
to Ends. No physician, for instance, deliberates 
whether he will cure . .
This passage from Aristotle is so consistent with modern 
marginalist theory as represented by such economists as Lionel 
Robbins that it deserves attention. The chief difference in 
Aristotle's theory and that of modern marginalist theory is 
that Aristotle considered choice a passive or negative thing 
as it applies to nature, in which he included society. The 
laws of nature and society he thought to be in a state of 
equilibrium, so that choice could be applied only to ordering 
the few alternative means available. According to his view, 
the only way man can improve the implementation of choice is 
for him to improve his mind and character or, to develop his 
soul, as Aristotle would put it. In his illustration of the 
weaver, Aristotle indicated that man might learn more about 
the characteristics of wool, but that his chief job was that 
of becoming a better weaver since wool and weaving were the
^The Ethics of Aristotle, op. cit., p. 5^•
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limits of nature already set for him* This excludes technology 
and capital, but leaves room for the development of human skill, 
which offers an unending avenue of improvement*
It will be remembered that Xenophon found an unlimited 
area for the application of knowledge and capital in scale of 
organization and the ordering process in his casual descriptive 
work. Aristotle could not avoid descriptive material, and yet 
he ignored the obvious fact that improvements in skill can 
change material productivity and upset the equilibrium of ’’Ends.'5 
In his equilibrium of exchange, he avoided this problem by 
being completely subjective. He let the seller's valuation of 
his own offering depend on his own demand for it as compared 
with his demand for the object he sought in exchange. Therefore, 
demand is completely determined by one individual for both sides 
of the equilibrium, and any shift in skill or ability involves 
no upset of the equilibrium. Any exchange is a result of the 
equality of the personal equilibrium of demands of the different 
parties to the transaction.
In postulating an "End" (the accumulation of virtue, which 
is not materially limited by the order and equilibrium of nature), 
Aristotle developed a system of relativity or proportional com­
parison to relate this extra factor to material goods, namely 
goods of the body (physiological necessities) and external 
goods (material instruments of life like tools and conveniences). —
Virtue includes that which makes man superior to the animals, the
i ^
power of reason. As Aristotle defined it, virtue is choice in 
the only area of uncertainty and therefore the only variable re­
source. The value of virtue is improved by mental and moral 
training:
Thus it is clear that household management attends 
more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, 
and to human excellence more than to the excellence of 
property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of free 
men than to the virtue of s l a v e s .77
Aristotle recognized that the practice of virtue is dependent 
upon such material preconditions as food, shelter and social or­
ganisation, and these he incorporated in the natural equilibrium. 
Although not taken account of in his formal theories, he also 
recognized that practicing the art of wealth getting leads men 
to deviate from natural equilibriums. He recounted the story 
of Thales, for example, who got a monopoly of the olive presses 
in his district by leasing them all cheaply the winter before a 
bumper crop. According to Aristotle, he did this to prove that 
philosophers had practical knowledge and, incidentally, made a 
tidy profit.
Deviations from the natural equilibrium tend to be con­
trolled by the state through ordinances, such as those on price 
control, but a basis of comparison was needed to arrive at just 
value. For this purpose, Aristotle worked out a marginal, analysis 
or a proportional system of comparatives which, except for the 
inclusion of virtue, is a precise statement of the marginalist 
form introduced in the late nineteenth century. Philip Wicksteed
77Aristotle, Aristotle*s Politics, op. cit., p. 75*
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specifically commented on this fact in his pioneering work on 
marginal analysis:
Wow I conceive that the application of this dif­
ferential method to economics must tend to enlarge 
and harmonise our conception of the scope of the study, 
and to keep it in constant touch with the wider ethical, 
social and sociological problems and aspirations from 
which it must always draw its inspiration and derive 
its interest; for if we really understand and accept 
the principle of differential significances we shall' 
realise, as already pointed out, that Aristotle's 
system of ethics and our reconstructed system of eco­
nomics are twin applications of one identical princi­
ple of law, and that our conduct in business is but 
a phase or part of our conduct in life, both being 
determined by our sense, such as it is, of differen­
tial significances and their changing weights as the 
’ ‘ " hich they are the differences expand
lationship between material factors which vary in their material 
components, but somehow retain a constant, mutual orientation. 
This is a static analysis and, in the same way in which Aristotle 
dealt with nature, limits choice to means within a predetermined 
equilibrium of ends. However, Aristotle did not admit variations 
in material components in the harmony of nature as did Wicksteed. 
Instead, Aristotle dealt with development and growth as being 
limited to the boundless potential of virtue. Since absolute 
quantitative measurement was inadequate for dealing with this 
quality, Aristotle employed a relationship involving the infinite 
potential of virtue and the maximization of returns from two
Wicksteed was dealing with an equilibrium or harmonic re-
'wicksteed, op. cit., pp* 779^780
I*t6
material classes of goods, i.e., goods of the body and external 
goods.
Aristotle considered these two classes of goods as being 
naturally constant in value or absolute in relation to the 
individual, even if some men are perverted enough to try to ac- 
cumulate external goods beyond their usefulness. Wicksteed 
drew on proportionality or relative values because he found 
the material substance of the harmony of values of material 
goods subject to change, although he felt the harmony was 
stable. Thus, for his type of measurement, ratios derived
from the assumption of equilibrium or harmony were the only
stable economic dimensions.
Aristotle stated his analysis in the following terms after 
pointing out that all must have three kinds of goods: goods of
the body, external goods, and goods of the soul (courage, tem­
perance, justice and prudence):
. . . and this is not only matter of experience, but, 
if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accord­
ance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a 
limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful 
are of such a nature that where there is too much of 
them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no 
use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the 
greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet
useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects.
No prodf is required to show that the best state of 
one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree 
of excellence to the interval between the natures of 
which we say that these very states are states: so
that if the soul is more noble than our possessions
14?
or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, 
it must be admitted that the best state of either has 
a similar ratio to the other.79
We must credit Aristotle with formulating a system for 
analyzing an unlimited potential in relation to an equilibrium 
or balance of forces. This is infinitely more difficult in the 
social sciences than in the natural sciences. In his works in 
physics and metaphysics, Aristotle was thorough and coherent in 
his development of a theory of the circulation of energy as the 
basis of substance and form, thus combining change and circula­
tory equilibrium. Such ideas underlie the principles of the in­
destructibility of matter and* the conservation of energy, which 
permit mathematical analysis of natural phenomena. In another 
sense, Aristotle was more advanced in his social theories be­
cause he grappled with a principle of infinite possibility which 
is the necessary rationale of the existence of change.
Aristotle’s Equilibrium Analysis
Aristotle's theory of equilibrium needs special attention 
because it is the avenue by which Greek equilibrium analysis 
reached European education and influenced social philosophy.
This influence from Greek thought is still a vital force today.
"^Aristotle, Aristotle's Politics, op. cit., p. 279* It 
will be noted that the concluding sentence of this passage con­
tains a statement of subjective demand resulting in a constant 
ratio of maximum values, although two are inelastic and the last 
is infinitely elastic as to quantity usable. This is an ab­
straction which perhaps transcends J. R. Eicks' two lines of 
demand theory. See J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 195&)» Chapt. II, "The Measurea- 
bility of Utility," pp. 8-15, especially pp. 10, 11, and 12.
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The "checks and balances" of the American constitution, for 
example, and the tradition of hearing both sides in a law suit 
before judicial decision are ideas drawn from Greek equilibrium 
theory acquired through the medium of Aristotle's writings* 
Theories of climax in vegetation, the balance of nature, and 
circulatory equilibriums such as the theory of the carbon cycle 
are also in the Aristotelian tradition*
In an earlier section, pre-Socratic philosophy was traced 
through its primitive formative period when the basic pattern 
of analysis was being developed. The sequence in the development 
of philosophy was: first, the analysis of things as organic or
material facts; second, as processes or sequences of change; 
third, as balanced patterns of change with repetitive characteris­
tics suggesting circular flow; and fourth, as circulations in 
balance between one another, or equilibriums between circular 
equilibriums. Through all these stages, equilibriums were 
sought. Later, change was recognized as disturbing the equili­
brium, and a further equilibrium was sought beyond it which more 
fully explained the known facts or processes. The techniques 
of pure equilibrium analysis which denied change and assumed 
complete predictability were set forth by Parmenides and his 
successor, Zeno.
In his investigations in the physical sciences, Aristotle 
improved his equilibrium theories by searching out the cause of 
the motion or changes within any given circulation, at least to
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the point of the "unmoved mover," However, in his theories on 
politics and ethics, he built a hierarchy of equilibriums in 
which change was excluded on the assumption that the equilibriums 
were based upon a beginning foundation of voluntary transactions 
which precluded any demand for change. Since the primary ap­
proach to resource analysis has been through economic theory, 
and since economic theory has relied very heavily on equilibrium 
analysis, the characteristics and limitations of equilibrium 
theory should be kept in mind when attempting to apply the theory 
to resource problems. Aristotle presented the simplest repre­
sentation of equilibrium theory, and for that reason, his theories 
most clearly illustrate the basic limitations of that approach 
in their sharpest form.
First, Aristotle assumed that exchange was created by a 
natural diversity, and took place through the voluntary partici­
pation of parties equally capable of refraining from the exchange. 
He placed all human relationships, however unequal in fact, in 
natural equilibriums. Thus, by defining social relations as 
equilibriums, he could then analyze them from this starting point. 
Equilibrium, for him, was a fact, not a tool of thought or an 
hypothesis used for convenience in research. As Parmenides 
demonstrated, anything can be analyzed with equilibrium assump­
tions which do not incorporate the concept of change, but such 
analysis leads to conclusions incompatible with reality.
Equilibrium in exchange, in Aristotle's theory, was based 
upon the equality of subjective demand by a party for both the
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goods he had, and the goods he wanted. Thus, if a man valued 
his surplus agricultural produce exactly the same as he valued 
a pair of shoes, the values would be in equilibrium automati­
cally and exchange would be possible. This internal individual 
value was natural and universal; therefore equilibrium value 
was also natural. Aristotle regarded money as an artificial 
creation which facilitated exchange and permitted latitude of 
time and place in transactions. He believed that the natural 
equilibrium between the usefulness of goods was the same for 
all men, though he did foresee the possibility of fraudulent in­
dividuals deviating from natural values in trying to accumulate 
money with no relation to naturally-determined utility. This 
accumulation was fraudulent since, by definition, it violated 
moral and legal sanctions. Since exchange in Aristotle’s 
system was based upon the equality of the goods to the trader 
himself, there was absolutely no room for profit. Thus, when 
a shoemaker wished to trade shoes and the housebuilder wanted 
shoes, the natural demand was the same in both their natures; 
therefore the just price would be the same for both of them.
Any deviation from this equilibrium price Aristotle regarded 
as a deviation from justice and virtue, which could be cor­
rected only by an impartial party, a judge, who could "feel” 
the natural price without being influenced by personal
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greed*
Max Lerner's characterization of Aristotle might well have 
been written about Greek thought in general:
But while he ransacked all the storehouses of 
knowledge open to him at the time, the Faustian im­
pulse was not yet in him. That was to come with the 
age of conquest. Knowledge was for him a way of ac­
commodating ourselves to the world rather than a way 
of conquering it, as it was with the scientists of 
the seventeenth century. It was a form of adjustment, 
not a form of action.81
So powerfully driven were the Greeks by their naturalism that 
they could not shake off the idea that man's course is pre­
determined and that he must of necessity conform with the mold 
set for him by nature. It may be that even yet we have not al­
together shaken off the naturalism which pursued the Greek phil­
osophers.
SOThe Ethics of Aristotle, op. cit•, pp. 107-137» See es­
pecially pp. 118-120, where demand price and the concomitance be­
tween equilibrium and exchange are elaborated. Using the mean or 
the proportion as the basis of equilibrium, Aristotle derived 
price in money terms from the equilibrium where seller A 1 
Seller B : : A's goods C : B's goods D* Thus, A times D equals 
B times C. A judge does not find equilibrium price by equilibrat­
ing the demands of the offerers; he finds just price by deduction 
from the equilibrium. However, since immoral deviations are just 
as likely to go one way as another, just price is average price 
or mean price between those asked by the parties in the trans­
action, generally speaking.
8lLerner, Max, in his introduction to Aristotle's Politics,
op. cit., p. 16.
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PART III
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THOUGHT ON WEALTH, NATURE, AND MAH
At this point we shall glance only briefly at the great 
medieval meander into introspective moralization before again 
taking up the thread of economic thought related to natural re­
sources with the blossoming of mercantilist thought.
The medieval period was primarily characterized by mystic 
and moral exposition until Saint Thomas Acquinas, perceiving 
that the lure of heresy had led too many souls astray* retraced 
the path and again took up the method of systematic thought in 
his search for intellectually satisfying proofs of religion*
The doctrine of the church now required the best of the systematic 
thought of the past to sustain it* and Aristotle the Philosopher 
became almost as authorative as the New Testament, After a 
period of relative-neglect, his works were again studied and com­
mented upon by all the great scholars. Acquinas* however, was 
interested in economics purely from the moral standpoint* and 
his works bear the marks of the period when narrow moralism and 
faith served as the basis for reflective thought. Becker char­
acterized the, era of Saint Thomas Acquinas as follows:
Theology related and expounded the history of the 
world. Philosophy was the science that rationalized 
and reconciled nature and history. Logic provided 
both theology and philosophy with an adequate methodo­
logy* ".As a result, we have, among innumerable other 
works, the Summa theologica, surely one of the most 
i amazing and stupendous products of the human mind. It
is safe to say that never before or since has the wide
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world been so neatly boxed and compassed, so com­
pletely and confidently understood, every known 
detail of it fitted, with such subtle and loving 
precision, into a consistent and convincing whole
One of the advances of the period, perhaps born of the or­
ganizational vastness of the Roman Empire and the Roman Church, 
was a tendency to look at the economics of the world on a 
greatly enlarged scale. The development of trade and the widen­
ing of contact between peoples may have been a contributing 
factor. For example, in about 1360 a Frenchschoolman* Nicole 
Oresme, wrote a discussion on the origin of exchange. He was 
a translator and commentator of Aristotle, and was familiar in 
detail with Aristotle's work; however, his pattern of emphasis 
was different. He did not take up the idea of individual dif­
ferences in human skill advanced by Plato; instead, he elaborated 
on Aristotle's statement that different individuals have a little 
more of one thing than another. He enlarged this idea to a 
naturalistic concept that geographical diversity causes dif­
ferences of produce, such as between shepherds and wheat farmers, 
concluding that natural diversity over space creates the natural
specialization which results in trade. He referred, not to city
2trade, but regional trade. Exchange was still considered 
natural, but instead of being tied to individual variations of 
'management and skill resulting in a little more or less of dif-
^"Becker, Carl L., The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Cen­
tury Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932")"* pp. 
10-11.
^Monroe, Arthur E., Early Economic Thought (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950) p." 81.
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ferent goods in different hands, it was related to different 
natural regions and to different types of economic activity in 
these regions. The natural basis was still there, but Oresme's 
theories required less exact process to be tied to nature by 
logic and reason and encompassed a more generalized outlook 
than did Aristotle's*
The Birth of Mercantilist Thought
Two main shifts in emphasis characterize mercantilist 
writers. The first was the recognition of a new economic unit, 
the nation. The unit of concern was no longer the individual in 
pursuit of virtue and wealth; the economic health and wealth 
of the nation became the concern of economic writers for the 
first time. The second shift was a consciousness of an unlimited 
source of wealth, over and above the natural sources, through 
the expansion of trade.
Writing in 1613, while serving a prison term for a coinage 
violation, an Italian intellectual, Antonio Serra, produced a 
tract on the process of increasing wealth* Although he fastened 
on gold and silver as the ingredients of wealth, he was quite 
aware of the function of goods. Serra eliminated from consid­
eration special causes of wealth such as an influx of money re­
sulting from natural fertility as a basis of export. He was 
searching for the social process which leads to wealth, not 
natural wealth. He defined this social process as:
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The common factors are divided into four chief 
classes: quantity of industry, quality of the popu­
lation, extensive trading operations, and regulations 
of the sovereign. They will be called common factors, 
because they may occur in any kingdom; and the com­
bination of them in any place, though it raise nothing 
in excess of its own needs, but must procure' every­
thing from abroad, and though it had no mines of gold 
or silver, will surely make it abound in these m e t a l s.3
Serra*s direction was outward, toward an unlimited source of
wealth by the expansion of certain activities involving trade,
completely above and beyond nature.
The same emphasis is to be found in the writings of Thomas
Mun, writing in England in 163O:
The revenue or stock of a Kingdom by which it is 
provided of foreign wares is either Natural or Arti­
ficial. The Natural wealth is so much only as can 
be spared from our own use and necessities to be ex­
ported unto strangers. The Artificial consists in 
our manufactures and industrious trading with foreign 
commodities, concerning which I will set down such 
particulars as may serve for the cause we have in 
hand.^-
Natural Law in the Eighteenth Century
We tend to lose sight of the persisting influence of natur­
alism in the brilliant surge of scientific thought during the 
eighteenth century. The French philosophers and encyclopedists, 
erudite and insatiably curious about everything, gave an im­
pression of absolute devotion to science. They were iconoclasts,
^Ibid., pp. 14-6-1̂ 7 
^Ibid., p. 172.
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pulling down the house of Saint Thomas Acquinas; yet they re­
tained an abiding faith in a completely knowable world subject 
to natural laws, albeit allowing for a great deal more room for 
debasement and corruption (and, incidentally, for more improve­
ment) than the saintly Thomas.
One of the most influential books of this period was Mon­
tesquieu's Esprit des Lois, published in 17^8 at Geneva. It 
was particularly popular in England. The idea of a natural 
system of law underlying principles of science, justice, govern­
ment and economics was commonly accepted in this period, and 
Montesquieu's book was the theoretical exposition of this faith* 
Jefferson's and Paine's natural rights of man, European natural 
law, and British natural price are all eighteenth-century trans­
lations of Greek naturalism into an expansive nationalistic com­
mercial environment. Montesquieu's classical education is re­
flected throughout his work in such ideas as the balance of
power, and in his constant references to Aristotle and various 
5Latin classics.
Montesquieu discoursed on the application of natural law 
to everything from climate and soil to slavery and justice.
His habit of tracing everything back to a coherent whole pattern 
evidences his background in classical naturalism and in Scholastic
5See Lawrence Meyer Levin, The Political Doctrine of Mon­
tesquieu's Esprit des Lois; Its Classical Background. Publica­
tions of the Institute of French Studies, Inc. (New York:
Columbia University, 1936).
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absolutism. However, the national, outlook of the mercantilists 
and the widening perspective which had been developing during 
the preceding centuries are also apparent:
Mankind by their industry, and by the influence 
of good laws, have rendered the earth more proper for 
their abode. We .see rivers flow where there have been 
lakes and marshes: this is a benefit which nature has
not bestowed; but it is a benefit maintained and sup­
plied by nature.®
In his discussions of the relation of nature to civiliza­
tion, Montesquieu cited Holland, Egypt and certain provinces in
7China as being areas essentially made habitable by man. He 
paraphrased Thucydides' illustration of Attica as owing her 
-liberal government to an infertile soil, and his idea that fer­
tility encourages invasion and a desire for absolute government:
Countries are not cultivated in proportion to 
their fertility, but to their liberty; and if we 
make an imaginary division of the earth, we shall be 
astonished to see in most ages deserts in the most 
fruitful parts, and great nations in those where 
nature seems to refuse everything.°
One can easily see that Montesquieu did not allow his in­
quiry into social and natural relationships to jar his faith in 
the natural order. It did not interfere with scientific thought 
and careful scrutiny of facts as it had with Saint Thomas.
This was because Montesquieu's faith in the natural order was
Montesquieu, Baron de, Charles de Secondat, The Spirit of 
laws. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 38 (London: Ency­




simply the faith that everything would make sense in a clear, 
coherent picture if the subject were pursued just a little 
further. As long as he never quite arrived at the full natural 
harmony he sought, this faith provided the inspiration of the 
Scholastic without the fetters of a world presumed finite, 
changeless, and completely understood.
In contrasting the thirteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Becker illustrated the middle position of the eighteenth:
With the best will in the world it is quite im­
possible for us to conceive of existence as a divinely 
ordered drama, the beginning and end of which is known, 
the significance of which has once and for all been re­
vealed* For good or ill we must regard the world as a 
continuous flux, a ceaseless and infinitely complicated 
process of waste and repair, so that 'all things and 
principles of things' are to be regarded as no more 
than 'inconstant modes or fashions,1 as the 'concur­
rence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting 
sooner or later on their way.' The beginning of this 
continuous process of change is shrouded in impenetrable 
mist; the end seems more certain, but even less en­
gaging. 9
Becker assumed less natural order in modern physical sciences 
than Montesquieu did in society in the eighteenth century:
But the intelligent world is far from being so well 
governed as the physical. For though the former has 
also its laws, which of their own nature are invariable, 
does not conform to them so exactly as the physical 
world. This is because, on the one hand, particular 
intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and conse­
quently liable to error; and on the other, their 
nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they 
do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and 
even those of their own instituting they frequently 
infringe. 3-0
9Becker, 0£. cit., p. 12. 
■^Montesquieu, ojo. eft., p. 1.
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Montesquieu regarded commerce in general as one of these 
loosely confining lavrs of nature which is productive of many 
advantages. Customs and knowledge from different countries 
are carried by commerce, and the movable surplus of one country 
is traded for that of another so that the mutual advantage of 
both avoids the necessity of advantage or profit from the trans­
action, and peace is encouraged. He pointed out Holland's ad­
vantage of having domestic forests and quarries because ships 
could bring back timber and marble as ballast at cost.’*’̂'
Consistent with his view of this national benefit from 
commerce, Montesquieu advocated the need for a balance and 
freedom of trade, so that natural principles could govern the 
process without advantage accruing to special groups or classes. 
He espoused a laissez-faire policy of free trade: that business
interests should not interfere with the free flow of commerce. 
Montesquieu regarded commerce as a natural resource, and be­
lieved that constraints and restrictions upon it by special 
interests should be stopped by the government* The merchants, 
the guilds, and frequently the nobility as well as the crown, 
were the violators which needed regulation for national benefit 
to accrue from the natural process of commerce:
The freedom of commerce is not a power granted to 
the merchants to do what they please: this would be
more properly its slavery. The constraint of the mer­
chant is not the constraint of commerce. It is in the
11Ibid., pp. 146, 148
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freest countries that the merchant finds innumerable 
obstacles: and he is never less crossed by laws than
in a country of slaves.1^
Montesquieu's view of the orderliness of the laws of all 
things and his faith in their being knowable is behind the 
scientific courage of the eighteenth century. People were con­
fident that they could find out how things fitted together, and 
not the least of the incentives was the anticipation of gaining 
individual glory as the definitive authority in some field of 
science. With the assurance that there was only a narrow gap 
between natural law and the variables of physical and social 
processes, men sought the overall view of the stable relation­
ships or equilibriums which made life conform to natural purpose.
The Foundation of Natural Value
Although the seventeenth century was buoyed by a spirit of 
expansionism and of new and vast perspectives in society and the 
physical sciences, the Greek influence was still strong. Con­
sistent and thoroughgoing explanations had to be developed which 
defined the relationship of all things to all others. One could 
start with the basic dictum everyone took for granted, Aristotle's 
first principles, or one could start with the discovery of a 
great natural unit or equilibrium and deduce from it back to the 
details, making due allowance for small areas of free agency and 
human frailty in following nature's laws.
12Ibid., p. 14-9.
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The tremendous expansion of trade had stimulated men to 
look beyond the problems of virtue and morals. They looked 
abroad for riches and necessities, and began to think in terms 
of large provincial agricultural areas as potential units of 
commerce. From the fourteenth century when Oresme looked to 
esqsansive geographic differences for the cause of exchange and 
commerce and Etien Marcel was leading the merchants of Paris 
to dictate policy to the throne, France developed as a national 
unit with increasing consciousness of the importance of commerce. 
This broad outlook was still rooted in the certainty of a totally 
knowable world, and the assurance that logic and observation 
could provide an intelligible explanation of all things was still 
bolstered by natural and moral truisms.
Thomas Hobbes’ writings furnish an example of this trend.
He tried to apply the principles of Gallileo’s physics directly 
to social law and political theory of the state* Hobbes* idea 
was that natural law, when applied to all things, made the organic 
relationship or material things real, not only at the foundation 
of relationships, but as the essential character of the new and 
most important social unit, the national state.
In the latter eighteenth century, the Physiocrats or "Econo- 
mists” as they were called in France, approached national economic 
problems from two directions* First, they tried to build up a 
body of underlying material relationships which were thought to 
comprise the essentials of commerce and wealth* Secondly, led 
by Quesnay, they took the overall economic process and analyzed
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it as an equilibrium of circulating values* These two approaches 
are essentially the modern micro- and macro-economic approaches* 
The Physiocrats' application of these approaches to explain the 
economic processes as they saw them was the first elaboration of 
a body of theory designed to give a comprehensive explanation 
of national economic processes. The theory retained the idea of 
natural value derived from the physical properties of nature as 
the sole and total source of economic wealth and values. It 
contained a concept of natural resources and assigned the basis 
of wealth and value to these resources. It was not a theory of 
development; too many unassimilated developments had taken 
place while the rigid Scholastic framevfork of philosophy ignored 
the challenge. Eighteenth century economic theory was an at­
tempt to explain what was happening, and why it was happening.
It retained an overtone of Greek philosophy; i.e., that nature 
must be understood so that man could better adapt himself to it 
insofar as possible.
As men in the eighteenth century tried to look at their 
problems in terms of generalizations which fit the scale of 
life of their day, they struggled to build up a new framework 
of relationships. One of the simplest ways to start the con­
struction of a theory of the general commercial process was to 
build upward from the fundamental organic relationship. The 
old Greek ideas of organic nature, the natural equilibrium, 
the circulation and the circulatory systems in equilibrium were 
still a basic part of the classical education of the times.
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In what Monroe described as "the most important work on
13economics before the Wealth, of N a t i o n s Hichard Cantillon 
attempted a systematic survey of the nature of commerce in his 
Essai sur le Commerce , building from the first principles of 
nature. For Cantillon, the productivity of the land was the 
source of wealth. The value of human labor, he thought, could 
be defined by establishing the basic equation of man to natural 
production. Cantillon postulated that it took about twice the 
natural produce of the land required for a man’s subsistence to 
support a family and perpetuate the population. On this as­
sumption, human labor could be measured in terms of the produce 
of the land required to sustain and perpetuate the human in. his 
effort. Further, if human labor could thus be valued, then all 
products could be valued in natural terms by computing the labor 
and land equivalents which go into them. Cantillon noted that 
supply and demand involved slight variations in price, but this 
he assumed was secondary to value, and not the issue. However, 
Cantillon qualified his ironclad material and natural definition 
of value derived from the productivity of nature by interjecting 
considerations of standards of living:
In order to understand this better, it is necessary 
to know that a poor Peasant can support himself, at the 
lowest calculation, on the produce of an Acre & a half 
of land, living on bread & vegetables, wearing clothes 
of Hemp, & wooden shoes . . .
This is why I did not specify how much Land corres­
ponds in value to.the work of the humblest Peasant or 
Laborer, when I said that it was worth twice the produce 
of the Land which serves to support him; for that varies
"^Monroe, op. cit., p. 2^6.
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according to the standard of living in the different 
Countries. In some southern Provinces of France, the 
Peasant lives on the produce of an acre & a half of 
Land, & there his labor may be estimated as equal to 
the produce of three acres. But in Middlesex County, 
the Peasant ordinarily spends the produce of 5 to 8 
acres of Land, & thus his work may be estimated at 
twice that.l^
Cantillon chided some of the English writers who had re­
ferred to this par between land and labor without treating it 
as a basis for analysing the relations of the economy or as a 
cause or first principle underlying exchange. He believed that 
v/ithin any given nation where the standard of living is fairly 
uniform, the equilibrium of values could be deemed constant, and 
that the produce of the land could serve as the measure of ex­
change values as expressed through the organic cost of physical 
human labor. Cantillon's essay was written between 1730 and 
1734, although it was not published until 1755* This preceded 
Francois Quesnay's Tableau Economique by three years and Turgot's 
Reflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses by 
only a little over a decade.
Turgot was a prominent French statesman of the period, and 
had reached the position of finance minister when his attempt to 
institute free trade by breaking the monopoly of the guilds on 
production led to his downfall in 1776* ^he movement for national 
control and domestic freedom from commercial privileges in the 
hands of the guild masters was the heart of the liberal free trade •
lifIbid., pp. 234-255.
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philosophy of that day. The guild masters had served the pur­
pose of governing the productive economy during the years of 
feudal instability, but with the development of the national 
state, their industrial monopolies obstructed the growth of 
commerce and limited the production of goods. The theoretical 
foundation for the free trade philosophy was that of the order 
of nature, i.e., the natural value of goods based upon their 
equation to the value of the produce of land. By deriving the 
value of labor from its necessary relationship to the produce of 
the land, Cantillon arrived at what he considered the natural value 
of goods.
Turgot developed the same view in his Reflexions, but recog­
nized another problem in the equation. According to his view, 
the natural produce of the land is the expression of nature, and 
so the land must be valued in a given ratio to the value of its 
produce. Other commodities are valued as they are equal to the 
labor or land productivity, and the value of their source is equal 
to the same ratio of the product of the land to the land itself. 
Turgot illustrated this idea as follows:
Land is always the first and sole source of all 
riches; it is land which, as a result of cultivation, 
yields all revenue; it is land also which furnished , 
the first fund of advances prior to all cultivation . .
All classes of work in agriculture, industry or 
commerce require advances. Even if the earth, were
15Ibid., p. 553
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cultivated by hand, it would be necessary to sow 
before reaping; it would be necessary to live until 
after the harvest. The more elaborate and vigorous ^  
cultivation becomes, the larger the advances are , ■
These excerpts suggest that Turgot regarded the productivity 
of the land as a first principle, or prime permissive factor.
This idea did not, however, prevent him from recognizing that 
accumulation has an important role in development, but this was 
not his major concern in his efforts to free French commerce 
from the restrictions which prevented its growth and the full 
development of the potential for specialization and utilization 
already inherent in her agricultural wealth. His reliance upon 
agriculture as the prime source of wealth is not surprising since 
France was and still is relatively rich agriculturally. See de­
scribed the importance of French agriculture as-follows;
. . .  the predominance of rural property ownership 
and of agricultural production constitutes a permanent 
characteristic of French civilization, which survived 
even in the nineteenth century, in spite of the progress 
of industry. Consequently the equilibrium was never 
destroyed, as it was in England and has been in Germany 
today, to the advantage of industrial production and to 
the prejudice of the rural sections . . . France remained 
essentially an agricultural country, and even today it _„ 
is not losing its character as an agricultural democracy.
Turgot stated that land produces a surplus above the material
input required for its cultivation, and he attributed the source
of value to this natural surplus. Thus, the source of the material
l6Ibid.. p. 352.
17See, Henri, Economic and Social Conditions in France During 
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 233.
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requirements of progress and change were still inherent in the 
natural order. Turgot believed that this natural surplus was 
the yardstick by which all other values could be measured. Thus, 
his value system was based on natural wealth, or a resource.
The raw existence of nature is valuable insofar as it produces 
a surplus over the cost of working the land. This surplus produce 
of nature is the positive contribution which adds something new 
and, as such, is a resource, or a source and measure of value. 
Labor is equal in value to the amount of natural produce required 
to support a laborer; sheep are equal in value to the given 
quantity of natural produce required to raise them. Here is the 
problem of a par between produce and other items. If an acre of 
land will produce four bushels of grain above all costs, this 
four bushels is the natural surplus which provides the material 
requirements for further production. Therefore, all produce is 
equal in value to the amount of other products which require the 
same amount of natural capital for production. This ratio is 
constant in exchange. Of course, a constant standard of living 
is assumed in order that labor may be so equated.
Additionally, the problem of the ratio between the value of 
the surplus produce of the land and the exchange value of the 
land itself had to be faced. The problem is that the price of 
land, which is a social thing, is a function of supply and demand, 
not nature. This ratio between the social right of ownership and 
the value of the natural produce of the land Turgot called "the
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penny in the price of land.” This was apparently a popular term 
of the day for the ratio between the annual surplus of the land 
and its market value. It was reasonable that the value of the 
net product of the land be determined from its natural material 
relations and that the sales price of the land be a function of 
this relationship when we consider that this phase of value was 
more obviously institutional in a period of complex legal tenures 
and varying degrees of titles in land. This circumstance con­
founded the market price of land as an index of value. Turgot 
found that land sold for the twentieth to the thirtieth penny; 
that is. for twenty to thirty times the net product or revenue 
of the land, varying somewhat with supply and demand.
Turgot’s natural productivity theory based on the material 
relationship of nature to society furnished a basis for the de­
termination of value above and beyond the complicated pattern of 
feudal and guild rights. The introduction of a measurement in 
terms of a natural surplus above subsistence was a blow to the 
bullionists and mercantilists of the day who had contended that 
the wealth of a nation was to be determined by the amount of 
precious metal in a country. Not only was nature the source of 
life, but nature was the source of the accumulation which per­
mitted expansion of the natural potentials of commerce and 
efficiency. Therefore, free trade between nations and within 
nations would promote the natural order and permit natural wealth
Monroe, op. cit., p.
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to be put to its natural uses as it was accumulated by man from 
nature.
This was the first theory to incorporate the idea of a 
beneficent nature so popularly associated with the term natural 
resources today. According to the theory, all surplus above the 
cost of subsistence is initially a gift of the bounty of nature 5 
therefore, nature is the source of increasing wealth. The net 
product or revenue from nature above the cost of cultivation or 
exploitation permits the accumulation of advances for more effi­
cient use in society if this potential making possible commerce 
and re-investment in the land is not interfered with. The roots 
of this theory of natural value go back to the Greeks, but the 
emphasis on land was a contribution of the eighteenth century*
This basic theory of the natural product has survived as a popu­
lar and academic concept of value through the legal and theoretical 
traditions of all agricultural nations. Because of the wide ac­
ceptance of the idea, the limitations of the theory have posed 
a problem in much subsequent economic theory. Two approaches 
which have been employed to handle the natural value of the pro­
duce of the earth are (1) to treat it as a free good, and (2) 
when scarcity makes it a subject of economic valuation, to assume 
that the price mechanism evaluates the social importance of the 
material quantities involved. This second method is based on 
the assumption that if society and commerce are free and governed 
by natural principles, the price mechanism will adequately discover
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the natural value, and that all the social potentials of natural 
resources will be taken account of in the equilibrium price of 
a free market.
The body of macro-economic theory developed by the eighteenth 
century natural order economists has been influential in France 
and the United States to the present day, along with classical 
British political economy. This macro-economic approach based 
on the productivity of nature system of value was framed by 
Quesnay into a formula for national policy and comprehensive 
analysis. Adam Smith added a new emphasis to this framework with 
a synthesis which gave it meaning in the setting of the industrial 
revolution, but in the process he omitted the idea of the produc­
tivity of nature. This ommission left natural resource analysis 
a stepchild of economic theory.
Quesnay and National Equilibrium Analysis
Francois Quesnay was a physician, and it may have been his 
initial work on the blood system which led him to work out an 
organic analysis of the national distributive system. In the 
tradition of his day, he found the basis of material quantity in 
the produce of the land, and this he found to circulate through 
the economy in a balanced system of exchange as long as free 
pricing was allowed to regulate natural exchange processes. As 
with Aristotle, Quesnay believed that fair exchange would not 
allow profit. Any income by the mercantile or manufacturing
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classes in excess of their costs of production he regarded as a 
drain on the product of the land, which could only be spent for 
luxury goods. He viewed capital as productive only if spent on 
the land to assist nature in yielding her bounty; nowhere else, 
in his view, was capital productive^ Leo Rogin explained this 
point as follows:
It should be noted that while the cultivators are
referred to as the productive class, it is not their
labor but the land which is conceived to be the source 
of the surplus. The surplus is a free gift of nature.
It is this doctrine of the produit net which constitutes 
the distinctive feature of Physiocratic theory, and it 
is to the demonstration of this doctrine that the Tableau is primarily dedicated.^9
Quesnay's Tableau Economique was essentially a balance sheet 
showing the equilibrium or national exchange between the various 
classes of society: farmers, landed proprietors, and industrial­
ists. Although Quesnay believed that the natural order of society
and just exchange would not permit profit or the creation of
wealth, he was aware that wealth in the form of movable property 
could be increased. This net increase he attributed to the surplus 
bounty of nature, and he thought the only productive use for it 
was re-investment in the cultivation of the land, or in the aiding 
of nature to produce. In his Observations Importantes Quesnay 
postulated a multiplier effect of re-investment in land by which 
the amount of surplus was continually augmented. Although a 
point of economic maturity is indicated when the absolute potential 
of nature is approached and additional capital can no longer fur­
ther the production of a surplus, the concentration on the usefulness
o£. cit., p. 20.
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of surplus in perpetuating itself, and the primary importance of 
surplus above the equilibrium of natural exchange is the im­
portant economic contribution of this systematic theory of the 
national economy.
The ideal of perfectability in society was implied in
20Quesnay's third Observation in his statement that a maturity 
or optimum state of the bounty of nature can be achieved by re­
investment of the net surplus in natural development, and in a
reserve for contingencies resulting from natural variations,
21The sixth Observation ad\Fanced the idea that following the 
natural course of furthering the produce of the land stimulates 
man to plan ahead in anticipation of nature, with the implication 
that this course is the sole source of virtue as well as net 
profit, Quesnay1s incorporation of the idea of a natural surplus 
in his generalized view of a national circulatory system drew to­
gether the concept of equilibrium with that of change in economic 
theory. His analysis was one of an equilibrium in process for 
the purpose of explaining how change and accumulation could still 
occur within the equilibrium. This is different from the Greek 
concept of equilibrium in which the equilibrium was regarded as 
natural, and change had to be denied except in its non-material 
form, i.e., the accumulation of virtue. Moreover, Quesnay recog­
nized the productivity of capital, or at least the existence of a
20Quesnay, Francois, Oeuvres Economiques et Philosophiques de
F. Quesnay (Paris: Jules Peelman Cie., 1888), p. 31$•
21 Ibid. , pp. 322-324-.
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choice between using accumulated capital in a sterile way, for 
luxuries, or in a productive way, for assisting nature to fulfill 
her natural potential to produce.
The existence of a variable, that is, an element which can 
be augmented or lost, is, of course, the source of man’s interest 
in substances, economically speaking. That which is a fixed part 
of a natural order of things is not a resource, even though it 
is subject to abuse by man or exists in limited quantities. From 
the point of view of man generally, if there is a fixed fund or 
flow of a given substance which is habitually used up or is not 
accumulated, it cannot confer greater or lesser benefit, and is 
no more a resource than the sun shining or the average rainfall.
Quesnay did not assert that society can change its material 
gain from nature by social or technical changes which would be 
essentially human productivity making use of a neutral nature, 
but rather that natural productivity can be taken advantage of 
by man. He developed an analysis of the economy from the most 
significant social unit of the day, the nation, and used national 
accounting hypotheses and equilibrium techniques in a modern way. 
His contribution was the recognition of the possibility of ma­
terial change in the quantity of goods in the total economy.
His equilibrium was not between fixed quantities of goods, but 
between relationships.
Quesnay emphasized that material goods, as used or as accu­
mulated, are the only true significance of exchange, and that the 
balance of international trade had to be in material goods. The
l?k
theoretical structure for his economic analysis was built upon a 
natural resource theory of wealth; in it, all facets of production 
were measured by and secondary to natural productivity which he 
assumed to have an existence of its ovm, external to human ex­
ploitation, and therefore suitable as a scientific measurement 
for social values* In his theory it is this natural wealth which 
supports man, but it is the surplus above what he uses at his 
standard of living which constitutes the resource of economic 
interest. This net product can either be misused or be put to 
natural use, and it is the resource of economic progress and de­
velopment, the foundation of a continuous process of economic 
change. This aspect of Quesnay’s theory was a break with the 
natural equilibrium of the Greeks, and was taken up by the out­
standing theorists of the next two centuries.
Adam Smith and Human Productivity
In many details of outlook, Adam Smith stands out as the 
representative of the Sophists in the eighteenth century moral 
order of nature. It was he who reasserted in his time that 
"man is the measure of all things." Looking back from the twen­
tieth century, The Wealth of Nations appears to be the beginning 
of a period rather than the climax of one. From the point of 
view of the development of resource theory, The Wealth of 
Nations was a major synthesis from which followed two lines of 
divergent thought, one emphasizing agricultural production and
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the ideological tradition of the Physiocrats, and the other em­
phasizing the potentiality of human beings to make of nature 
whatever capital and ingenuity will permit. These two lines of 
thought have since been wedded by analysis of the monetary ex­
pression of their influence on the economy, and the analysis 
of price from the industrial and commercial points of view.
In his general equilibrium or macro-economic approach,
Adam Smith revealed himself a true child of the natural order 
school of the eighteenth century. He assumed balance or equili­
brium in nature and society to be the object of development and 
change, that economic processes tend toward a balance, and that 
this balance tends to serve the best interests of society. He 
might have looked toward change itself as the logical state of 
things rather than change toward a beneficial equilibrium of 
interests, but the idea of directionless change was inconceivable 
to the natural order faith of the eighteenth century. He wrote:
The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different employments of labour and stock must, in 
the same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or con­
tinually tending to equality.22
This tendency toward an equilibrium Smith believed to be caused
by the competitive shifting of individuals from less productive
enterprises to more productive ones. Thus, material increase for
the individual and for the nation as a whole takes place within
an ordered tendency toward an equilibrium* This pursuit of self-
interest, assisted by an invisible hand, creates the equilibrium
22Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1957)Y P* 99*
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and the material benefit to the nation:
• * • and by directing that industry in such a manner 
as its produce may be of the greatest value, he in­
tends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention.^
Adam Smith's theories were deduced from the assumption of 
an inherent equilibrium in nature; otherwise he could just as 
well have postulated a constant tendency toward disequilibrium. 
This would have been consistent with his theory of individual 
first principles of the relation of man to nature. The invisi­
ble hand could just as well have been the force which leads men 
to disturb equilibriums by changing rates of productivity and 
upsetting the possibility of order and equality in the profits 
of stock. However, Smith held strongly to his faith in natural 
order and in the naturalness of an equilibrium between processes, 
as did Quesnay.
In his views on the individualized relationship between man 
ana nature, Smith revived the Sophist anthropomorphic measurement, 
and breathed Aristotle's boundless creativity of the human spirit 
into the Physiocratic concept that material wealth was subject to 
accumulation. However, the deciding factor in the relationship 
of man to nature is what man can obtain. In Smith's view, man 
must get what he can as a result of his own effort and ability; 
thus, value is a product of human ability. Therefore, surplus 
is determined in its critical degree by human effort, and re-
23Ibid., p. 4-23.
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sources are a product of the value man bestows upon them by his 
effoi't in making them available.
On specialization and the division of laborT Adam Smith 
felt that the tendency to barter and trade is the cause of ex­
change, that it stimulates specialization and improved skill 
which, in turn, increases the practical value of barter and 
trade. Thus, exchange and specialization are mutually stimu­
lating developments spurred on by the properties of the human 
being, and augmented and made profitable through the ability 
of accumulated knowledge and skill to result in greater pro­
ductivity and greater adaptation of nature to man's needs. One 
can see Xenophon's idea that skill results from specialization 
and Aristotle's infinite potential for personal self-iritprovement 
joined with the recognition of the potential for commerce. Thus, 
Adam Smith's main thesis was that man, as a result of his individual 
potential, creates his own wealth. This is essentially the same 
theoretical explanation of unlimited change which the Greeks could 
not apply to the material world. Adam Smith could not quite apply 
it to society:
The annual produce of the land and labour of any 
nation can be increased in its value by no other means, 
but by increasing either the number of its productive 
labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers 
who had before been employed . . .  The productive powers 
of the same number of labourers cannot be increased, 
but in consequence either of some addition and improve­
ment to those machines and instruments which facilitate 
and abridge labour; or of a more proper division anddistribution of e m p l o y m e n t . 2 4
24 -Ibid.. p. 326
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In a purely human theory of the creation of surplus, human 
labor, organization, and skill become the natural resources 
which man can exploit. The world of nature in which he lives is 
subject to a natural equilibrium, and thus cannot be a source of 
increment. If natural materials are scarce, value is attributed 
to them by man, and the socially-conferred rights of ownership 
of these materials give value to the rights, not to the natural 
materials of themselves. Otherwise, the goods of nature are 
equilibrated, evenly divided or distributed equally among the 
population by the process of free exchange, and every person has 
access to his material needs as a result of his personal contri­
bution to the social value, not as:,a result of any positive action
of nature. One might say that Smith completely dissolved the 
field of natural resources into the study of the social processes 
connected with the creation and distribution of wealth:
^he most abundant mines either of the precious 
metals or of the precious stones could add little to 
the wealth of the world. A produce of which the value 
is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily 
degraded by its abundance . . .
The value of the most barren lands is not diminished 
by the neighborhood of the most fertile. On the contrary, 
it is generally increased by it. The great number of 
people maintained by the fertile lands affords a market 
to many parts of the produce of the barren, which they 
could never have found among those who their own produce could maintain.^5
Adam Smith's analysis introduced a complete shift from the Greek
25Ibid., pp. 173-174.
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thought in which nature was the creative force and men adjust 
as best they can to a natural equilibrium; his idea was that 
there is a neutral balance of nature and that human beings by 
their efforts create their own wealth.
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CONCLUSION
This brief examination of the ways in which men at dif­
ferent times have viewed themsel\res and their surroundings 
and the ways in which they have tri6d to explain man's rela­
tionship to the physical world has shown that much of man's 
thought on these things during the period surveyed has been 
colored by his preoccupation with forms of equilibrium. Further, 
the tracing of equilibrium theory from its simplest roots has 
revealed its limitations as a method for formulating a theory of 
resources. The most fatal of these limitations is that the method 
can properly be applied only to static relationships and hence 
will lead to conclusions inconsistent with reality if applied to 
an area, the fundamental characteristic of which is change.
The stability which is inherent in any concept of equilibrium 
implies that resources are a part of a state of affairs. Dis­
tinctions between society and nature are irrelevant under this 
assumption of stability; therefore, any theory of natural or 
physical resources is also irrelevant. The refinements of 
cycles and sub-balances within equilibrium theory to incorporate 
larger units of time, scale, and institutional practice developed 
in nineteenth-century economic thought did not overcome this 
limitation, and the method's application to resource analysis is 
the same. The first step toward a theory of resources, then, 
would seem to be the abandonment of the equilibrium approach.
It may then be possible to discover new horizons in a world 
where unlimited change is recognized rather than one in which
l8l
change is directed toward a necessary equilibrium*
The basic relationship between nature and man was origi­
nally conceived by the earliest Greeks as an organic or quanti­
tative relation between natural materials in process, with man 
included as just another element. With the introduction of 
interest in the abstract nature of the problem, the existence 
of a natural equilibrium was assumed, but some form of creativity 
was recognized. Three basic forms of creativity were developed 
in early economic thought.
The first of these was indicated by Xenophon in showing that 
the detailized organization of a given unit or dimension of ac­
tivity could result in an increase in productivity above the pre­
viously existing balance. The further implementation of this 
idea reached fruition in theoretical developments after Thomas 
Acquinas. It was seen that expansion of the spatial unit, or 
extensive as opposed to intensive, organization of space yielded 
an unlimited source of productivity as national trade and colonial 
interests grew.
The second of the creative processes was an elaboration of 
the organic and material relationships viewed from the standpoint 
of man. The natural balance between man and nature had no in­
tensive direction for the Greeks, except in terms of household 
management and efficiency. This was an idea closely entwined 
with the spatial intensification of Xenophon. However, writers 
in the eighteenth century developed the extensive property of 
nature. The Physiocrats' theory that nature produces an organic,
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measurable surplus above its natural balance with mankind sug­
gested an organic or material boundlessness or possiblity of 
expansion and accumulation from the bounty of nature. This 
theory is rather nebulous, and was tempered by Quesnay*s as­
surance that a potential equilibrium or maturity to the expan­
sion of natural surplus can be reached, but it is, nevertheless, 
an example of a concept of creative expansion beyond a defined 
framework of equilibrium, and an approach to change as a natural 
process.
The third concept of creativity developed during this per­
iod was that initiated by Aristotle and limited to the intensifi­
cation of the human mind. Adam Smith turned this infinite course 
of change and creativity outward into extensive material change 
in terms of productive relationships and technology. This theory 
stressed the material and productive potential of individuals, 
and postulated material surplus or accumulation as the permissive 
factor for human creativity. However, this productive potential 
of human beings was confined within a national equilibrium which 
presupposed certain limits and intensive features of human possi­
bility. Smith’s theory dwarfed the relevance of abstract space„ 
and material quantity as measures of value.
^hese three formulations have common elements in an equili­
brium of natural relations and possibility for change through in­
tensification and extensification, which are both creative pro­
cesses. The process of intensification is subject to deductive 
formulation from a presumption of equilibrium at some given level
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or unit, but extensive possibility requires projection into, the 
undeterminable* This produces a disquieting sense of unscientific 
inexactness that has disturbed the longing for a potential balance 
or order of nature which is still with us from the eighteenth cen­
tury;
The assumption of a stable equilibrium and logical detailiza- 
tion from this equilibrium makes the distinction between sources 
of value irrelevant. According to equilibrium theory, value is 
a state of affairs, whether a product of spatial organization, 
organic relations and material quantity, or human knowledge and 
ability. The theory assumes that the constant flow of relation­
ships can be measured at any given point and the same results ob­
tained. The most convenient point has been the money price of all 
things. Thus, value and all theory can be related to price, with 
no further inquiry into distinctions between sources of value or 
non-existent external change.
The concern with change introduces an interest in the source 
of change, however, and the change in human appraisals and the 
possible changes in natural fact give new axes to value which 
must involve an explanation of how price follows, not how it 
measures value, and introduces the need for a theory of how re­
sources change in their natural or physical content, their spatial, 
and their human or technological significance.
The nineteenth century introduced the fourth element of 
time. Time was not considered a natural fact or constant for
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purposes of abstraction by Aristotle. Plotinus in the following 
century was the first of the early philosophers to insist that the 
passage of time was an absolute physical process introducing corn- 
pletely new time at all sequential moments. This, in itself, 
is a mortal blow at the foundation of the equilibrium hypothesis* 
However, creativity and production were analyzed through the 
time of Adam Smith in terms of the most pressing limiting factors, 
and planning of time, in its intensive and extensive facets, 
awaited an era of greater capital accumulation to achieve signi­
ficance in the order of importance of economic theory of potentials.
It would seem that any theory of resources and their analysis 
must be tied to changes from equilibrium or "net product" as 
the Physiocrats conceived it. No special significance attaches 
to any given element of the economy as long as it is in static 
relationship to the rest of the elements of the economy. Two as­
pects of analysis of change which have been developed up to the 
present are: (1) natural or organic change and development or
evolution; and (2) the purely human or mental development of tech­
nological and scientific grasp. These two elements operate within 
the intensive and extensive exploitation of the spatial and tem­
poral constants, and make up a set of factors for development 
theory and resource analysis. The order of importance of these 
factors in any given situation, and the concomitant relationship 
or pattern of consistence between various degrees of one and the 
other make up a body of theory which should be explored initially
185
in a systematic survey of the literature of the nineteenth cen­
tury for ideas and formulations dealing with the problem of de­
velopment and natural relations between change and patterns of 
physical and social circumstances.
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